This case is another of a recent number of cases involving the interpretation of the new juvenile transfer statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318 (Supp. 1991). Appellant had five juvenile cases pending against him in chancery court when the prosecutor moved to transfer two of these cases to circuit court. One case contained a felony theft-by-receiving count and the other case involved two felony counts of breaking or entering into two vehicles. A capital felony murder charge had also been filed against the appellant prior to the transfer hearing in this case, but the trial court specifically stated it did not consider that murder charge when it ruled on the state’s motion to transfer. After a hearing on the state’s motion, the trial court transferred the cases to circuit court. In this appeal, appellant claims the trial court erred (1) in failing to allow him ten days notice before the hearing, (2) in finding sufficient evidence existed to support the transfer and (3) in rejecting his argument that § 9-27-318 is unconstitutionally vague.
In his first argument, appellant cites Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-325(f) (1987) which in relevant part provides that the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to all juvenile court proceedings and the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply to delinquency proceedings. Accordingly, he submits that, under ARCP Rule 6(c), the prosecutor’s transfer motion in this case was required to have been served on appellant no later than ten days before the time specified for the hearing. Appellant argues that because he was given only four days notice of the hearing scheduled for the prosecutor’s motion, the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing appellant additional time to prepare and respond to the state’s case.
By its own language, Rule 6(c) is not inflexible, and in fact, provides that for cause shown, the court may provide for a time other than the ten-day period set out in the Rule. In any event, our Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provide that court proceedings should not be disturbed because of a technical error which resulted in no prejudice. Robinson v. Abbott, 292 Ark. 630, 731 S.W.2d 782 (1987); see also ARCP Rule 61. Stated another way, the court has held that error is no longer presumed to be prejudicial, and it will not reverse for error unless prejudice is demonstrated. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 290 Ark. 589, 721 S.W.2d 659 (1986); cf., Purser v. Corpus Christi St. Nat’l Bk., 258 Ark. 54, 522 S.W.2d 187 (1975) (where Purser was not given the ten-day period to respond to the bank’s motion for summary judgment, this court upheld the trial court’s premature entry of the judgment because it was manifest that the error was not prejudicial); see also Keenan v. American River Transportation Co., 304 Ark. 42, 799 S.W.2d 801 (1990). And finally, Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984); citing McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), is our seminal case on this point where this court held no longer is it presumed that simply because an error is committed it is prejudicial error. See also Gage v. State, 295 Ark. 337, 748 S.W.2d 351 (1988); Wheat v. State, 295 Ark. 178, 747 S.W.2d 112 (1988).
In the present case, appellant fails to show that he suffered prejudice. At the hearing, he never suggested that the abbreviated or four-day notice given him prevented him from presenting any witnesses. Nor did he proffer any testimony or evidence that he could, or intended to, present if he had been given additional time.
Although appellant argues the prosecutor was also hampered by the trial court’s ruling to proceed with the hearing on the prosecutor’s motion, the record fails to bear out appellant’s argument. While the prosecutor offered no testimony, he entered into a number of stipulations with the appellant, and based on those stipulations, we believe the prosecutor clearly showed by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer of appellant’s cases was warranted. Bradley v. State, 306 Ark. 621, 816 S. W.2d 605 (1991).
Under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(e) (Supp. 1991), the trial judge must consider the following factors before deciding whether to transfer a juvenile’s case:
(1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission of the offense;
(2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such efforts; and
(3) The prior history, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the juvenile’s prospects for rehabilitation.
As we have stated repeatedly, the trial court need not give equal weight to each of the foregoing factors and proof need not be introduced by the prosecutor against the juvenile on each factor. Pennington v. State, 305 Ark. 312, 807 S.W.2d 660 (1991); Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991); reh. denied, 304 Ark. 402A, 805 S.W.2d 80 (1991); Ashing v. State, 288 Ark. 75, 702 S.W.2d 20 (1986). The standard of review in juvenile transfer cases is whether the trial judge’s finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, and findings of fact by the trial court will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Bradley v. State, 306 Ark. 621, 816 S.W.2d 605.
At the hearing, appellant and the prosecutor stipulated to seven state motions that outlined previous charges and convictions against appellant. The charges ranged from loitering to theft and robbery offenses. The parties agreed that appellant was first convicted of theft and placed on probation in 1987. That probation was later revoked because of another theft of property charge. The parties further stipulated that appellant had been on home attention and had been committed to the Office of Youth Services on three or four occasions — which included robbery charges filed in January of 1989. The state also underscored the other offenses pending before the trial judge. Those cases involved alcohol, cocaine and carrying a weapon.
The foregoing stipulations and offenses unquestionably support the trial court’s finding that appellant exhibited a repetitive pattern to commit felony offenses and reflected he possessed character traits, a prior history and a mental maturity indicating he is beyond rehabilitation. In addition, the stipulated evidence reflects that the offenses committed by the appellant have become increasingly more serious. In view of the above, we are unable to say the trial court was clearly erroneous in transferring appellant’s cases to circuit court.
Before leaving appellant’s foregoing arguments, we address his objection made below, and argued on appeal, that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in an earlier case against appellant. Those findings included a 1988 psychological report reflecting the appellant “had a poor response to probation and home attention and that placement in a more restrictive environment may be indicated.” Appellant correctly points out that the report did not necessarily reflect his current psychological disposition and the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of it.1
We agree with appellant that judicial notice may not be taken of the record in a separate case. Leach v. State, 303 Ark. 309, 796 S.W.2d 837 (1990); see also Southern Farmers Assn., Inc. v. Wyatt, 234 Ark. 649, 353 S.W.2d 531 (1962). However, while we agree that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the psychological report in issue, we conclude the error was harmless. Aside from the report’s improper admission into evidence, we have thoroughly discussed hereinabove the stipulations and evidence that we hold support the trial court’s transfer of appellant’s cases to circuit court. We will not reverse for error unless prejudice is demonstrated. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 290 Ark. 589, 721 S.W.2d 659 (1986).
In his final argument, appellant argues that provisions (b) (2) and (d) of § 9-27-318 are conflicting, and as a consequence are unconstitutional for vagueness. Basically, appellant contends that neither the chancery court nor the circuit court under these two provisions appears to have the final say as to which one should exercise jurisdiction. Appellant postulates that the initial court, be it chancery or circuit, could transfer the juvenile case to the second court’s jurisdiction only to have the second court return the proceeding to the initial court for trial.
Although appellant told the trial court he believed § 9-27-318 was unconstitutionally vague, he never mentioned the argument he raises now. For that reason, it is questionable as to whether this issue was preserved for appeal. In any event, appellant concedes the hypothetical situation he poses here did not occur below and for that reason alone, he lacks standing to raise the constitutionality of (b)(2) and (d) of § 9-27-318. See Burrow v. State, 282 Ark. 479, 669 S.W.2d 441 (1984).
For the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s decision to transfer appellant’s case to circuit court.
Holt, C.J., Newbern and Brown, JJ., dissent.The report is not abstracted, and our only knowledge of what it contains is from our review of the trial court’s comments at the hearing and the parties’ arguments in their briefs.