dissenting. The majority directs the reader’s attention to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 25-19-101 to -107 (Repl. 1991), which provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by this section or by laws specifically enacted to provide otherwise, all public records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the State of Arkansas during the regular business hours of the custodian of the records.
Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a) (Repl. 1992) (emphasis added).
This court, very laudably, has followed the basic precept that the objectives of the FOIA are such that whenever the legislature fails to specify that any records in the public domain are to be excluded from inspection, then privacy must yield to openness. Ragland v. Yeargan, 288 Ark. 81, 702 S.W.2d 23 (1986). We have with lock-step precision consistently affirmed the view that the FOIA should be interpreted broadly and exceptions narrowly in order to counterbalance the self-protecting interests of governmental bureaucracy, McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989). This is as it should be in order to safeguard the citizens rights to openness of government.
The Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989 provides that “[a] 11 records may be closed and confidential within the discretion of the court.” Ark. Code Ann. §9-27-309(a) (Repl. 1991). The Juvenile Code further provides that “[n]o information whereby the name or identity of a juvenile who is the subject of proceedings under this subchapter may be ascertained shall be published by the news media without written order of the juvenile court.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-348 (Repl. 1991). I read these two provisions to encompass the FOIA.
The majority notes that Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-310(a) (1987) states that proceedings are commenced with the filing of a petition and that since no petition had been filed these juveniles were not subject to the discretion of the court. I do not believe the legislature intended this statement to be a definition of “proceedings” as used in section 9-27-348. Such an interpretation would result in a situation where the records of any juvenile being held in a juvenile detention center could be released just because the juvenile justice system had not yet permitted a petition to be filed. What an absurd result — it would render the policy of protecting juveniles’ identity absolutely meaningless. Thus, the majority holds today that it makes no difference that while a juvenile is held in a juvenile detention center awaiting charges on a matter that could possibly come before the juvenile court, his or her identity and any records relating thereto are subject to publication by the media without the prior approval of the juvenile court. This is so simply because the authorities have not yet filed a petition to trigger the “proceedings.”
There is an additional reason for affirming this case and that is the fact that these juveniles were being held in a federally funded juvenile facility which is housed in the same facility as the Craighead County Jail. The means to hold these juveniles in a regional juvenile facility were provided by our federal government. In order to receive federal funds, this regional juvenile detention center was subject to the following provision of Juvenile Justice Detention and Prevention Act (JJDPA):
Except as authorized by law, program records containing the identity of individual juveniles gathered for purposes pursuant to this title [ 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601 et. seq.} may not be disclosed without the consent of the service recipient or legally authorized representative, or as may be necessary to carry out this title. Under no circumstances may program reports or findings available for public dissemination contain the actual names of individual service recipients.
42 U.S.C. § 5676 (emphasis added).
The majority opinion places in jeopardy not only the juvenile detention center in Craighead County, but also any other juvenile facility in our state-in which is federally funded and faced with a request similar to the one made in this case. The majority opinion thus forces our juvenile facilities to make a Hobson’s choice — a choice of violating the Juvenile Code with its policy of protecting juveniles’ identities or violating the JJDPA and losing federal funding. This is the point at which the precision of the majority loses touch with reality by opining that the Juvenile Code and the federal act in question are not applicable as exceptions to the FOIA. I fail to see that our legislature acted irresponsibly in this respect.
This court has faced conflicting public policies courageously in times past. Today’s decision impairs, even more so than previous decisions, the concept of a juvenile system of justice; a concept which was approved as a Constitutional Amendment, after the passage of the FOIA, and for which a whole tier of new judges was authorized and funded (who may not have anything to do if this court continues to chip away the Juvenile Code). Today’s decision is a significant chip at the Juvenile Code because it not only threatens the regional juvenile facility in question, but also threatens any other juvenile facilities who have received federal funding under the JJDPA. Our juvenile facilities may now find their funds cut off because of today’s requirement of disclosure of the names of juveniles who are being held in a federally funded juvenile detention center while awaiting the filing of formal charges.
Sometimes, we create more problems than we solve. Fortunately, the legislature is set to go into session, otherwise the decision today would be a disaster.