dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
At no time while Sergeant Keith was testifying about the oral statements made to him by Murl Payne did defendant’s counsel1 voice the objection now asserted on appeal. Additionally, nothing in defendant’s motion for new trial complains about the receipt in evidence of any of Sergeant Keith’s testimony regarding the oral statements made to him by Murl Payne.
The document referred to in the majority opinion as Murl Payne’s “written confession” was identified at trial as State’s Exhibit 23. Regarding its admission in evidence, the transcript shows:
“MR. SIFFERMAN:2 I offer State’s Exhibit 23.
MR. McPHERSON:3 At this time, I would like to request a recess so we can discuss some of the things contained in the report. (JURY ADMONISHED) RECESS 9:58 a.m. TRIAL RESUMED 10:12 a.m.
(OUTSIDE THE HEARING AND PRESENCE OF THE JURY)
(CONFERENCE OFF RECORD)
THE COURT: Bob, does that look all right to you?
MR. McPHERSON: I can still read that.
THE COURT: Can you get it on the back side, too, Scott?
(CONFERENCE OFF RECORD)
THE COURT: Let the record reflect that on State’s Exhibit 23, Exhibit 23, Mr. McPherson objected to that portion, Lines 9 and 10 of the statement, State’s Exhibit 23, and that objection is sustained, and that the prosecuting attorney has covered that portion of the exhibit. Is that satisfactory, Bob? Does it look all right to you now?
MR. McPHERSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I think rather than call specific attention to that portion deleted and covered up, and — I think the witness should read — I am going to admit the exhibit, and I think, perhaps, Scott, you should have the witness read it and don’t pass it to the jury.
MR. SIFFERMAN: All right, Judge. RECESS: 10:14 a.m. TRIAL RESUMED 10:20 a.m.
(WITHIN THE HEARING AND PRESENCE OF THE JURY)
THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr. Sifferman.
MR. SIFFERMAN: With respect to—
THE COURT: Yes—
MR. SIFFERMAN: I offer State’s Exhibit 23.
THE COURT: It will be admitted.
(MR. SIFFERMAN:) Q. Would you read what Merle [sic] Payne’s confession was on February 16, 1985. Read that exhibit to the jury.”
At that juncture, according to the transcript, Sergeant Keith began reading State’s Exhibit 23, aloud. While he was *787reading the sixth page of the seven-page statement, this occurred:
“[KEITH]: ... Roxie didn’t sign the title. She said to have Sissy sign it so she did and I got it titled. The truck is titled in my name. While Roxie was here at Christmas, she told me that I got the job done and that Lonnie was next but that would have to wait. I knew the job she was talking about was getting Talley, getting Talley killed. I told her
MR. McPHERSON: If the Court, I would like to interrupt the witness and make—
THE COURT: Approach the bench. (CONFERENCE OFF RECORD) (OUTSIDE THE HEARING OF THE JURY)
MR. McPHERSON: I didn’t see that in the statement.
THE COURT: Make whatever record you want to.
MR. McPHERSON: I object to any reference made about killing Lonnie Goes or any other evidence of a similar crime. The defendant is charged with only one crime here today and that is what we are defending today. I object to that last statement about Lonnie Goes going to be killed or whatever that statement says which the witness read. I thought all reference to killing Lonnie Goes was blacked out. I didn’t notice that statement just read by the witness.
THE COURT: Mr. McPherson, the Court gave you an opportunity to go over the statement and sustained your objection to a portion of it, and such portion you objected to was blacked out by the prosecutor, and I asked you if that was satisfactory and you answered that it was. The Court suggested that the exhibit be read to the jury rather than passing it to them for them to read individually. If you want me to, I can admonish the jury to disregard any statement pertaining to the murder of Lonnie Goes, but I don’t know — it might be exploiting it and — off the record.
(CONFERENCE OFF RECORD.)
THE COURT: Do you want me to admonish the jury concerning Lonnie Goes.
MR. McPHERSON: Yes, Your Honor, that last statement read by the witness.
THE COURT: Now, specifically, Mr. McPherson, you want me to admonish the jury to disregard the statement, ‘Lonnie was next’?
MR. McPHERSON: Yes, Judge, I think that will be sufficient. (CONFERENCE OFF RECORD) (WITHIN THE HEARING OF THE JURY)
THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, the Court ordered that portion of the confession read by the witness which states, ‘And Lonnie is next’ stricken. You will not consider that statement in arriving at your verdict in this case. You may proceed.”
Sergeant Keith then read the remainder of State’s Exhibit 23 to the jury.
It is manifest that nowhere in the above passages from the transcript did defendant’s counsel register the objection to State’s Exhibit 23 now asserted on appeal.
In defendant’s motion for new trial, defendant assigned error in the admission of State’s Exhibit 23 for the following reasons:
“a. The statement contained references to another crime of the same or simil-iar [sic] nature as the crime charged.
b. An improper foundation was laid for the introduction of the statement in that the State failed to show that Murl Payne was unavailabile [sic] as a witness.
c. The statement was made while Murl Payne was under arrest and for the purpose of plea bargaining and in an attempt to curry favor with the authorities and had therefore lost it’s [sic] probative value.”
None of those averments raise the argument relied on here, i.e., that State’s Exhibit 23 constituted inadmissible hearsay, and denied defendant her constitutional right to confront and cross-examine a witness against her.
*788Defendant’s “Objections to Transcript,” filed in this Court more than three months after we received the transcript, are, in my view, unconvincing. The only specific complaint lodged by defendant against the transcript is that it omits an alleged objection made by defendant’s attorney to State’s Exhibit 23. That objection, says defendant, was “on the ground that Murl Payne was not present at trial and that the state had made no argument or showing that Murl Payne was unavailable as a witness.”
If defendant believed the transcript was inaccurate or incomplete, she had a remedy under Rule 30.04(g), Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure (17th ed. 1986), which provides, in pertinent part:
“If there is any dispute concerning the correctness of any ... transcript, or if the parties fail to agree within a reasonable time as to its correctness, the ... transcript shall be settled and approved by the trial court.”
Nothing in the record on appeal suggests that defendant made any effort to avail herself of the above procedure.
Most importantly, however, the segments of the transcript heretofore set forth demonstrate that the concern of defendant’s counsel at trial was that State’s Exhibit 23 contained references to the possible future murder of Lonnie Goes, and that counsel’s objective during the proceedings outside the presence of the jury was to have the prosecutor mask the references to that subject in State’s Exhibit 23, and to ensure that the jury would not become aware of them.
For the foregoing reasons, I am unwilling to assume that the objection now advanced by defendant was registered during Sergeant Keith’s testimony, and I am convinced it was not raised in the motion for new trial. Consequently, the question I would address is whether the objection now advanced by defendant should be considered under plain error review.
In answering that question, I note that there was competent and substantial evidence of defendant’s role in the conspiracy, apart from the oral statements of Murl Payne and State’s Exhibit 23.
Darryl Harvey “Bubba” Payne, age 21 at time of trial, testified that prior to the murder, he and Teddy Albert talked to defendant near Cleo Talley’s home, and told defendant they could make the killing look like a burglary or a robbery. Bubba quoted defendant as saying she did not want it done that way, that Cleo Talley usually came outside early in the morning, and that Bubba and Albert “could get him when he come out the front door.” According to Bubba, Albert asked defendant about money, and defendant said not to worry about it, she would take care of it.
Bubba added that several weeks after the murder, he told defendant he did not like the idea of Cleo Talley getting shot. Defendant, according to Bubba, replied that he should not worry about it, and that she had “got it taken care of.”
Teddy Albert, age 33 at time of trial, testified that prior to the murder, he and Bubba Payne talked to defendant near Cleo Talley’s home, and that defendant said, “You can shoot him through a window.” Defendant, according to Albert, pointed toward Talley’s house and said to shoot him through the window at an angle, adding that Talley would be in bed. Albert also quoted defendant as saying, “Well, if you don’t want to do it, come back in the morning and shoot them both when they are out there by the huller.”
Monica Jean Payne, the daughter of Murl Payne and the sister of Bubba Payne, testified that on October 18, 1984, she was residing with her father in Forrest City, Illinois. Monica recounted that around “eight or eight-thirty” that evening, while at her home, she received a phone call from defendant. According to Monica, Murl Payne talked to defendant, saying “that the boys are on their way and not to go back to the farm ... [u]ntil midnight.”
The State’s evidence showed that Cleo Talley was shot by Kenny Brown between 7 and 8 p.m., October 18, 1984.
Defendant, who was residing in an “RV” adjacent to Cleo Talley’s home on the date of the murder, testified that she left *789her residence around 5 p.m., that date, that she phoned Murl Payne long distance during the evening, and that she, accompanied by Lonnie Goes, returned to her residence sometime after 11:30 p.m. Upon arrival, she noticed a light burning in Cleo Talley’s home. This prompted her to investigate, whereupon she discovered Talley’s body.
The State’s witnesses, in addition to Bub-ba Payne, Teddy Albert and Monica Payne, included Brown, who solemnly related the details of his shooting of Cleo Talley.
Monica Payne disclosed that around Thanksgiving, 1984, defendant was at Monica’s residence in Illinois. On that occasion, according to Monica, defendant described what happened when she found Cleo Talley, and she talked about insurance and about paying Brown. Monica quoted defendant as saying she would have the money for Brown in a couple of weeks.
State’s Exhibit 23 and Murl Payne’s oral statements to Sergeant Keith, for the most part, supplied the same information presented by the testimony of the other State’s witnesses. The only evidence furnished by State’s Exhibit 23 and Murl Payne’s oral statements to Sergeant Keith that is not found in the testimony of other witnesses is evidence of certain conversations between Murl Payne and defendant regarding the killing of Cleo Talley. As demonstrated earlier, however, the testimony of Bubba Payne, Teddy Albert, and Monica Payne supplied sufficient evidence to establish that defendant conspired to have Cleo Talley murdered.
Consequently, this is not an appeal in which the case against defendant hinges on State’s Exhibit 23 and Murl Payne’s oral statements to Sergeant Keith. I am therefore unconvinced that the receipt of that evidence rises to the level of plain error. Appellate courts employ plain error review sparingly, limiting its application to those cases where there is a strong, clear showing of manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. State v. Hubbard, 659 S.W.2d 551, 555 — 56[4] (Mo.App.1983); State v. Harper, 637 S.W.2d 170, 172[3] (Mo.App. 1982). Resort to plain error as a basis for appellate relief places a much greater burden on the accused; he must not only show that prejudicial error resulted, he must further show that the error so substantially affects his rights that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice will inexorably result if left uncorrected. Hubbard, 659 S.W.2d at 556[7]; State v. Miller, 604 S.W.2d 702, 705-06 (Mo.App.1980).
Nothing in the record on appeal persuades me that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice will result if we eschew plain error review of the point on which the majority opinion ordains reversal. In saying this, I do not dispute the majority’s conclusion that State’s Exhibit 23 and Murl Payne’s oral statements to Sergeant Keith were not made for the purpose of concealing the identity of the conspirators or to evade prosecution. It appears that such evidence, upon proper objection, should have been excluded. However, as I read the record, such objection was never made. If defendant’s counsel at trial was derelict in that respect, or remiss in failing to ensure that the court reporter recorded the objections he did in fact make, those issues can be litigated and resolved in a proceeding under Rule 27.26, Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure (18th ed. 1987). Said another way, if there was error in the receipt of the evidence now challenged on appeal, the error was that of defendant’s counsel at trial, not the trial court.
I would not reverse the judgment on the basis utilized by the majority, and, as I find no basis for reversal in any of the other assignments of error raised by defendant, I would affirm the conviction.
. Attorney Robert McPherson represented defendant at trial.
. Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney Scott Sifferman.
. Footnote 1, supra.