concurring in part and concurring in result.
Although I have no quarrel with the majority’s analysis of the submissibility of Nettie’s case against SIS, I would not reach the issue because I find no error in the admission of Roger Kelley’s statement to Jack Cook that I.M.S. “should have caught it [the backup problem].” As the majority correctly holds, the statement was not admissible as an admission of a party opponent because I.M.S. was not a party when the statement was offered. When viewed in the context in which the statement was made, however, it was a declaration against interest.
The majority analogizes Kelley’s statement to the declarant’s statement in Carpenter v. Davis, 435 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Mo. banc 1968). There, in response to the witness’s statement “I’m sorry, lady, you pulled right out in front of me,” the declarant, who died prior to trial, stated ‘Tes, I know, it’s not your fault.” The Missouri Supreme Court held that the statement ‘Tes, I know” would be admissible as a declaration against interest on remand but the portion of the statement “it’s not your fault” would be excluded as an expression of opinion. 435 S.W.2d at 384. The bases for excluding the opinion were that the witness at trial might intentionally or inadvertently change a word and convey a different meaning and that the opinion may be ambiguous. Id. Also, as one of the dissenting judges pointed out, the decedent might have been too harsh on herself or not in possession of pertinent facts, although this was not viewed by the dissent as a basis for excluding the statement. 435 S.W.2d at 386 (Seiler, J. dissenting). In addition, it is worth noting that the excluded portion of the statement was the decedent’s opinion of someone else’s fault, not her opinion of her own.
In this case, the disputed statement was made by the president of I.M.S. who (1) authored the software program, (2) was presumably familiar with the division of responsibilities between I.M.S. and SIS, and (3) was confronted by a customer about a problem which had clearly caused major damages. Under such circumstances, the statement “we should have caught it” is a statement of fact personally cognizable by the declarant, *235at least insofar as it relates to the division of responsibility between SIS and I.M.S., the key issue in the case. Thus, the proper analogy is not to the portion of the statement in Carpenter that “it’s not your fault;” the proper analogy is to the statement Carpenter held admissible — i.e., “Yes, I know [that I pulled right out in front of you].” It was against I.M.S.’s pecuniary interest to acknowledge that the problem was within its area of responsibility, and the statement was made under circumstances which rendered it improbable that a motive to falsity existed. Kelley resided and worked in another state and was therefore unavailable.1 Thus, the four part test of United Services of America v. Empire Bank, 726 S.W.2d 439, 444 (Mo.App.1987), set forth in the majority opinion was satisfied and the statement was admissible as a declaration against interest. It is therefore unnecessary to address the issue of submissibility.
. Conceding the lack of any authority therefor, Appellant argues that the fact that Kelley’s deposition had been taken and was on file means that he was not "unavailable.” The absence of authority for this contention is readily explained by its circularity. Aside from impeachment, a deposition of a non-party is generally admissible only if the witness is unavailable. Rule 57.07(a)(3). Thus, the availability of a deposition cannot render an absent witness “available.”