ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR
Newton Byrd Aaron, III, appellee, has filed a petition to rehear. Chiefly, he is concerned that this Court increased Mary Aaron’s alimony in futuro even though she made no such request; thus, he contends, the *412issue was not before the Court. We find that Newton Aaron’s assertions are without merit and his Petition to Rehear is, hereby, respectfully, DENIED.
The issue of alimony in futuro was before this Court, and we know of no rule or principle of law which would thwart our efforts to do complete justice. “The rule is well settled in this state that under a prayer for general relief the court may grant any other and different relief from that specifically indicated and prayed for which is justified by the pleadings and the proof. The Connecticut Indemnity Company v. DeGalleford, 470 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tenn.1971) (citations omitted). Moreover,
a court of equity regards not mere forms, but looks to the substance of things; and if the facts appear upon the face of the bill, that entitle the party to a specific relief, although the forms of speech adopted in the bill be not technically the most appropriate, and although the form of prayer does not in totidum verbis embrace the specific relief to which the facts stated entitles the complainant.
Id. (citing Dodd v. Benthal, 51 Tenn. 601 (1871). In her counter-complaint, Mary Aaron specifically requested reasonable alimony and she prayed “for such other further and general relief which ... may appear and be proper.” Moreover, she addressed the adequacy of the alimony in her brief to this Court: “Despite the Court’s best efforts Wife is left is [sic] a dramatically lesser financial situation.” The Court’s modification is justified by the pleadings and the proof.
Furthermore, even if Newton Aaron is correct in his assertion that on appeal Mary Aaron did not request additional alimony, Tenn.RApp.P. 13(b) grants this Court considerable discretion to consider issues not presented for review in order to achieve fairness and justice.
Finally, as to Newton Aaron’s contention that he lacked notice of a possible increase in the alimony award, the Court’s modification constituted relief “within the purview and spirit of the equities set forth in [Mary Aaron’s] bill.” 470 S.W.2d at 7.
Mary Aaron has requested, by separate motion, that payment of the increased amount of alimony in futuro be ordered retroactive to June 18,1992, the date of the final decree. This we decline to do. The increased payments shall take effect on the date of the release of this order.
ANDERSON, C.J., DROWOTA, REID, JJ., and FONES, Special Justice, concur.