concurring specially. While I concur in the court’s opinion because of our deferential standard of review, and agree that RSA461-A:12 (Supp. 2009) governs the petition of the respondent, Mary Ellen Curotto *659(wife), to relocate with the children to Florida, I write separately to express my concern about how the trial court applied this statute to the facts of this case.
Under RSA 461-A:12, a parent seeking to relocate has the initial burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the relocation is for a legitimate purpose and is reasonable in light of that purpose. RSA 461-A:12, V. Once the parent has met this prima facie burden, the burden shifts to the other parent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that relocating is not in the child’s best interests. RSA 461-A12, VI.
In this case, the parties do not dispute that the respondent met her prima facie burden. The only issue is whether the petitioner, Eric W. Heinrich (husband), met his burden of.proving that it was not in the children’s best interest to relocate to Florida. In making this determination, the trial court properly examined the factors set forth in Tomasko v. Dubuc, 145 N.H. 169, 172 (2000), which include:
(1) each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move; (2) the quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents; (3) the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child’s future contact with the noncustodial parent; (4) the degree to which the custodial parent’s and child’s life may be enhanced economically, emotionally, and educationally by the move; (5) the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements; (6) any negative impact from continued or exacerbated hostility between the custodial and noncustodial parents; and (7) the effect that the move may have on any extended family relations.
The trial court’s analysis focused upon factor (3), the move’s impact upon the children’s future contact with their father, and factor (4), whether the move would enhance their emotional, financial and educational lives. Although there was evidence that relocation would have greatly enhanced the children’s lives (their mother would have had a lucrative job, they would have lived near extended family and been able to attend private school), the trial court denied the wife’s request to relocate, to my mind, principally because, if she moved, the husband’s time with the children would “noticeab[ly] decrease.” I find this troubling. If an involved parent’s regular contact with his or her children is sufficient, in and of itself, to bar the other parent’s reasonable request to relocate for legitimate reasons, will it ever be possible for one parent to relocate when the other parent is thoroughly involved in the children’s lives?