ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
ROBERTSON, Justice,dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The language of the Workers’ Compensation Act clearly states that “Upon settlement of all cases where the carrier admits liability for the death but a dispute exists as to the proper beneficiary ... attorney’s fees shall be paid periodically and not in a lump sum.” Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8306 § 8(d). Counsel for Mary Stott reiterated both in the trial court and before this Court that TEIA admitted liability for the death benefits and the case was tried only as a dispute between the beneficiaries. This is precisely the situation contemplated by the Act.
The majority holds that no settlement was reached under the Act since TEIA waited until the day of trial to admit liability, and the admission was not “unequivocal”. Nowhere in the statute does the legislature set a time limit at which settlements can be accomplished, nor require an unequivocal admission of liability. This Court cannot, under the guise of liberal construction, read into the Act a provision which is not there. Goldman v. Torres, 161 Tex. 487, 341 S.W.2d 154, 158 (1960). It is undisputed that TEIA in fact admitted liability, albeit at the last moment. For these reasons I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals directing periodic payment of attorney’s fees.
BARROW and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this dissent.