Ragsdale v. Armstrong

ROBERTSON, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

This is one of those difficult cases in which no resolution is supported by both the policy of the state of Missouri expressed in the statutes relating to motor vehicle liability insurance and the terms of the insurance contract between the Ragsdales and Shelter Mutual Insurance Company.

Judge Limbaugh’s dissent, true to the language of the policy and the common usage of the words used in the insurance policy, finds that the existence of some insurance coverage in the defendant, Armstrong, is sufficient to defeat the policy’s coverage for uninsured motorists. Unfortunately, Judge Limbaugh’s conclusion ignores the public policy of the state relating to uninsured motorist coverage set out in section 379.203.1, RSMo 1994, which requires a minimum of twenty-five thousand dollars in liability coverage by its reference to section 303.030, RSMo 1994.

Judge Benton scours the Shelter insurance policy for words that permit the Court to find Shelter intended to invoke the statutory definition of a “motor vehicle insurance policy.” He concludes that the failure of Armstrong to have twenty-five thousand dollars in liability coverage is the same as Armstrong having no insurance at all. Once this leap is accomplished, Judge Benton has no difficulty invoking the uninsured motorist provisions of the contract, stacking the Ragsdale policies and providing the Ragsdales an additional $140,000 in coverage. Under Judge Benton’s reasoning, this result obtains so long as the Armstrong insurance policy provided less than twenty-five thousand dollars in liability coverage. If, however, Armstrong’s policy had provided twenty-five thousand dollars in coverage, the Ragsdales would be limited to that twenty-five thousand dollars. Thus, under Judge Benton’s reasoning, the Ragsdales receive a windfall because they were injured by a person carrying less than the Missouri statutory minimum coverage.

I cannot concur in Judge Benton’s interpretation of section 303.190 and its application of that statute to define the phrase “motor vehicle liability policy” contained in the Ragsdales’ policies. I agree with Judge Limbaugh that section 303.190 applies only to the provisions of Chapter 303 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law and not to the contents of uninsured motorist provisions.

I would apply Cook v. Pedigo, 714 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Mo.App.1986), to limit the Rags-dales’ recovery to $15,000, the difference between the Ragsdales’ liability insurance and the minimum liability requirements. By specific reference, Section 379.203.1 requires all automobile insurance policies to provide uninsured motorist protection in an amount equal to or greater than the minimum liability requirements of $25,000/$50,000 under section 303.030.5. I believe these sections demonstrate a legislative intent to ensure motorists injured by a negligent and financially irresponsible motorist, i.e., an uninsured or underinsured motorist, a recovery equal to the statutory minimum amount. Cook, 714 S.W.2d at 952. I would indulge the fiction, demanded by the public policy set out in the statutes, that Armstrong was uninsured only to the extent that her liability coverage did not meet Missouri statutory mínimums. I would, therefore, require Shelter to pay the $15,000 difference between the Missouri minimum insurance requirements and the amount of liability insurance Armstrong actually carried. I do not share the views expressed by Judge Benton and the *787members of the Court who join his opinion or with Judge Price that the policies can be stacked. Missouri law requires the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage. Armstrong was not uninsured.

Cook has the virtue of applying the policy embodied in the statutes — which Judge Limbaugh does not — without requiring the leap across the statutes upon which Judge Benton relies. But Cook is rough justice at best. Only legislative clarification and/or more carefully drafted insurance contracts will provide a definitive answer.