dissenting.
Article V, § 27.3 of the Constitution of Missouri reads as follows:
“Upon recommendation by an affirmative vote of at least four members of the commission, the supreme court en banc, upon concurring with such recommendation, shall remove, suspend, or discipline any judge or magistrate of any court or any member of any judicial commission or of this commission, for the commission of a crime, or for misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency or any offense involving moral turpitude, or oppression in office. No action taken under this section shall be a bar to or prevent any other action authorized by law.”
*859In my view, this constitutional language demonstrates the intention that the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline be a full partner with this Court in the operation of our judicial disciplinary system. This constitutional delegation of powers by Missouri to the Commission and the Court is unique. It compels a different treatment by this Court of the recommendations of the Commission than is recognized in the judicial disciplinary systems of our sister states of California and Alaska, where there is de novo review by the Court of Commission findings and recommendations. See Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1 (1973) and In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1975).
The ultimate decision-making process under Art. V, § 27 consists of at least three functions (See Geiler, supra, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 204, 515 P.2d 1, 4):
(1) The fact-finding function: a determination whether the conduct alleged in the charges to have occurred did in fact occur. In the exercise of this function, the Court should adopt the findings of fact of the Commission unless there is no substantial evidence upon the whole record to support them.
(2) The question of law function: a determination whether certain conduct, found as a fact to have occurred, constitutes “a crime, * * * misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency or * * * [an] offense involving moral turpitude, or oppression in office.” In the exercise of this function, the Court should show deference to the conclusions of the Commission, and adopt them unless firmly convinced they are wrong.
(3) The imposition of discipline function: a determination of the sanction, if any, to be imposed upon the judge. In the exercise of this function, the Court should show deference to the recommendations of the Commission, and follow them unless firmly convinced they are unjust.
I think it must be said that when the people of Missouri adopted Art. V, § 27, they intended a more significant role for the Commission than is given to it by the principal opinion.
I concurred in the principal opinion of November 14, 1978. We have reheard the case and it is now obvious that I made a mistake.
I respectfully dissent.