Stanford v. Dairy Queen Products of Texas

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

I would hold appellants proved by a preponderance of the evidence that appellee had an agency in Travis County.1 I would have no trouble finding, as a matter of law, that appellees’ agency is “a situation in which the business of the defendant is, in more or less regular and permanent form, actually conducted in the county of suit ...” Milligan v. Southern Express, Inc., 151 Tex. 315, 250 S.W.2d 194 (1952).

When persons visit a Dairy Queen restaurant they look to Dairy Queen for a favored recipe, quality control, cleanliness and price. They are not looking to whomsoever is inside, “slinging the hash,” for the stand. They are looking to Dairy Queen as the principal.

The following evidence is uncontroverted. The restaurant from which the cheeseburger was purchased operated under a license issued by Dairy Queen Products. Dairy Queen Products is the exclusive licensor for restaurants of the registered trade name “Dairy Queen” in the State of Texas. In return for its grant of a license, Dairy Queen Products receives the right to a percentage of the gross profits — usually two (2%) percent. The license to use the trade name “Dairy Queen” gives Dairy Queen Products the right to make exacting requirements concerning bookkeeping systems, employees, availability of business records of the licensee for inspection by licensor, construction of buildings, and clothing of employees. Dairy Queen Products supervises the operations of the licensees by means of field inspectors who inspect all restaurants within the state. The purpose of such inspections is to insure compliance with the terms of the franchise. Dairy Queen Products spends substantial sums of money for advertising and contributes time, expertise, and money to the Trade Association of its franchisees. Daily Queen Products’ interest in the quality of food and service is portrayed by the food specifications, quality control specifications and health and sanitation rules. Dairy Queen Products participates in advertising with its individual licensees or with groups of them.

Although Dairy Queen Products is in the business of selling the trade name “Dairy Queen,” it is also in the business of maintaining the quality of Dairy Queen products that are sold by the local franchises. Additionally, it is in the business of furthering or increasing the business of Dairy Queen *807Restaurants, thereby promoting the trade name Dairy Queen and increasing its own profits. This necessitates constant supervision of all Dairy Queen restaurants and an active participation in their method of operation.

A person who represents a corporation or association in the promotion of that corporation or association is an agent or representative for the purposes of subsection 23. This is true despite the fact the agent or representative is not employed by or paid by the corporation or association. Skelly Oil Co. v. Medart, 488 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Civ.App.— Waco 1972, no writ); see also John Deere Co. v. Ramirez, 503 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1973, writ dism’d).

See, also Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160 (Del.Super.Ct.1975), where the trial court obviously believed that the Dairy Queen Restaurant was an agent of its franchisor. It is equally obvious the court was of the opinion that the facts should be further developed in Dairy Queen’s unsuccessful attempt to extricate itself from the day-to-day business of the franchisee, by way of summary judgment.

The uncontroverted facts set out above clearly show a Dairy Queen restaurant was located in Travis County and that it was an agent or representative of Dairy Queen Products. The trial court erred in sustaining appellees’ plea of privilege.

It is not necessary, despite appellees contention, that an agent or representative under subsection 23 be able to contractually bind the defendant. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Lamb, 610 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1980, writ dism’d); Mid-Continent Life Insurance Co. v. Huston, 481 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Civ.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Cotton Concentration Co. v. A. Lassberg & Co., 433 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1968, no writ); Guittard & Tyler, Revision of the Texas Venue Statute: A Reform Long Overdue, 32 Baylor L.Rev. 563 (1980).

I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that venue to the suit be maintained in Travis County.

. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995, subdivision 23.