dissenting.
While I agree that absent a showing of agency, foreign authorities do not have to inform a United States citizen of his constitutional rights prior to any questioning as required by Miranda,11 dissent to the majority’s conclusion that an agency relationship did not exist in this case.
The majority concludes that an agency relationship did not exist between the El Paso Police and the State Judicial Police of Chihuahua, Mexico because the El Paso Police did not participate in appellant’s arrest or interrogation, and because the Court of Appeals determined that the Chihuahua State Police had an independent basis for obtaining appellant’s confession.
I. Agency
Federal courts have held that Miranda applies to confessions obtained by foreign authorities if: (1) the confession was obtained in such a manner as to shock the conscience of our courts; (2) domestic authorities participated in obtaining the confession; or (3) foreign authorities acted as agents for domestic authorities. E.g., United States v. Heller, 625 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F.Supp. 893, 894 (S.D.Tex.1987). Appellant neither contends that his confession was obtained in such a manner as to shock the conscience of a court nor that the El Paso Police physically participated in obtaining his confession.2 He does contend, however, that when the Chihuahua State Police obtained his confession, they were acting as agents of the El Paso Police.
The majority confuses the issue of participation with that of agency, holding that an agency relationship did not exist in this case because the El Paso Police did not participate in appellant’s arrest or custodial interrogation. Alvarado v. State, 853 S.W.2d 17, 22-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Agency and participation are distinct concepts. The El Paso Police did not “partieR pate” in obtaining appellant’s confession because they did not •personally assist in appellant’s arrest or interrogation. An agency relationship, on the other hand, does not necessitate participation; a delegation of duties is sufficient. Therefore, the question is not whether the El Paso Police “participated” in the interrogation, *26but whether, pursuant to a continuing cooperative arrangement, the Chihuahua State Police arrested appellant and obtained his confession on behalf of the El Paso Police. For the following reasons, I would answer that question affirmatively.
According to the testimony at the suppression hearing, the El Paso Police contacted Chief Jose Refugio Rubalcaba of the Chihuahua State Police and asked him to apprehend appellant who was believed to be in Juarez and was wanted for an El Paso murder. Chief Rubalcaba testified that he knew appellant would be released into the custody of the El Paso Police,3 and that the “main purpose” of the Chihuahua State Police in obtaining appellant’s confession was to assist the El Paso Police. According to Chief Rubalcaba, the Chihuahua State Police never contemplated bringing charges against appellant and had no intention of using appellant’s confession in any proceedings in Mexico. In fact, the Chihuahua State Police gave the confession to the El Paso Police for use in appellant’s trial. Chief Rubalcaba testified that he had assisted the El Paso Police in numerous murder investigations and that he considered the taking of appellant’s confession to be within the confines of the continuing cooperative arrangement between the neighboring police departments. Indeed, even the Court of Appeals recognized that the Chihuahua State Police obtained appellant’s confession because the El Paso Police requested them to do so. Alvarado v. State, 804 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991).
The majority defines an agency relationship as “a consensual relationship existing between two persons, by virtue of which one of them is to act for and on behalf of the other.” Alvarado, at 22 (citations omitted). “The actual agency relationship may be express or implied from the parties’ conduct.” Id. The Chief of the Chihuahua State Police testified to the existence of a continuing cooperative arrangement in which his department and the El Paso Police Department assist each other in the apprehension of criminal suspects beyond their respective borders. Pursuant to that arrangement, the El Paso Police requested that the Chihuahua State Police apprehend appellant. Given the majority’s definition, an agency relationship clearly existed between the El Paso Police and the Chihuahua State Police.4
The implications of the majority’s holding are great. By failing to recognize the existence of an agency relationship, the majority permits the El Paso Police to do indirectly that which they could not do directly, that is, obtain appellant’s confession without informing him of his constitutional rights, and his right to execute those rights prior to and during the custodial interrogation. The El Paso Police had an arrangement of mutual and reciprocal benefit with the Chihuahua State Police. Absent that arrangement, the Chihuahua State Police had nothing to gain by obtaining appellant’s confession. Indeed, the Chihuahua State Police delivered appellant’s confession to the El Paso Police Department for use in their case. The majority’s holding sanctions the continuation of cooperative relationships between Mexico and Texas police departments pursuant to which Texas police can rely on Mexico police to obtain confessions on their behalf in circumvention of federal and state constitutions.
II. Independent Basis
For the safety and welfare of its citizens, Mexico has an interest in keeping foreign *27criminals out of Mexico; therefore, if the United States notifies Mexico that a United States citizen wanted for a crime in the United States is residing in Mexico, Mexico police will question the suspect and deport him if they believe he is guilty. Both the majority and the Court of Appeals view this as an independent basis for obtaining appellant’s confession; the rationale being that the Chihuahua State Police had to obtain appellant’s confession in order to determine whether to deport him to the United States for being a criminal. Alvarado, at 23; see Alvarado, 804 S.W.2d at 671-72. However, a review of the record reveals that the Chihuahua State Police did not obtain appellant’s confession for any reason apart from their agency relationship with the El Paso Police.
The record reflects that Mexican law provides for deportation of United States citizens who are either suspected of having committed a crime in the United States or who do not have the proper documentation to be in Mexico. The record also reflects that appellant did not have such documentation — a fact the Chihuahua State Police were aware of before they obtained his confession. Therefore, once the Chihuahua State Police learned that appellant was in Mexico illegally, they could have deported him without any further inquiry. The Chihuahua State Police did not interrogate appellant in order to determine whether to deport him; rather, they obtained appellant’s confession to aid the El Paso Police who had requested their assistance pursuant to their cooperative relationship.5
The majority wrongly concludes that the Court of Appeals determined that an agency did not exist. In determining the admissibility of appellant’s confession, the Court of Appeals wrote:
[Tjhe procedure by which Appellant was arrested and his confession taken would have occurred in the exact same manner regardless of any express or preexisting arrangement between the Mexican and American law enforcement agencies .... Given this independent, albeit concurrent, basis for the arrest and production of the challenged confession, the deterrent effect intended by the various federal and state exclusionary rules would not be served by the suppression of this Appellant’s confession.
Alvarado, 804 S.W.2d at 672 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals did not determine that the Chihuahua State Police acted independently from the El Paso Police and therefore no agency existed; rather, that court determined that the Chihuahua State Police could have acted independently. In so holding, the Court of Appeals implied that an agency did exist between the El Paso Police and the Chihuahua State Police.6
*28In creating this independent and concurrent basis exception to the Texas exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeals relied upon federal cases from the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, interpreting the judicially created federal exclusionary rule.7 As a judicially created rule, the federal exclusionary rule is subject to any exception the United States Supreme Court may create.8 In Texas, however, because the state legislature created our exclusionary rule, only the legislature can create exceptions, as it did in 1987, when it enacted subsection (b) of article 38.23, the “good faith reliance” exception.9 The legislature has not provided for any other exception to article 38.23; thus the Court of Appeals was without authority to create this independent and concurrent basis exception to the state exclusionary rule. See Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (plurality opinion); Oliver v. State, 711 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth, pet. ref'd) (op. on original submission).
Based on Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), the majority concludes that this Court cannot disturb the Court of Appeals’ determination that because the Chihuahua State Police had an independent basis for obtaining appellant’s confession, it is admissible. Alvarado, at 22-23. Arcila does not preclude review where the court of appeals misapplies the law, fails to apply the law, or creates new law contrary to existing law.
In this case, the Court of Appeals essentially held that it doesn’t matter whether the Chihuahua State Police were acting as agents of the El Paso Police as long as the Chihuahua State Police could have obtained the confession for independent reasons. Alvarado, 804 S.W.2d at 672. The Court of Appeals never determined that the Chihuahua State Police did in fact obtain appellant’s confession for an independent reason, and as previously stated, the record does not support such a conclusion.
By failing to determine whether the Chihuahua State Police were acting as agents of the El Paso Police, the Court of Appeals did not correctly apply the law to the facts; and by erroneously creating an independent basis exception to the state exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeals created new law contrary to existing law. Under these circumstances, Arcila does not preclude review.
*29I would hold that the Chihuahua State Police were acting as agents of the El Paso Police, that appellant was therefore entitled under Miranda to be informed of his constitutional rights, and that the confession was inadmissible under the state exclusionary rule for failure to comply with Miranda. Because the majority does not so hold, I dissent.
BAIRD, J., joins.. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. Appellant does not challenge the voluntariness of his confession, nor does he claim that his confession was obtained in violation of Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. arts. 15.17(a) or 38.22, § 2.
. The record reflects that the Chihuahua State Police released appellant to immigration officials who in turn released him into the custody of the El Paso Police. Despite the intervention of the immigration officials, Chief Rubalcaba knew that appellant would ultimately be released into the custody of the El Paso Police.
. The majority states that an agency relationship can be formed from a "joint venture arrangement,” but notes that the “mere notification of the potential existence of a criminal in another police’s jurisdiction is not enough to create such a relationship.” Alvarado, at 23. The record reflects that the El Paso Police specifically requested that the Chihuahua State Police apprehend appellant pursuant to a longstanding reciprocal arrangement. This is much more than the mere notification of appellant’s presence in Juarez.
. In concluding that the Chihuahua State Police were not acting on behalf of the El Paso Police, the majority writes:
The evidence at the suppression hearing indicated that when a Mexican citizen commits a crime in the United States and flees to Mexico, that person can be tried in Mexico under Mexican law. Mexican law does not recognize American traditions of venue. This unusual situation may have convinced the trial court as well as the court of appeals that the Mexican police acted on their own behalf, and not on behalf of their American counterparts. While appellant is not a Mexican citizen, it appears to be the Mexican procedure to obtain voluntary statements from all persons arrested. The evidence also indicates that the Mexican authorities would not deport an individual to U.S. authorities if they did not believe he was guilty of the crime, thereby necessitating an opportunity for the individual to make a statement to Mexican authorities.
Alvarado, at 24.
There are serious problems with the majority's analysis. First, since appellant is a United States citizen, Mexican laws regarding the apprehension of Mexican citizens are irrelevant. Second, the majority incorrectly implies that appellant would not have been deported if he were not a crime suspect in this country. As previously mentioned, the record reflects that appellant could have been deported once the Chihuahua State Police discovered that he was in Mexico illegally; a fact they were aware of before they obtained his confession.
. If the Court of Appeals had held that the Chihuahua State Police had acted independently in obtaining appellant’s confession, there would be no question of agency, and the Court of Appeals would not have addressed the state exclusionary rule. However, because the Court of Appeals rested its holding on the applicability of the exclusionary rule, it is clear that the court *28did not conclude that appellant’s confession was in fact obtained for independent reasons, but merely that it could have been obtained for independent reasons.
. See Heller, 625 F.2d at 599-600; United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir.1972); United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir.1971); United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n. 1 (2d Cir.1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 935, 28 L.Ed.2d 219 (1971).
Neither the federal constitution nor any federal statute provides for redress if evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, the United States Supreme Court created the federal exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (exclusionary rule applies to the states). The Supreme Court has also excluded evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (confessions obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination were inadmissible); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1203-04, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) (confession obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was inadmissible). The Texas exclusionary rule suppresses evidence obtained in violation of any state or federal law. Tex.Code Crim.ProcAnn. art. 38.23(a).
. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (good faith exception); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (inevitable discovery doctrine).
. The Texas exclusionary rule appears in article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and provides in relevant part:
(a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.
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(b) It is an exception to the provisions of Subsection (a) of this Article that the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.
TexCode Crim.ProcAnn. art. 38.23.