ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
RAY, Justice,dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The jury in this case found that Texas Farmers Insurance represented to Parkins that a fire insurance policy would be issued on a designated building and that such representation was a “deceptive trade practice.” After the jury answered all four special issues in favor of Parkins, the trial judge rendered a judgment non obstante veredicto for Farmers. In order to sustain the action of the trial court in granting the judgment non obstante veredicto, it must be determined there is no evidence upon which the jury could have made its finding. Dodd v. Texas Farm Products Co., 576 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.1979). All evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to support the jury verdict, and every reasonable inference from the evidence is to be indulged in favor of the verdict. Douglass v. Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.1974). All contrary evidence and inferences are to be rejected. Martinez v. Delta Brands, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.1974).
Parkins sued under the Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. Section 17.44 of the Act specifically provides that “[tjhis subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices .... ” Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.44.
In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Parkins, the following facts must be considered. Parkins testified he told the agent, Upham, that he was not going to be living in the building. The issuance of a homeowners policy which requires the building be owner occupied, was not compatible with the information given the agent. Furthermore, Parkins was given a receipt for payment which recited the word “Fire” and listed a policy number. This receipt was introduced into evidence and recites on two different lines:
If a person seeking insurance coverage went to an agent’s office and informed the agent he would not be living in the building, that he wanted the cheapest coverage to satisfy the mortgage company’s requirement for insurance and was given a receipt which contained the word fire on a separate line, I believe he would have every right to *778think he had a fire policy without the requirement that it be owner occupied. The receipt was in evidence and was considered by the jury. This exhibit had the capacity or tendency to deceive an average or ordinary person, even though that person may have been ignorant, unthinking or credulous. This was the definition of “False, Misleading or Deceptive Acts or Practices” given the jury in the court’s charge.
Parkins stated that he definitely told Up-ham that he was not going to use the house as his residence. There was testimony that Parkins had not heard the word “homeowners” until after the fire. A homeowners policy which includes fire insurance was not mentioned. He testified he believed the receipt was evidence of fire insurance and that he had “what I asked for, fire.” A witness to the request for fire insurance coverage stated Parkins asked for “just plain fire insurance.” The jury had the benefit of a photograph of the building and did not believe that a reasonable and competent insurance agent would issue a homeowners policy on such a building after being told by the owner that he was not going to make it his home, but was buying it as an investment.
The insurance agent did not appear as a witness during trial, but parts of his deposition were introduced into evidence. Par-kins, on the other hand, testified and was cross-examined in front of the jury. Farmers attempted to impeach this testimony by introducing portions of his deposition. It is within the sole province of the trier of fact, who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Royal v. Cameron, 382 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The jury in this case who observed Parkins’ demeanor was entitled to believe his testimony concerning the insurance policy.
I respectfully submit the majority erred in holding there was no evidence that Farmers misrepresented the terms of Par-kins’ insurance coverage. The receipt with the words “Fire” on a separate line with a policy number is some evidence of misrepresentation. Since this receipt was introduced into evidence, the jury was free to find, as they did, that it was deceptive. The majority’s opinion would require the insured to be knowledgeable not only about the insurance business, but the companies comprising the Farmers Insurance Group and the forms they utilize. This was clearly not the intent of the Legislature in enacting the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the courts below and render judgment for Parkins.