with whom CARPENETI, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
I write separately to express my disagreement with the court's decision to remand to the superior court for a finding on whether the $5,900 paid by VP to Handle was rightfully Miller's money.
In my view, the uncontested facts known to the parties when Miller made his offer of judgment clearly establish that the VP payment belonged to Miller. It is uncontested that Handle was never in privity of contract with VP, and Handle's counsel confirmed at oral argument that Handle never brought a claim against VP. Indeed, Handle went out of its way to communicate that its contract was with Miller and that it would look to Miller to satisfy its claim for cost overruns. In addition, although Miller enlisted Handle as the appropriate agent to negotiate the rust and steel defect claims with VP-an entirely reasonable step in light of Handle's first-hand knowledge of the construction process-Handle has not alleged that Miller ever agreed or even suggested that Handle could keep the settlement it negotiated with VP. These facts are part of the extrinsic evidence that must be considered in determining the parties' reasonable expectations regarding the settlement offer. 1 With no contract or claim existing between Handle and VP, the cireum-stances show that both Miller and Handle *991understood Miller's settlement offer to have been premised on the assumption that Handle had no claim to direct reimbursement from VP and would be required to turn over any recovery to Miller. Thus, I believe that this case need not be remanded for a finding that addresses whether the $5,900 was Miller's money. I would reverse the superior court's decision, hold that Miller was entitled to an offset for Handle's recovery from VP, and remand for entry of judgment in Miller's favor. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. See Beal v. McGuire, 216 P.3d 1154, 1162 (Alaska 2009) (citing Neal & Co. v. Ass'n of Vill. Council Presidents Reg'l Hous. Auth., 895 P.2d 497, 502 (Alaska 1995)); Rules v. Sturn, 661 P.2d 615, 617 (Alaska 1983) (interpreting offer of judgment in light of surrounding circumstances).