concurring in part; dissenting in part. Sherman Renshaw’s remedy in this case is Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111(a) (1987), which was in effect at the time of his sentencing. That provision provides that a circuit court may-correct an illegal sentence at any time. See also Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992). Because Renshaw’s original thirty-year sentence exceeds the statutory maximum of twenty years, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111(a), that sentence should have been reduced as provided under § 16-90-111 (a). The trial court erred in refusing to do so. In this appeal, the majority court is correct in holding the trial court erred in failing to award Renshaw relief, but the majority is wrong in correcting Renshaw’s sentence by granting a writ of habeas corpus.
In authorizing the remedy of habeas corpus to correct Renshaw’s thirty-year illegal sentence, the majority has added a means by which a prisoner can now circumvent Rule 37 and its time limitations that control illegal-sentencing matters. Rule 37.1 in pertinent part provides that a prisoner may have his or her original sentence modified on the ground that (a) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States or this state, or (b) the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or (c) the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law, or (d) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. However, to obtain such relief, the prisoner is required to file a petition to correct an illegal sentence within ninety days from the conviction judgment and pronouncement of sentence. Rule 37.2.
Here, the appellant failed to file a direct appeal, nor did he file a timely postconviction petition. Arkansas law is well settled that a habeas corpus proceeding will not be issued as a substitute for postconviction relief. Mackey v. Lockhart. 307 Ark. 321, 819 S.W.2d 702 (1991). In my opinion, Renshaw’s illegal thirty-year sentence can be corrected only under § 16-90-111(a), not by a writ of habeas corpus.
In conclusion, I also agree with the majority in holding the trial court erred when it modified Renshaw’s ten-year sentence to run consecutively rather than concurrently as provided in Renshaw’s original order. The rule is well settled that once a valid sentence has been put into execution, the trial court is without jurisdiction to modify, amend, or revise it. Redding v. State, 293 Ark. 411, 738 S.W.2d 410 (1987). Because the trial court entered an illegal ten-year consecutive sentence, the trial court’s order should be corrected, as is permitted under § 16-90-111 (a).
Corbin, J., joins this opinion.