dissenting.
In Garcia v. Dial, 596 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), this Court granted mandamus relief in a case in which a trial court purported to act although it lacked jurisdiction to do so. Dial, the trial judge, had granted defendant Garcia’s motion to dismiss an indictment against him on the basis of a violation of the now-defunct Speedy Trial Act. Later persuaded by the State that this ruling was a mistake, Judge Dial ordered the cause reinstated on the court’s docket and set for trial. Garcia petitioned for mandamus and prohibition relief, asking this Court to order Judge Dial to set aside the order setting aside the dismissal, and to prohibit the trial. We observed:
“It is well settled that when a trial court empowered with jurisdiction over a criminal case sustains a motion to dis*48miss the indictment or information, the person accused thereunder is, in law, discharged from the accusation against him; there is, concomitant to such dismissal, no case pending against the accused and, accordingly, no jurisdiction remaining in the dismissing court. See, e.g., Flores v. State, 487 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Pugh v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 258, 289 S.W.2d 929 (1956); Ringer v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 242, 129 S.W.2d 654 (1938); Turner v. State, 21 Tex.App. 198, 18 S.W. 96 (1886); Venters v. State, 18 Tex.App. 198 (1885). Compare Article 44.31, V.A.C.C.P.”
We held that the only authority remaining in the trial court following dismissal of the indictment was to set aside the order setting aside the dismissal. Finding this to be a ministerial act, and that Garcia had no adequate remedy at law, we granted mandamus relief. See also State ex rel. Holmes v. Denson, 671 S.W.2d 896, at 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (once it entered dismissal of indictment, trial court without authority to order State not to refile).
In the instant application for writ of prohibition, applicant Curry contends similarly that, having entered a judgment of acquittal in Curry’s favor, the trial judge of the Criminal District Court No. 1 of Tarrant County was without jurisdiction to order him to repay attorney’s fees. The judgment of acquittal was entered on November 20, 1990. Three weeks later, on December 10, 1990, the trial court ordered the graduated reimbursement of attorney’s fees totalling $16,055. The question presented is whether the jurisdiction of the trial court extended beyond entry of the judgment of acquittal so as to authorize this order. The trial judge believed she had jurisdiction by virtue or Article 26.-05(e), Y.A.C.C.P., and a majority of this Court today agrees. But the opinion of the majority does not explain how Article 26.-05(e) may be read to confer this jurisdiction so much as it simply announces that it does. See Op. at 45. Thus, the majority largely begs the question.
Once a verdict of acquittal is returned, “the defendant shall be at once discharged from all further liability upon the charge for which he was tried[.]” Article 37.12, Y.A.C.C.P.; see also Article 42.01, § 1(11), V.A.C.C.P. With a judgment of acquittal, no less than when an indictment is dismissed, the jurisdiction of the trial court is exhausted. Appointed representation ends. Article 26.04(a), V.A.C.C.P. Nevertheless, because Article 26.05(e) says the trial court “shall” order the defendant to pay whatever amount he is able to, the majority holds that the trial court’s jurisdiction continues. In my view, the majority misconceives our statutory scheme.
Article 26.05(e) reads:
“(e) If the court determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset in part or whole the costs of the legal services provided, including any expenses and costs, the court shall order the defendant to pay the amount that it finds the defendant is able to pay.”
That the statute uses the mandatory “shall” simply means the trial court, during the pendency of its jurisdiction, has no discretion but to order the offset in the event it finds the defendant has the ability to pay. This absence of discretion does not speak to the question of when the determination is to be made whether the defendant can offset in whole or part the costs of his representation. The statute provides no procedural mechanism for a post-judgment determination of a defendant’s ability to pay. That in itself is persuasive enough that it was not meant to stretch the jurisdiction of the trial court beyond the point at which it would ordinarily extinguish. In short, Article 26.05(e) does not operate on its face to extend or expand the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter of the cause and over the person of the accused, as the majority would have it.1
*49Nor does Article 26.05(e) otherwise read like a “recoupment” statute, at least not in the ordinary sense of that word. By its terms the trial court is to determine whether the defendant has the resources to “offset in part or in whole” the expense of legal services. Surely a true “recoupment” statute would not limit the defendant’s liability to only a part of that expense, but would simply extend the time over which the entire expense was to be repaid. That the provision requires the defendant to “offset” the expense indicates, moreover, that the attorney’s fees have not yet been paid, so there is nothing yet for the county to “recoup.” This impression is fortified by the fact that the trial court orders the defendant to “pay” that part or whole of attorney’s fees that he can afford; not to “repay” the county for them. It seems unmistakable to me that Article 26.05(e) was meant to authorize the trial court, during the pendency of its jurisdiction, to order the defendant himself to pay whatever portion of his attorney’s fees he can afford during that time. It does not authorize the trial court to reach beyond its jurisdiction to force a defendant to repay expenses of representation already incurred on his behalf by the county.
This is not to say that Articles 26.04 and 26.05 do not contemplate reimbursement by the defendant of attorney’s fees under certain circumstances. Article 26.04 requires the trial court to appoint counsel to represent an indigent accused — that is, if the accused has not waived his right to counsel under Article 1.051, V.A.C.C.P. The trial court makes a preliminary determination whether the accused is “financially able to employ counsel,” id,., § (b), considering such factors as income, property, debt and family obligations of the accused, and whether he has been able to post bail. Article 26.04, supra, § (b). The accused must either answer a sworn questionnaire or testify, or both, attesting to his indigen-cy, and must sign a sworn statement to the effect that he cannot afford to employ counsel. Id., §§ (c) & (d). Under § (e) of Article 26.04, “[i]f there is a material change in circumstances” after the initial determination whether the accused is indigent, the losing party may move for a reassessment of the accused’s status as indigent/non-indigent. Appointed counsel is to be reimbursed for services rendered *50according to a fee schedule set up in every county by the criminal court judges therein. Article 26.05, supra, §§ (a) & (b). And if the defendant is determined to be financially able, either before trial or anytime during trial pursuant to Article 26.04, he may be ordered to offset whatever portion of the expense of his representation he can afford, before that expense is incurred by the county. Article 26.05(e), supra.
Whatever portion the defendant has not already offset, the State may be able to recover after the fact. Article 26.05, § (d), provides:
“(d) All payments made under this article shall be paid from the general fund of the county in which the prosecution was instituted or habeas corpus hearing held and may be included as costs of court.”
(Emphasis added.) Presumably this cost of court is taxable to the defendant in the judgment of conviction.2 Thus the Legislature has provided a mechanism for recovering the expense of indigent representation. The defendant, once convicted, will have a judgment against him for court costs, and the judgment may be executed “as in civil actions.” Article 43.07, V.A.C.C.P. I am aware of no provision, however, that authorizes the assessment of costs to a defendant who has been acquitted at his trial. *51In any event, assuming arguendo that costs may be adjudged against a defendant even though he has been acquitted,3 no such costs were levied against applicant in the judgment of acquittal in this cause. With the entry of the judgment of acquittal, the charging instrument was finally disposed of as surely as by a motion to dismiss. Article 37.12, supra; Garcia v. Dial, supra. At that point in time no costs had been adjudged against applicant, so there was no judgment of costs against him “to carry ... into execution.” Id., at 528, quoting Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641, at 644 (1933). Absent at the very least some further pleading by which the trial court may reacquire jurisdiction, the trial court had no authority thereafter to order applicant to repay attorney’s fees.
This Court is not limited by the denomination of petitioner’s pleadings, but will look to the essence of the pleadings, including the prayers, as well as the record before us. Id., at 529; State ex rel. Wade v. Mays, 689 S.W.2d 893, at 897 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Although he applies nominally for a writ of prohibition, and prays that we order respondent to refrain from “the issuance of any further Capias or other instrument of coercion” to enforce her order of December 10, 1990, that applicant repay attorney’s fees, it is obvious that the more appropriate remedy is to issue the writ of mandamus, as in Garcia, directing respondent to set aside that order. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
MILLER and MALONEY, JJ., join.. The majority would read selective portions of Garcia v. Dial, supra, and Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, at 1070 (1926), to mean that in a criminal case the trial court “does not lose it’s [sic] general jurisdiction to act until all of the issues which arise as a result of the initial action have been resolved.” Op. at 44 (emphasis supplied).
*49As to “general jurisdiction to act," hornbook law says, “All Texas courts are courts of limited jurisdiction in the sense that each court has only such power as the constitution and laws enacted thereunder give such court.” 16 Tex.Jur.3d Courts § 46; Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641, at 644-645 (1933). "General jurisdiction” is an abstract delegation. In civil cases the requisite to actual exercise of such judicial power is jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cause or the parties to the action; that is to say, jurisdiction must "attach” to one or the other. 16 Tex.Jur.3d Courts § 47; Morrow v. Corbin, supra, 62 S.W.2d at 645. A criminal action requires both. Garcia v. Dial, supra, at 527.
Garcia v. Dial and Cleveland v. Ward, both supra, stand for the fundamental proposition that the trial court which first obtains subject matter and personal jurisdiction retains power and authority — to the exclusion of every other court — to resolve all essential issues in the cause and to dispose of them accordingly in its judgment, thereby exhausting its jurisdiction. Garcia v. Dial, supra, at 527-528; Cleveland v. Ward, supra, 285 S.W. at 1070-1071 (in suit in equity to cancel certain notes and deed of trust securing them and remove existing cloud on title, trial court has jurisdiction “to dispose of the whole subject-matter and adjust all the equities between the parties;”) accord: Pioneer Savings & Loan v. Peck, 20 Tex.Civ.App. 111, 49 S.W 160, at 169 (1898), writ refused (trial court authorized “to fully and finally adjudicate all the matters at issue between the parties incident to [equitable action to cancel mortgage]”). As these cases demonstrate, the judicial resolution and adjudication are made and concluded in the judgment rendered and memorialized in the judgment entered.
Here the only judgment rendered and entered was an acquittal upon the verdict of "not guilty,” and under the governing statute as a matter of law Curry was “at once discharged from all further liability.” See ante, at 42.
Furthermore, “jurisdiction” also means the trial court "must not only have jurisdiction over the person and the matter but authority to render the particular judgment.” Ex parte Duncan, 42 Tex.Cr.R 672, 62 S.W. 761, at 761 (1901); Ex parte Armstrong, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 362, 8 S.W.2d 674, at 676 (1928) (unless power or authority to perform contemplated act is properly provided, court is "without jurisdiction and its acts without validity”). Once the court adjudged an acquittal of Curry, the statute operating to discharge him, the court lost jurisdiction over his person, and thus power to render any further judgment or order in the premises.
. The provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure governing assessment and collection of costs against the accused are less than user-friendly. Article 1018 of the 1965 Code, a carryover from previous codes, provided:
“When the defendant is convicted, the costs and fees paid by the State under this title shall be a charge against him, except when sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life, and when collected shall be paid into the State Treasury.”
In 1985, Chapters 53 and One Hundred Three of the 1965 Code were recodified in what is now "Title 2” of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 269, p. 1300, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985. Although no substantive change was intended, id., § 6, at p. 1307, Article 1018 was simply repealed. Nevertheless, Title 2 contains a number of costs to be assessed against defendants convicted of felony and/or misdemeanor offenses. E.g., Article 102.004, V.A.C.C.P. (Jury Fee); Article 102.005, V.A.C.C.P. (Fees to Clerks); Article 102.013, V.A.C.C.P. (Court costs; crime stoppers assistance account); Article 102.051, V.A.C.C.P. (Misdemeanor and Felony Costs).
Article 42.15(a), V.A.C.C.P., reads:
“(a) When the defendant is fined, the judgment shall be that the defendant pay the amount of the fine and all costs to the state.”
Article 42.16, V.A.C.C.P., reads:
"If the punishment is any other than a fine, the judgment shall specify it, and order it enforced by the proper process. It shall also adjudge all costs against the defendant, and order the collection thereof as in other cases.”
(Emphases supplied.) Before the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, these provisions applied only to misdemeanor judgments, at least if we are to trust a caption appearing in Vernon’s Annotated C.C.P. (1950). That caption was omitted, however, from the 1965 Code. Thus, unless we are to read Article 42.15(a) to apply when the defendant is fined only, a punishment ordinarily authorized only in misdemeanor cases, see V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Chapter 12, these provisions do not presently have such limited application.
Prior to 1965, what are now Articles 43.01 through 43.13, V.A.C.C.P., provided for execution of judgments in misdemeanors only— again, according to a caption in Vernon's. That caption was also omitted from the 1965 Code. Thus, presumably Article 43.07, V.A.C.C.P., governing “Execution for Fine and Costs,” now applies to felonies and misdemeanors alike. That statute reads:
“In each case of pecuniary fine, an execution may issue for the fine and costs, though a capias was issued for the defendant; and a capias may issue for the defendant though an execution was issued against his property. The execution shall be collected and returned as in civil actions. When the execution has been collected, the defendant shall be at once discharged; and whenever the fine and costs have been legally discharged in any way, the execution shall be returned satisfied.”
From all these provisions I gather that, because the money expended from the general funds of the county to pay an indigent’s attorney’s fees "may be included as costs of court[,]” Article 26.05(d), supra, and because in a judgment of conviction “all costs” may be assessed against the accused, Articles 42.15 & 42.16, supra, and execution had thereon, Article 43.07, supra, attorney’s fees may be assessed to the convicted defendant as costs of court. Execution of the judgment may be had "as in civil cases.” Id. Of course, an indigent convict may not be imprisoned for failure to pay a fine or court costs, for that would violate the federal Equal Protection Clause, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971), and, in cases of felony, our own state constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, since there is no statutory provision for a felon to earn credit toward discharging court costs by incarceration. See Ex parte Smith, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 335, 8 S.W.2d 139 (1928) and Ex parte Byrd, 112 Tex.Cr.R. 19, 13 S.W.2d 855 (1929).
. Former Article 1018 provided that costs could be charged to the accused when convicted. Specific costs enumerated in Title 2 of the current Code are recoverable from the accused only after he has been convicted. Articles 42.15 and 42.16 contemplate assessment of costs in a judgment of conviction. Reimbursement of attorney’s fees may be imposed as a condition of probation. Article 42.12, § 11(11), V.A.C.C.P., or as a condition of parole, Article 42.18, § 8(g), V.A.C.C.P. But there is no provision for including an assessment of costs against the accused in a judgment of acquittal. Indeed, Article 37.12 provides that upon acquittal the accused "shall be at once discharged from all further liability upon the charge for which he was tried.”