concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that part of the majority opinion which affirms the conviction and sentence. However, I must respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which interprets K.R.S. 439.3401. The instructions given to the jury by the trial court were correct and followed the direction of this Court as announced in Huff v. Commonwealth, Ky., 763 S.W.2d 106 (1989).
Huff, supra, held that K.R.S. 439.3401 was constitutional because any parole eligibility disparity resulting from the application of the statute did not render it unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary. Huff recognized that it was a prerogative of the legislature to designate classifications for crimes and to provide a minimum time for service of any sentence imposed before there was an opportunity for parole eligibility. As noted in Huff, and as present here, the entire attack on the statute is based on the possible disparity in sentencing which might occur in regard to the minimum for parole eligibility.
Chapter 439 relates to probation and parole. K.R.S. 439.3401 creates the classification of violent offender and defines that term. Sanders argues that in the context of other sentencing statutes and holdings of this Court that the statute has denied him due process and equal protection of the law on the basis of proportionality.
When an equal protection issue is raised, the reviewing court must consider whether the subject statute has a rational basis which furthers some legitimate articulated State purpose. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973).
It is easy to argue that there is need for clarification of this Court’s decision in Berry v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 625 (1990) and Offutt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 799 S.W.2d 815 (1990). However, I believe the solution offered by the majority is not correct. There may be some disorder in the sentencing system, but it does not amount to ambiguity so as to deceive the violator or amount to a constitutional deprivation of either equal protection or due process. It could be argued that those who violate the law must run some risks in regard to what they believe to be the opportunities for parole eligibility. Certainly the current system requires some explanation to juries but it cannot be so burdensome when compared to the remedy announced by the majority in this case.
Parole is an executive function, not a judicial one. Parole is administered by the parole board which is an autonomous body pursuant to K.R.S. 439.320. The actual length of imprisonment has always been determined by the parole board and nothing in the majority opinion changes that situation. Any explanation to the jury must include such an analysis. The progressive decision of this Court in Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 794 (1987) is not subject to any collateral attack simply because a brief explanation of the complete truth in sentencing should be given. Sentencing always involves something of a legal mystery to most lay people who serve on juries and every effort must be made to assure that the jury will fully understand their responsibilities.
It has always been the responsibility of this Court to harmonize statutes which appear to be in conflict. Such reconciliation should follow the intent of the legislature. In this case, the clear intent of the General Assembly was to punish violators of violent crimes with longer sentences by restricting *397the time in which parole eligibility could be achieved. K.R.S. 532.100 and K.R.S. 532.-030 are earlier statutes and it is clear that the legislature recognized the ineffectiveness of such statutes to control crime of a violent nature when it enacted the more recent law.
It has been said that it is advisable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when making sentencing decisions. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) and Huff.
Certainly, any jury would expect a life sentence to mean life. The parole system now means that there is eligibility for release within twelve years, regardless of the nature of the crime. The classification of offenses is solely in the hands of the legislature just as is the imposition of penalties. Although it is totally unintentional, I believe that the majority has invaded the proper province of the General Assembly in resolving the situation.