ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Howard E. Pardue and Jimmie R. McMillan contend in their motion for rehearing that the cases on which they rely in their original brief support the proposition that the failure to answer, after proper service, thus suffering a default judgment to be granted, is the very act that forecloses the subsequent urging of a plea of privilege. We disagree.
These defendants, by filing motions to set aside the default judgment, sought an adjudication for that sole purpose and not on the merits of the case. They were successful and the default judgment was set aside. We have reviewed United Chemical Co. v. Leathers, 285 S.W. 918 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1926, writ dism’d), and the other cases on which appellants rely, but remain firm in our belief that the distinction between United Chemical and this case lies in the fact the trial court refused to set aside the default judgment in United Chemical, thus the plea of privilege urged after final judgment came too late. We see no distinction in a default judgment having been set aside because of defective service and one set aside on equitable grounds. After the default judgment is set aside, the defendant is then afforded the opportunity to answer and present his defenses, including any pleas.
Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ motion for rehearing.