concurring and dissenting.
I concur to remanding this case to the Court of Appeals for a harm analysis. However, I dissent to the Court’s holding that the veniremembers were challengeable for cause.
Both parties in a criminal case have a statutory right to challenge veniremembers who have a bias or prejudice against a phase of the law upon which a party is entitled to rely. See Article 85.16(b)(8) and (c)(2), V.A.C.C.P. The obvious intent of Article 35.16 is to effectuate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury while also providing the prosecution a statutory right to an impartial jury. In other words, our Legislature has statutorily decided that both sides in a criminal case are entitled to a fair trial.
The veniremembers in this case were not challengeable for cause under this Court’s decision in Garrett v. State which overruled direct precedent, and has been used to overrule various other parallel precedents,1 of this Court. See Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 860 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), and at 861-64 (Campbell, J.) (discussing parallel precedents Garrett effectively overruled). Fairly and consistently applied, Garrett should cut a wide swath through this Court’s parallel precedents making no distinctions between defense challenges for cause and prosecution challenges for cause. See Garrett, 851 S.W.2d at 861-64 (Campbell, J., dissenting). To be consistent with Garrett, Howard, Zinger and Castillo, the Court should decide the veniremembers in this case were not challengeable for cause.
Garrett relied on what it characterizes as a veniremember’s “minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt” rationale to overrule precedent which had held a veniremember who categorically refuses in a capital case to consider affirmatively answering the “future dangerousness” special issue based on the facts of the offense itself is subject to a challenge for cause. See Garrett, 851 S.W.2d at 857-61.2 The rationale for the unprecedented new rule announced in Garrett is “a venireperson who categorically refuses to answer the [“future dangerousness”] special issue on nothing more than evidence of the capital offense itself may only be indicating that his threshold for proof beyond a reasonable doubt is somewhat higher than the minimum that the law recognizes as sufficient.”3 Radial v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 820 (Tex.Cr.App.) (Clinton, J., concurring in the judgment), cert.denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 614, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996) (explaining Garrett’s rationale); see Garrett, 851 S.W.2d at 860 (veniremember “who indicates he would set his reasonable doubt threshold higher than the legal minimum” does not demonstrate a prejudice against the law).4
*412After Garrett, this veniremember is not subject to a challenge for cause unless he says “he would not answer the [“future dangerousness”] special issue affirmatively [based on the facts of the offense itself] even if the facts of the offense itself convinced him beyond a reasonable doubt that” this special issue should be answered affirmatively. See Rachal, 917 S.W.2d at 820-21 (Clinton, J., concurring in the judgment). Under Garrett, this veniremember “really does hold the State to a higher burden of proof than the law allows.” Id.
Garrett’s “minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt” rationale was applied in Castillo to overrule more precedent which had held a veniremember who categorically refuses to consider convicting on the basis of one eyewitness is subject to a challenge for cause.5 See Castillo, 913 S.W.2d at 532-35.6 After Castillo, this veniremember is not subject to a challenge for cause unless he categorically refuses to consider convicting on the basis of one eyewitness even if he believes that witness beyond a reasonable doubt. See Castillo, 913 S.W.2d at 533; see also Rachal, 917 S.W.2d at 818-21 (Clinton, J., concurring in the judgment).7
Garrett’s “minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt” rationale was applied in Howard to overrule more parallel precedent to the effect that a veniremember who categorically refuses in a capital case to consider affirmatively answering the “future dangerousness” special issue without evidence the defendant had committed a prior murder is subject to a challenge for cause. See Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 127-29 (op. on reh’g).8 After Howard, this veniremember is not subject to a challenge for cause unless she categorically refuses to consider affirmatively answering the “future dangerousness” special issue without evidence the defendant had committed a prior murder even if other evidence convinces her beyond a reasonable doubt that this special issue should be answered affirmatively. See Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 127 (op. on reh’g); see also Rachal, 917 S.W.2d at 818-21 (Clinton, J., concurring in the judgment).
In this case, the veniremembers categorically refused to consider the minimum (or full range of) punishment for a defendant convicted as a principal. Under Garrett’s rationale, these veniremembers were not subject to a challenge for cause. They did not say they would categorically refuse to consider the minimum punishment even if the evidence otherwise convinced them the minimum punishment was appropriate. These veniremembers merely indicated their threshold for being convinced the minimum *413punishment should be assessed was “somewhat higher than the minimum that the law recognizes as sufficient.” Compare Rachal, 917 S.W.2d at 820 (Clinton, J., concurring in the judgment). “Unless we are prepared to hold that jurors must always” assess the minimum punishment, then under Garrett it cannot be said that such veniremembers have “a bias against the law.” Compare id.
Garrett rejects the principle that venire members must be able to keep an open mind with respect to punishment until they hear the evidence in the case being tried. But, this essentially is the principle the Court’s opinion applies in this case to decide the defense challenges for cause were erroneously denied. See majority opinion, Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.2d at 4 (prospective jurors must be able to keep an open mind with respect to punishment until they hear the evidence in the case being tried).
To support its holding in this case, footnote three of the Court’s opinion claims “the State is entitled to jurors who can accept that the maximum legal punishment will be appropriate in some circumstances for a defendant found guilty as a party.” (Emphasis in Original). This states a pre-Garrett holding of this Court in Phillips v. State, 701 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), cert.denied, 477 U.S. 909, 106 S.Ct. 3285, 91 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986) (veniremember who says he could never answer special issues in such a way as to require imposition of the death penalty for defendant found guilty of capital murder as a party was subject to prosecution challenge for cause).
Therefore, the Court essentially relies on Phillips for its holding in this ease. But, Phillips and Garrett cannot be reconciled. Under Garrett, a veniremember like the one in Phillips is not challengeable for cause because this veniremember merely indicates his “threshold for proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is somewhat higher than the minimum that the law recognizes as sufficient. See Garrett, 851 S.W.2d at 860. It would appear Phillips is another one of Garrett’s collateral casualties. See Garrett, 851 S.W.2d at 861-64 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Garrett’s “minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt” rationale is an irrelevant rabbit trail, and I would use this case to overrule Garrett. While a veniremember like the one in Garrett arguably may not increase the State’s burden of proof, there is another and more important reason why this veniremember is subject to a challenge for cause which Garrett and its progeny completely ignored even though raised by the losing party in each one of these cases. See Zinger, 932 S.W.2d at 518 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (Garrett and Castillo completely ignored the losing party’s alternative contentions on why the veniremembers were subject to a challenge for cause).9
The simple fact of the matter is the venire-members in Garrett and Castillo demonstrated an inability to follow the law by categorically refusing to consider all the evidence in deciding guilt and punishment issues. But see majority opinion, Johnson, 406 at 4 (prospective jurors must be able to keep an open mind with respect to punishment until they hear the evidence in the case being tried). A trial court does not abuse its discretion to decide that a veniremember, who categorically refuses to consider affirmatively answering the “future dangerousness” special issue based on the facts of the offense itself, demonstrates an inability to consider all the evidence in answering this special issue which also effectively demonstrates an inability to consider the full range of punishment for the offense. A trial court does not abuse its discretion to decide that a veniremember, who categorically refuses to consider convicting on the basis of one eyewitness, demonstrates an inability to consider all the evidence in deciding guilt. A trial court does not abuse its discretion to decide these veniremembers demonstrate an inability to follow their oaths to render a verdict “according to the law and the evidence.” See Article 35.22, V.A.C.C.P.10
*414Garrett’s “minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt” rationale also is based on a flawed premise. This premise is that without Garrett we must be “prepared to hold that jurors must always be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of legally sufficient evidence.” See Castillo, 913 S.W.2d at 533; Rachal, 917 S.W.2d at 820 (Clinton, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining the premise of the “minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt” rationale). This is incorrect. All we must be prepared to hold is that jurors must be able to consider all the evidence in deciding guilt and punishment issues. See Article 35.22. And, a veniremember who categorically refuses to do so is challengeable for cause. This is what I always thought the law was until Garrett and its progeny came along.
This case demonstrates Garrett’s flawed premise. In reversing this conviction, I do not understand the Court’s opinion to hold that jurors must always assess the minimum punishment. I understand the Court’s opinion to hold jurors should be able to consider assessing the minimum punishment under appropriate circumstances. This is no different from saying a veniremember should be able to consider convicting on the basis of one eyewitness (Castillo) or should be able to consider affirmatively answering the “future dangerousness” special issue based on the facts of the offense (Garrett).
However, Garrett has effectively interpreted Article 35.16 to mean the parties (or, at least the prosecution) in a criminal case are not entitled to a favorable ruling on a challenge for cause to veniremembers who categorically refuse to consider all the evidence in deciding guilt and punishment issues.11 In Garrett the veniremember demonstrated an inability to consider the full range of punishment by categorically refusing to consider all the evidence in answering the “future dangerousness” special issue. Similarly the veniremembers in this case demonstrated an inability to consider all the evidence in deciding punishment by categorically refusing to consider the full range of punishment for a defendant convicted as a principal. They were not challengeable for cause under Garrett.
In this case, the Court should either overrule Garrett or follow it. The Court picks a third and what I consider to be the least desirable option which is to wholly ignore Garrett creating a glaring inconsistency and imbalance in how the Court interprets Article 35.16(b)(3) (prosecution challenges for cause) and Article 35.16(c)(2) (defense challenges for cause).
As this case demonstrates, Garrett apparently applies only to prosecution challenges for cause which means the citizens of this State, acting through them officials, are not entitled to a fair trial. This stands the clear legislative intent of Article 35.16(b)(3) on its head.
With these comments, I join the Court’s judgment to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a harm analysis. I dissent to everything else.
. See Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 126-30 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996) (op. on reh'g) (prosecution challenge for cause erroneously granted); Zinger v. State, 932 S.W.2d 511, 513-14 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996) (same); Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529, 532-37 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995) (same).
. Therefore, under Garrett, the defense apparently is not entitled to a favorable ruling on a challenge for cause to a veniremember who categorically refuses in a capital case to consider affirmatively answering the mitigating evidence special issue based on the facts of the offense. But cf. First v. State, 846 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
. Therefore, under Garrett, a veniremember who says he will always affirmatively answer the "future dangerousness" special issue based on the facts of the offense itself is not subject to a challenge for cause since this veniremember only holds the prosecution to the low "end of the range” of reasonable doubt. See Garrett, 851 S.W.2d at 860; Castillo, 913 S.W.2d at 533 (as long as the law permits a range of "reasonable doubt," the veniremember who says he will hold the prosecution to the "high end of the range” is not requiring anything that the law does not tolerate).
.Garrett mischaracterizes the nature of the inquiry. The inquiry in cases like Garrett is whether the veniremember can consider affirmatively answering the "future dangerousness” special issue based on the facts of the offense. This inquiry does not seek to commit the veniremember to answer this special issue affirmatively based on the facts of the offense. The inquiry is only whether the veniremember can consider all the evidence in answering the "future dangerousness’’ special issue. This has absolutely nothing to do *412with a veniremembers "minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt.”
. Castillo repeated Garrett's mistake by mischar-acterizing the nature of the inquiry. The inquiry is whether the veniremember can consider all the evidence in deciding guilt which has nothing to do with a veniremember's "minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt.”
. Therefore, after Castillo, the defense apparently is not entitled to a favorable ruling on a challenge for cause to a veniremember who categorically refuses to consider an affirmative defense or any other defense based on the testimony of a single witness. And, the prosecution apparently is not entitled to a favorable ruling on a challenge for cause to a veniremember who categorically refuses to consider convicting without eyewitness testimony despite this Court’s precedents to the contrary. See White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 809, 822 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 962, 110 S.Ct. 2575, 109 L.Ed.2d 757 (1990) (veniremember who cannot convict without eyewitness testimony is subject to a challenge for cause). The prosecution also is apparently not entitled to a favorable ruling on a challenge for cause to a veniremember who categorically refuses to convict without 1,000 eyewitnesses. The defense also is apparently not entitled to a favorable ruling on a challenge for cause to a venire-member who categorically refuses to consider an affirmative defense without 1,000 eyewitnesses.
. After the veniremember in Zinger categorically refused to consider convicting on the basis of one eyewitness, he later said he could never get to the point of saying even if he believed the witness beyond a reasonable doubt when the venire-member was asked the extra question required by Garrett and Castillo. See Zinger, 932 S.W.2d at 512. This demonstrates an inability to consider all the evidence in deciding guilt since the veniremember said he could never get to the point of considering whether the eyewitness convinced him beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court nevertheless held the veniremember in Zinger was not challengeable for cause. See id.
. Howard repeated Garrett's and Castillo's mistakes by mischaracterizing the nature of the inquiry.
. Fairness requires that a judicial opinion address all the contentions made by the losing party on appeal especially when the Court has used Garrett to overrule more precedents and to reverse more convictions costing the tax payers millions of dollars in retrials.
. This Court has yet to address whether the veniremembers in cases like Garrett and Castillo *414demonstrate an inability to consider all the evidence in deciding guilt and punishment issues even though the losing party made this contention in each one of these cases. See Footnote 10. Garrett's “minimum threshold level of reasonable doubt” rationale does not answer, and is completely unresponsive to, the contention that these veniremembers categorically refuse to consider all the evidence in deciding guilt and punishment issues. See Zinger, 932 S.W.2d at 518 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting).
. Therefore, under Ganett a defendant is not entitled to a favorable ruling on a challenge for cause to a veniremember who categorically refuses to consider all the evidence in answering the mitigating evidence special issue at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. But see Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370, 399-400 (Tex.Cr.App.1994).