ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.By affidavit from the judge who tried this case and the deputy county clerk, it has now been shown that the first notice of appeal which is contained in the transcript is a clerical error. We will now consider the case on its merits.
Officer Turrigiano of the Dallas police force testified that on the night in question he and his fellow officers, Smith and Magness, of the vice squad, in the course of their official duties, proceeded toward the Dal-Hi Motor Courts; that he took a cab, and his partners followed in an unmarked police automobile; that when he arrived at the courts he was met by the appellant who asked, “Can I help you?” to which he replied, “Yes, is there any chance of getting a girl?” and the appellant in turn said, “Yes, I believe I can. Pay off the cab.” Turrigiano testified that he registered at the office and was carried to Cabin 14 by the appellant ; that the appellant sold him a bottle of whiskey, got rid of a soldier who was asleep in the cabin, told him, “A girl will be here in just a couple of minutes,” and shortly thereafter Judy Lee Hendricks arrived and said that she was the girl whom the porter (the appellant) had sent. Turrigiano stated that they discussed the price for her sexual favors; that he reached for the telephone, called the police dispatcher’s office, told them to have Smith and Magness pick him up at Cabin 14, and that within two minutes Detective Smith arrived; that they proceeded to Cabin 16, where they arrested another girl, and then carried the two girls, the appellant and the manager of the courts to the city hall.
Officer Magness testified that Turrigiano preceded them to the courts in a taxi and that he and Officer Smith waited in the vicinity until they received a call to go to Cabin 14; that upon their arrival they were met by the appellant who answered their inquiry, “Have you got anything?” by stating that there was a girl in Cabin 14; that Smith went to Cabin 14 and returned with *88Judy Lee Hendricks; that Smith then went to Cabin 16 and brought back another girl and that the two girls, the manager and the appellant were placed under arrest.
Appellant, testifying in his own behalf, gave practically the same version of the affair as had the arresting officers, except that he stated that he knew Turrigiano was an officer and had instructed him to “Call me a girl;” that he called Joyce from a list of girls’ phone numbers which he had; and that shortly thereafter Joyce and another girl arrived, and Joyce went to Cabin 14 and he placed the other girl in Cabin 16. Appellant’s defense seems to have been that he was taking orders from an officer of the law, which he thought justified his actions in the premises.
We find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and shall discuss the contentions advanced in the appellant’s brief.
Appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to grant his motion for instructed verdict which recited the following contentions:
1. That the appellant was entrapped by Officer Turrigiano into committing the offense charged. It is the settled law in this state that the conduct of the officer in this case does not constitute entrapment. Cliff v. State, 144 Texas Crm. R. 340, 162 S.W. 2d 712.
2. That the evidence does not establish that Judy Lee Hendricks was procured for unlawful sexual intercourse because no act of sexual intercourse took place. We have been cited no authority, and know of none, which would support this contention.
3. That the evidence does not show that the appellant solicited a female person for the purpose of having unlawful sexual intercourse with a male person. We think that the statement of the case set forth above disposes of this contention.
4. That the court erred in permitting Turrigiano to testify, even though no objection was made to such testimony, about his conversation with Judy Lee Hendricks regarding the price for sexual intercourse which took place in the absence of the appellant. We think our recent holding in Dabney v. State, 159 Texas Cr. Rep. 494, 265 S.W. 2d 603, disposes of this contention.
Appellant objected to the court’s charge because it failed to *89charge on circumstantial evidence. We refer to the facts herein-before stated and conclude that no such charge was required.
He further contends that there is a variance between the information and the proof as to the name of the woman procured. The information charged that the appellant procured “Judy Hendricks.” The two state’s witnesses testified that they arrested “Judy Lee Hendriks.” The addition of a middle name does not constitute a variance. The state’s case is not affected in any way by the appellant’s testimony that he procured “Joyce Hendricks.”
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.