Dissenting opinion by
OWEN, Justice in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, and GONZALEZ, and HECHT, Justices, join.I respectfully dissent.
*484I do not agree with the Court’s conclusion that the manufacturer of a tomato chopper to be installed in a cannery is excluded from the scope of section 16.009 by virtue of the fact that the manufacturer did not also perform the installation. There is no such limitation in the statute. Chisholm-Ryder Company, Inc. constructed the tomato chopper. If the tomato chopper was an improvement to real property, Chisholm-Ryder comes within the purview of section 16.009. On the record before us, the question of whether the tomato chopper was an improvement is at least one of fact. The jury resolved this issue adversely to the Sonniers.
I.
The underlying facts are largely undisputed. For many years, the Texas Department of Corrections operated a canning plant at its facility in Sugar Land, Texas. In 1965, the TDC ordered a tomato chopping unit from Chisholm-Ryder. The unit was then manufactured in its entirety by Chisholm-Ryder. However, Chisholm-Ryder did not install the tomato chopper.
The tomato chopper weighs approximately 1200 pounds and was bolted to the floor of the Sugar Land cannery. It was connected to the next phase of the cannery process by steel piping which was anchored to the floor with bolts. The tomato chopper was powered by electrical lines enclosed in a rigid conduit attached to the side of the building, and to the floor, walls, and ceiling. The tomato chopper was controlled by a master switch at a main breaker panel connected to the chopper by another conduit. It had the capacity to chop ten to twelve tons of tomatoes per hour. In 1985, the tomato chopping unit was moved to the TDC’s Ramsey III Unit, where it was similarly installed. There was testimony from a representative of the TDC that if the TDC were to cease making tomato puree, it would sell the tomato chopper separately from the real estate.
John Sonnier, an employee of the TDC, lost his hand and a portion of his arm in 1990 while inspecting the tomato chopper at the Ramsey III Unit. Suit ensued in federal district court in which the jury found the tomato chopper was an improvement to the real property at the Sugar Land facility. The Sonniers have appealed an adverse judgment, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has certified the following question to us:
Whether a person or entity that manufactures a tomato chopping machine “constructs ... an improvement to real property” for the purpose of qualifying for the protection of the Statute of Repose, Tex. Civ.Pract. & Rem.Code § 16.009 when that machine is originally installed by another party on real estate, then removed and reinstalled by such other party on real estate at a different location.
II.
The Court has applied an inappropriate test in determining whether the tomato chopper is an improvement, and accordingly, whether Chisholm-Ryder can be the manufacturer of an improvement. The Court concludes that the chopper was “personalty” at the time it was made, and therefore, Chisholm-Ryder could never be the constructor of an improvement under section 16.009 unless Chisholm-Ryder installed the “personalty.” The Court has borrowed the law applicable to fixtures and rigidly applied it to the term “improvement” in section 16.009. Such a construction does not give effect to the plain meaning of the statute.
The inquiry should be what the parties objectively intended at the time the item or product in question was constructed. The principle consistently running throughout our case law, prior to today, has been that section 16.009 applies where the object or product was intended to become a part of real property at the time it was made. There is a fundamental distinction between items of this nature, such as an elevator or a furnace, and items of “personalty” such as a tank car or a painting. It is virtually incontrovertible that at the time a manufacturer makes an elevator or a furnace, it is contemplated that these items will become an integral part of a building. The examples of “personalty” relied upon by the Court to validate its rationale, the tank car in the case of Logan v. Mullis, 686 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.1985), and a painting bolted to a motel wall in the Court’s hypo*485thetical, are not analogous. It cannot be said that at the time these items were manufactured, they were intended to become improvements to real property within the meaning of section 16.009.
I agree with the Court that until an elevator or furnace or a comparable item becomes a part of real property, it is not an improvement. But once sufficiently annexed, the question raised under section 16.009 is did the manufacturer construct an improvement? The Court myopically and incorrectly focuses on the fact that at one point in the progression of events, the object was not attached to real property.
The Court grants repose only to contractors, builders, and repairmen. It does not and cannot answer the question of why the Legislature used much broader terms in the statute: “a person who constructs or repairs an improvement.” Where the Legislature intended to single out specific trades or professions in statutes of repose, it has done so. Accord Dedmon v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 950 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir.1992). In section 16.008, the Legislature extended protection only to “a registered or licensed architect or engineer.” Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code § 16.008. The Court’s holding today is at odds with the statute it construes.
III.
In reaching its conclusion that the tomato chopper at issue does not fall within the ambit of section 16.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code as a matter of law, the Court overrules the holding of one of our prior decisions and disapproves of no fewer than seven decisions of the courts of appeals. Conkle v. Builders Concrete Prods. Mfg. Co., 749 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.1988); Karisch v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 837 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); Big West Oil Co. v. Willborn Bros. Co., 836 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1992, no writ); Ablin v. Morton Southwest Co., 802 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied); Dubin v. Carrier Corp., 798 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ dism’d by agr.); Rodarte v. Carrier Corp., 786 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990, writ dism’d by agr.); Dubin v. Carrier Corp., 731 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ); Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), appeal dism’d, 459 U.S. 802, 103 S.Ct. 24, 74 L.Ed.2d 39 (1982).
There has been only one prior occasion on which this Court squarely addressed the substantive provisions of section 16.009.1 We did so in Conkle v. Builders Concrete Products Manufacturing Co. The facts are strikingly similar to those presented by the certified question. The plaintiff in Conkle was killed when he became trapped in a bin that was part of a concrete batch plant. Conkle, 749 S.W.2d at 490. Dillon Steel designed and manufactured the bins and hoppers. It did not install them, and it did not manufacture or construct the mixer apparatus that was joined with them to form the concrete batch plant. Id. The plant originally was sold and delivered to Lok Rok Corporation and assembled on Lok Rok’s property, but the entire plant was subsequently moved to the site where Douglas Conkle later lost his life. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to Dillon Steel as the manufacturer of an improvement, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 489. Our Court reversed.
Our decision in Conkle is significant to our inquiry here for several reasons, the most important of which is that the manufacturer did not install the bins and hoppers. The decision of the court of appeals in Conkle (which is unpublished) as well as the briefing in that court and in our Court show this very clearly. Contrary to the Court’s holding today, the fact that the manufacturer was not the installer was not dispositive of the question of whether section 16.009 applied. We held in Conkle that one in Chisholm-Ryder’s *486shoes may nevertheless rely on section 16.009. See id. at 491. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on Conkle for this very proposition in Corbally v. W.R. Grace & Co., 993 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir.1993): “Conkle preserved an offsite manufacturer’s repose, but only if the manufacturer ‘constructs the entire improvement and not a component part of it.’ ”
The Court attempts to undermine our pri- or holding by asserting that the writ of error before us in Conkle “assumed without questioning the propriety of extending repose protection to off-site manufacturers.” This is incorrect. One of the specific points before us was spelled out in the court of appeals’ decision under review. That court held:
Dillon argues that the question to be answered is whether or not the manufacturer of the improvement must actually erect or install the improvement to benefit from the statute as the person who “constructs or repairs improvements to real property.” We agree with Dillon’s analysis. We find the question has been answered. A manufacturer of a product is the one who performs or furnishes construction even though it does not install the item.
Slip op. at 18 (relying on Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 618 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.), appeal dism’d, 459 U.S. 802, 103 S.Ct. 24, 74 L.Ed.2d 39 (1982)).2
In our decision in Conkle, we discussed Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator, noting that the court of appeals in Conkle relied on Ellerbe for the proposition that “a person who constructs an improvement to real property need only furnish construction, even though it does not install the item.” Conkle, 749 S.W.2d at 491. If the fact that Dillon Steel had not installed the improvement were fatal to its defense, we would have so held in Conkle. We did not.
What we did hold was that a fact question was raised by the evidence. Id. Thus, notwithstanding that Dillon Steel had not installed the bins and hoppers, an issue remained to be tried under section 16.009. (That issue was whether the bins and hoppers in which Conkle died constituted an improvement to real property and whether Dillon Steel manufactured the entire unit or only component parts.) Id. The Court’s decision today overrules a fundamental holding in Conkle.
The Texas courts of appeals have similarly applied the straightforward wording of the statute. There is a long line of decisions from the courts of appeals which concludes that the protections extended by section 16.009 and its predecessor, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5536a, § 2, do not turn on whether the one who constructs the “improvement” also installs it. Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co. was the first to so hold. Otis designed and manufactured an elevator for a multi-storied building, but did not install it. Ellerbe, 618 S.W.2d at 872. The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of Otis under article 5536a, § 2. Id. at 874.
In line with Ellerbe, other decisions have concluded that a manufacturer does not have to be the installer to be afforded inclusion in this statute of repose. Big West Oil, 836 S.W.2d at 801 (affirming summary judgment for constructor of underground storage tanks who did not install them); Ablin, 802 S.W.2d at 791-92 (affirming summary judgment in favor of manufacturer of garage door opener even though there was no direct evidence that the unit was actually installed by the manufacturer); Dubin II, 798 S.W.2d at 2 (upholding summary judgment for marketer and distributor of heater who was not the installer); Rodarte, 786 S.W.2d at 95 (affirming summary judgment in favor of manufacturer of heater-air conditioner who had no role in installation or servicing); Dubin I, 731 S.W.2d at 654 (sustaining summary judgment for designer and manufacturer of same wall heater that was subject of Dubin II); see also McCulloch v. Fox & Jacobs, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918, 922-23 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, *487writ ref d n.r.e.) (summary judgment upheld in favor of owner who did not design or construct pool, but hired contractor, approved dimensions, and always intended to convey pool to Homeowners Association). Accord Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 613, 518 n. 13 (5th Cir.1992) (affirmed summary judgment for manufacturer of electrical bus duct); Dedmon v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 950 F.2d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 1992) (summary judgment for manufacturer of residential furnace affirmed).
We need not pass upon whether this principle of law was correctly applied to the facts in each of these cases, but the holding that section 16.009 may apply to those who construct but do not install improvements to real property was sound. It is derived from the plain meaning of the statute: “a person who constructs ... an improvement to real property.” Prior to today, only one Texas decision has reached an opposite conclusion. Williams v. U.S. Natural Resources, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.App.—Waco 1993, no writ) (relying in part on Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 800 F.Supp. 1430 (E.D.Tex.1992)).
Implicit in each of the cases which held that the manufacturer was entitled to repose even though it was not the installer was the conclusion that the manufacturers of petroleum storage tanks, garage door openers, elevators, air conditioners, and comparable items contemplate that their products will be attached to and become a part of real property. In deciding if something within or upon real property is an improvement within the meaning of section 16.009, the determinative factor should not be who installed it. The inquiry should include the intent of the parties at the time the item at issue was constructed, the manner in which it is used in conjunction with the property, and the manner in which it is attached or connected in some way to the real property.
The Court relies upon our decision in Logan v. Mullis, 686 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.1985), but applies the factors we articulated without analysis. In Logan, we delineated the factors used to determine whether personal property had become a fixture to real property. Id. at 607. The essence of our holding in that case was that we must look at the broader picture and to the objective intentions of the parties to ascertain whether something is an improvement. The decision in Logan concerned an item of personalty that was designed to remain personalty, a railroad tank ear. Accordingly, the Court looked only to the intent of the person who annexed it to realty. Id. If we apply the rationale of our holding in Logan to the facts before us today, it is obvious that the intentions and reasonable expectations of the constructor must also be considered.
The facts in Logan shed light on the reasoning which led to our decision. Logan acquired an easement on which he built a road. As part of that project, he built a culvert beneath the road where it intersected a creek. To accomplish this, he cut both ends off of a railroad tank car, put it in the creek bed, and covered it with gravel. Id. Logan had given the owners of the subservient estate the right to use this road, but he later became embroiled in a dispute with them and destroyed the culvert. Id. The question before us was whether Logan had the right to remove the culvert. Id. We set out the three factors relevant to determining “whether personalty has become a fixture, that is, a permanent part of the realty to which it is affixed”:
(1) the mode and sufficiency of annexation, either real or constructive;
(2) the adaptation of the article to the use or purpose of the realty; and
(3) the intention of the party who annexed the chattel to the realty.
Id.
We explained that the third criterion dealing with intent is preeminent, while the first and second criteria constitute evidence of intention. Id. In determining intent, Logan also instructs that we are to look at objective manifestations. Id. at 608. While as a general rule, intent is a question of fact, even testimony that the personalty was not meant to become a fixture will not prevail in the face of undisputed evidence to the contrary. ‘Where reasonable minds cannot differ, the issue is one of law rather than one of fact.” Id.
*488We held in Logan that the intention to make the tank ear a fixture was conclusively established by Logan’s conduct at the time he built the culvert. “The manner in which he affixed the tank ear to the realty, the circumstances surrounding the building and eventual destruction of the culvert, and the adaptability of the culvert to the peculiar topography of the land are all prime evidence of intention.” Id. We held as a matter of law that the culvert was a fixture. Id. at 609.
Logan was not a case construing section 16.009, but the principles it set out are instructive in determining the meaning of “improvement” as used in that statute. Those principles are not, however, the only factors to be considered in determining whether something is an improvement to real property within the meaning of section 16.009.
The inquiry in this case should be whether Chisholm-Ryder constructed an improvement. In other words, was it reasonable for Chisholm-Ryder to expect that its product would become a part of real property? This concept runs throughout our prior case law, although it has not been articulated in these exact words.
IV.
Admittedly, the Legislature did not give us precise guidelines for determining the outermost reach of section 16.009. However, the language of the statute cannot be read to exclude automatically those who do not construct the improvement on the job site. Most of the difficulty in the case law has been encountered in attempting to parse whether the item manufactured is an improvement or a component part of an improvement. See, e.g., Reddix v. Eaton Corp., 662 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
I agree with the observation of the Court and of the Fifth Circuit that the distinction drawn in Reddix and Conkle between an improvement versus a component part can be difficult to apply. I would articulate the distinction between what is and is not included under section 16.009 somewhat differently. Those who only supply materials, such as nuts, bolts, nails, concrete, or lumber, are not included. They do not “construct” an improvement, but merely provide materials. But where “construction” must take place, such as the construction of an elevator or oil storage tanks, the manufacturer is included within the scope of section 16.009 if its product does in fact become a part of real property and if it was the objective intent of the parties at the time the item was constructed that it would become an improvement.
Articulating the test for the application of section 16.009 in this manner does no violence to Conkle, Ablin, or Ellerbe, as the Court suggests. A fact question would remain under Conkle as to whether the bins and hoppers were an improvement. See Conkle, 749 S.W.2d at 491. The garage door opener in Ablin and the elevator in Ellerbe would fall within the scope of section 16.009 as a matter of law. See Ablin, 802 S.W.2d at 791-92; Ellerbe, 618 S.W.2d at 872. Only the result in Reddix was and is questionable, regardless of whether the test for the application of repose under section 16.009 is stated in terms of component parts versus an improvement, or in terms of whether the item was constructed with the view that it would become an improvement to real property. See Reddix, 662 S.W.2d at 722-24. In some cases, such as this one involving the tomato chopper, reasonable minds may differ as to what is an improvement, and a fact question is presented.
Aside from the “component parts” distinction, a few courts also have struggled with the concept of whether the reach of the statute includes manufacturers and suppliers of standardized goods such as garage door openers. Williams, 865 S.W.2d at 205-06; Dedmon, 950 F.2d at 249-50; Dayton, 800 F.Supp. at 1436-39. These decisions have considered whether the statute confines repose to those persons who supply individual expertise not susceptible of the quality control standards of a factory. The Dedmon decision attempted to answer that question and to determine if the Texas Legislature intended to focus on the actor or on the product in section 16.009. The court in Ded-mon observed:
We suspect that the Texas Legislature intended the repose statute to protect a specific class of economic actors — construe*489tion-industry professionals who perform certain functions. But the broad wording of the statute blurs the intended boundaries of that class.
950 F.2d at 249. The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded, based on Conkle, that our Court had adopted a product-oriented approach. Id. at 250.
While the Fifth Circuit found the boundaries blurred when determining what products should be deemed improvements when attached to realty, the court had no difficulty in concluding that the scope of section 16.009 is not dependent on whether the improvement was actually installed by the one who manufactured it. Judge Reavley, writing for the court, observed:
The statute’s plain words protect any person who “constructs ... an improvement to real property,” and do not distinguish whether the person constructs the improvement on the premises, or off of the premises for later installation by another.
Id. at 247.
The question of whether the Legislature intended to extend repose to manufacturers of mass-produced products, even if the products were intended to become and did become an improvement to real estate, must similarly be resolved by applying the straight-forward meaning of the words in the statute. The statute draws no distinction between an improvement that is mass-produced and one that is specifically tailored for a given piece of real property.
The intent of a statute of repose is to provide some ending point for the assertion of claims. The Legislature deemed repose appropriate and in the public interest for certain suits involving an improvement to real property. The basic policy considerations underpinning a statute of repose exist for both a manufacturer of a tomato chopper and a general contractor. Those policy considerations may not be coextensive; there may be additional factors weighing in favor of repose for one class of constructor as opposed to another. But that does not mean that repose is unavailable, as a matter of law or principle, to either class of constructor. The determining factor is what the Legislature has put in place. We must be guided by the statute itself.
The Court today rejects the interpretation of section 16.009 previously adhered to by this and other courts. In so doing, it has ignored fundamental principles in our jurisprudence. “[I]n the area of statutory construction, the doctrine of stare decisis has its greatest force.” Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182,186 (Tex.1968). I agree that we should not apply this principle rigidly, but there are no compelling reasons to overrule the long line of Texas cases interpreting section 16.009. The longstanding interpretation of the statute has wrought no hardships or injustices, and there is no indication whatsoever that the Legislature disagrees with our prior interpretation of the statute or the interpretation in numerous decisions of the courts of appeals. The courts of appeals construed the predecessor of section 16.009, art. 5536a § 2, beginning with Ellerbe in 1981. The Legislature reenacted this statute with very little change as part of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code in 1985. See Acts 1969, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, § 1, 1969 Tex.Gen.Laws 3242, 3253-54. As this Court has held:
The rule is well settled that when a statute is re-enacted without material change, it is presumed that the legislature knew and adopted the interpretation placed on the original act and intended the new enactment to receive the same construction.
Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. Trinity Portland Cement Div., 563 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex.1978). See also Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex.1984).
We must apply the statute as written. The ordinary meaning of “construct” includes the construction of a tomato chopper. Section 16.009 does not require the constructor to also be an installer. The Legislature could have, but did not, expressly limit this statute of repose to contractors and installers. Chisholm-Ryder constructed a tomato chopper. If the tomato chopper is an improvement, the statute of repose applies.
V.
I agree with the Court that the fact the tomato chopper was removed from the Sugar *490Land cannery and reinstalled at the Ramsey III Unit is not dispositive of whether the chopper was an improvement. However, I disagree with the Court that the subsequent annexation of the chopper at the Ramsey III Unit creates a new ten year period of repose. The protection intended from the statute of repose would be defeated if the time within which suit must be brought began to run anew upon relocation of the improvement. See Conkle, 749 S.W.2d at 491 (fact question existed as to whether bins and hoppers were an improvement even though there was some evidence they were portable); Karisch, 837 S.W.2d at 681 (heat exchanger an improvement as a matter of law notwithstanding evidence that heat exchangers were sometimes moved within the refinery or removed and sold); Johnson v. Machine Ice Co., 820 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (fact question as to whether ice plant was an improvement although there was evidence it was removable and could be relocated); Ablin, 802 S.W.2d at 790 (garage door opener improvement as a matter of law even though easily removable). The intent of the parties and the nature of the item’s use were to be considered in determining if the item was an improvement.
VI.
Applying the traditional factors our courts have considered in eases of this nature to the tomato chopper, there is at least a fact question as to whether it is an improvement. (See, e.g., Conkle, 749 S.W.2d at 491, where we found a fact issue existed as to whether the bins and hoppers were an improvement to real property.) Both the TDC and Chisholm-Ryder could reasonably have expected that the tomato chopper would be annexed to real property and become an improvement. The tomato chopper was ordered by the TDC, and then manufactured for the TDC. There could be little doubt that it was to be used and installed in a processing plant. It weighed approximately 1200 pounds and had the capacity to chop ten to twelve tons of tomatoes per hour. It was not a household product. The TDC and Chisholm-Ryder unquestionably knew that it would have to be firmly attached in some manner to a building, and that wiring, conduit, and tubing would connect it to the plant. These are facts from which a jury could reasonably find and did find that the tomato chopper was an improvement.3
Instead of focusing on the objective intent of the parties, and factors such as how the alleged improvement is annexed to the property and its adaptation to the use of the real property, the Court focuses on who performed the installation. This is a departure from our prior jurisprudence, and the Court cites no authority for this novel approach. Under this new test for what constitutes an improvement, an elevator in a high rise building is and at the same time is not an improvement, depending on one’s vantage point. The elevator is an improvement if you are the defendant who actually installed it, but it is not if you are the defendant who manufactured it. Surely, the Legislature never intended the word “improvement” to have such a meaning.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
The response to the question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should be that, based on the record before us, the manufacturer of the chopping machine constructed an improvement to real property within the meaning of *491section 16.009 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code if the tomato chopper is an improvement. Whether it was an improvement was a fact question answered by the jury.
. Section 16.009 provides in pertinent part:
§ 16.009. Persons Furnishing Construction or Repair of Improvements (a) A claimant must bring suit for damages ... against a person who constructs or repairs an improvement to real property not later than 10 years after the substantial completion of the improvement in an action arising out of a defective or unsafe condition of the real property or a deficiency in the construction or repair of the improvement.
Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.009.
. The issue was joined in the briefing in this Court. Conkle asserted: "The summary judgment evidence ... creates an issue of fact as to whether Dillon constructed an improvement on real property, or whether it merely constructed and fabricated component parts of machinery which were erected and placed on real property by persons other than Dillon." (Emphasis added.) Dillon Steel responded: “The question as to whether one must actually erect or install the improvement to claim protection of the statute was answered in Ellerbe.”
. The only issue submitted to the jury, to which it answered "yes”, was as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the tomato chopper was an "improvement” to real property at the Central Sugarland Unit?
"Improvement” means all additions and bet-terments to the premises and includes everything that permanently enhances the value of the premises, and may even he something easily removable so long as it is attached and intended to remain permanently as part of the building. Likewise, merely attaching something as part of the building does not make it an improvement unless it is intended to remain permanently part of the building.
You are instructed that to determine whether the tomato chopper was an improvement, you should consider the mode and sufficiency to which it was affixed to the premises, the adaption of it to the use or purpose of the premises, and the intention of the party who placed it in the premises. The intention of the party who does the annexing is preeminent; the other two factors are merely evidence of intent.