dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc.
There is nothing more hollow than expressions of sympathy by judges over an injustice that the law permits them to redress. There was no compelled outcome here. Instead, there was a serious misjudgment that perpetuates a grave injustice. The en banc process permits us to remedy such an injustice by acknowledging the obvious: this is a case of “exceptional importance” that requires deliberation by the full court. See Fed. R.App. P. 35(a)(2).5 I therefore am once again disheartened that three members of the court have voted to prevent en banc review. See Igartúa v. United States, 654 F.3d 99, 111-12 (1st Cir.2011) (Lipez, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
It is true that en banc review is reserved for the exceptional case. It is also true that not every “unjust” decision will be a matter of exceptional importance under Rule 35(a). But the denial of en banc review here raises the obvious question: if this case does not warrant the full court’s attention, what case does? Two families were tragically harmed by an institution of the federal government. The betrayal of the public trust could not be more egregious. Two district judges and a member of the panel first hearing this case have found a basis in law to redress this betrayal. Three members of our court have voted to reconsider the panel’s unfortunate decision. Given these circumstances, it is frustrating in the extreme to witness the aversion to en banc review play out again.
This institutional bias against en banc review goes beyond the language of the rule emphasizing that en banc rehearing is generally disfavored. It is grounded, in part, in the human dynamics of an appellate court. The en banc process is deeply divisive. It requires colleagues to review the work of colleagues and sometimes judge that work negatively. There is also a fear that line drawing will become too difficult. If en banc review is granted here, the worry goes, how can we deny it there? These feelings and fears have no place in the en banc calculus. We can move beyond the hard feelings of the en banc process. We can draw distinctions in *529principled ways. Our job requires us to do these things.
This case is moored deeply in its facts and, ultimately, requires a judgment about when the families should have been on notice of the FBI’s “reprehensible” role in their decedents’ murders. Donahue v. United States, 684 F.3d 615, 616 (1st Cir.2011) (using that term to describe the FBI’s conduct). In urging en banc review, I acknowledge that the panel majority’s conclusion reflects careful thought and a good-faith attempt to deal with difficult facts. It is, however, palpably wrong. The majority correctly observes that “courts must apply legal rules even-handedly,” id. at 629, and they purport to apply a “rule” that requires rejection of appellants’ claims as time-barred. But the issue here does not turn on a bright-line rule; rather, the question is one of reasonableness. See id. at 623 (“[Tjhese appeals involve only the objective reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ failure to discern at an earlier time both their injury and its likely cause.”). Determining whether conduct was reasonable requires us to make a judgment call. In making that call, we fail in our responsibility if we do not test its correctness by applying what our late First Circuit colleague, Judge Frank M. Coffin, called “the justice nerve.” See Frank M. Coffin, The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the Federal Appellate Bench 222 (1980).
To be sure, we may not disregard applicable legal doctrine simply to accomplish justice. No matter what the equities, we may not “take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver [of sovereign immunity] beyond that which Congress intended,” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118, 100 S.Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979). “Neither, however, should we ... narrow the waiver that Congress intended.” Id. In opening the federal courts to tort claims against the United States, Congress made plain its objective to treat fairly individuals harmed by the conduct of government actors. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (describing the FTCA as “the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit”); id. at 140, 71 S.Ct. 153 (“The primary purpose of the Act was to extend a remedy to those who had been without it....”). Although we are not “free to construe [the FTCA statute of limitations] so as to defeat its obvious purpose, which is to encourage the prompt presentation of claims,” Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, we also should not make the reasonableness judgment in a particular case without regard for the FTCA’s objective “to mitigate unjust consequences,” Feres, 340 U.S. at 139, 71 S.Ct. 153.
Here, even without taking into account the egregiousness of the government’s conduct, the facts favor the Hallorans and the Donahues. Our earlier precedent had carved out a path that should have led the panel majority to conclude that the Hallorans’ and Donahues’ suits against the United States were timely. As I shall explain, the circumstances here are readily distinguishable from those of other, related cases in which we have found the plaintiffs’ actions to be late. Moreover, when measured against the only just outcome in this case, the majority’s rejection of the Hallo-ran and Donahue claims as time-barred is not only wrong, but inexcusably so.
The panel majority concludes that the plaintiffs reasonably should have known the factual basis for their claims by September 2, 1998, based solely on “information that was generally available at the time of the Salemme hearings.” Donahue, 634 F.3d at 625. The critical information was “the avalanche of publicity” surrounding John Morris’s testimony in April *5301998, id., supplemented by subsequent publicity about the ongoing hearings, most notably publicity on September 2 surrounding Stephen Flemmi’s admission that he had been told of Brian Halloran’s tip to the FBI about Roger Wheeler’s murder. Undoubtedly, these press reports concerning Morris and Flemmi were a significant development in unwrapping the relationship between the FBI and Bulger/Flemmi. In none of our other cases, however, were these early-stage reports the only basis for attributing knowledge of the relationship to the plaintiffs. Among other factors, we have emphasized Judge Mark L. Wolfs decision in September 1999 — a year after the cutoff date imposed by the majority in this case — as an important piece of the puzzle.
As examples of other approaches to the accrual date, in the Roger Wheeler case (the other plaintiff in McIntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.2004)), where the cut-off date for accrual was May 1999, one family member had spoken publicly on 60 Minutes suggesting actual knowledge of a connection between the FBI and Bulger/Flemmi before the cut-off date, and other family members were aware of that broadcast, among other news reports. Id. at 49. In Rakes v. United States, 442 F.3d 7 (1st Cir.2006), where the cutoff also was in May 1999, the panel referred to the “speculation” before September 1998 about John Connolly’s protection of Bulger and Flemmi, which triggered a duty to inquire. Id. at 23. We then concluded that the claim accrued “by late 1998” after Rakes’s own trial and the publication of articles surrounding Flemmi’s. Id. (emphasis added). Adopting that same timeline based on the same publicity would save the Hallorans’ claim. As for Michael Donahue, whose claim was filed a bit later, it is significant that he was an innocent bystander while Rakes was immersed in the Bulger/Flemmi history as a result of his own trial in late May and June 1998 (for perjury, because he lied to the grand jury about whether Bulger forced him to sell his — Rakes’s—liquor store). If “late 1998” was the appropriate accrual date for the Rakes family, it would be appropriate to conclude that the accrual date for the Donahues was months later (arguably as late as Judge Wolfs decision in September 1999). In addition, much of the publicity cited in Rakes referred to the FBI’s acquiescence to criminal activity other than murder — which would not have alerted the plaintiffs to the much more outrageous link between the FBI and the killings of their family members. Id. at 22-23.
In Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d 444 (1st Cir.2005), where the cutoff date was May 2000, we noted the April 1998 publicity surrounding Morris’s testimony but also emphasized newspaper articles that were published in 1999 and Judge Wolfs opinion. The panel wrote: “Agent Morris’s testimony and Judge Wolfs opinion easily provide the requisite knowledge that the FBI protected Bulger and Flemmi from prosecution and emboldened them to commit crimes, including the murder of Callahan.” Id. at 454. Moreover, we said that “Judge Wolfs statement [suggesting that Bulger and Flemmi may have played a role in the Wheeler, Halloran, and Callahan murders] would prompt a reasonable person to further investigate the matter.” Id. (emphasis added). By no means did we suggest that the publicity surrounding Morris’s testimony more than a year earlier was enough on its own to start the running of the clock. Likewise, in Patterson v. United States, 451 F.3d 268 (1st Cir.2006), the plaintiffs’ claims were rejected “most importantly” because one of the plaintiffs had been interviewed about the FBI’s possible role in the murder at issue before the cutoff date — not because of the news accounts. Id. at 273.
*531It is noteworthy that, in all of these cases, the accrual cutoff date was later than the dates in the present case (September 25, 1998 and March 1999). As more time passed — particularly with the publication of Judge Wolfs opinion in September 1999 — Morris’s sensational testimony about the FBI’s complicity became more plausible. As Judge Torruella points out in his dissent from the panel majority opinion, there was no good reason in the early stages of the publicity for these particular plaintiffs to pay attention to facially outrageous allegations concerning the FBI’s relationship with Bulger and Flemmi. See Donahue, 684 F.3d at 633 (Torruella, J., dissenting). Halloran had identified Flynn as his assailant, and the government thought that allegation sufficiently reliable to try Flynn for the crime. By September 1998, it may have been reasonable to conclude that the plaintiffs here should have had a “ ‘hunch, hint, [or] suspicion’ ” of a claim, McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 52 (citation omitted), at most imposing a duty of inquiry. But that inquiry cannot be presumed to have had instantaneous results and, indeed, the government was still unwilling in 2005 to concede that Connolly had disclosed Halloran’s conduct to Bulger and Flemmi. See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 637 (Torruella, J., dissenting). At a minimum, the claims here should not have been found to accrue, as in Rakes, before “late 1998” and, in light of the unique scenario involving Jimmy Flynn, and Donahue’s bystander status, the plaintiffs were entitled to a more generous view of the timing.
I can safely say that no one on our court is happy with the result reached by the panel majority in this case. All of us recognize the injustice that has been done to the Donahue and Halloran families. But we could have remedied this injustice. The en banc process is designed for just this situation, where the flawed application of precedent by a panel majority should be corrected. I deeply regret that we have failed to do so. I therefore dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.
. Although en banc rehearing is "not favored,” exceptions exist where "en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions” or "the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a).