Appellee’s motion for rehearing is granted. Our prior opinion is withdrawn, and the following is now our opinion.
This is an appeal from the granting of a motion for directed verdict in a suit for an alleged conversion and for the alleged denial of Cathey Conroy’s constitutional rights. For the reasons below, we affirm.
In her first two points of error, Conroy contends that the evidence either established conversion as a matter of law or was sufficient for the special issues to be. submitted to the jury. The evidence showed that Conroy failed to pay Peter Manos rent in October, 1981, and that Manos then filed a forcible detainer suit. It further showed that the constable put a notice to vacate on Conroy’s door and that her property would be removed anytime after 10:00 a.m. She was able to avoid the eviction by persuading the justice of the peace to rule that her pet deposit could be applied to October’s rent with her paying the difference. In November, Conroy again failed to pay rent, allowed a default judgment to be rendered against her for possession of the premises, and failed to vacate the premises with her belongings. Manos obtained a writ of restitution, and the constables, with two of Manos’ employees assisting them, executed the writ on December 3, 1981, by placing Conroy’s possessions on the sidewalk.
Conroy does not claim that the justice court had no authority to issue the writ or that the constables had no authority to execute it. She contends, rather, that the writ does not call for the constable to remove her belongings. We disagree. The writ calls for the constable to enter the building and that “peaceable possession thereof [be] restore[d] to the said plaintiff. ...” To put the landlord in possession the officer must remove the tenant’s effects. Ferguson v. Barnes, 274 S.W. 277 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1925, writ dism’d). Thus, the constable was acting within the law, and Manos’ employees committed no conversion in assisting him. We overrule Conroy’s first two points.
*126In three points of error, Conroy contends that there was inadequate notice in the writ of restitution that her belongings would be placed outside of her apartment if she failed to vacate and thus her due process rights under U.S. CONST, amend. XIV were violated. She contends, therefore, that the court erred in directing a verdict because the violation of her constitutional right established as a matter of law, or alternatively, was sufficient to raise a fact issue that she had a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981). While property rights are protected under the statute, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972); Hohensee v. Grier, 373 F.Supp. 1358 (M.D.Penn.1974), aff'd, 524 F.2d 1403 (3rd Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 874, 97 S.Ct. 196, 50 L.Ed.2d 158 (1976), as appellant concedes, suit may be brought if a private person engages with state officials in prohibited conduct. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). As pointed out earlier, the writ commanded the constable to restore peaceable possession to Manos, and that result could only be reached by dispossessing the apartment of Conroy’s possessions. Furthermore, the forcible detainer suit informed Conroy of Manos’ demand for “possession of the premises.” Thus the dispossession was not in itself wrongful.
Moreover, dispossession of the apartment did not in itself deprive her of her property. Conroy had notice that her right to occupy the apartment had terminated and that she might be dispossessed at any time. She was free to make any arrangements necessary for its protection before or after execution of the writ. We find no direct basis in the Rules of Civil Procedure, as does one of the dissents, for holding that she had the right as a matter of due process to be notified of the time and manner of executing the writ. So far as this record shows, she could have obtained that information by timely inquiring. She had full opportunity to appear and defend the suit, but failed to do so. She could have avoided the loss by her own efforts. Therefore, she cannot complain that she was deprived of her property under color of legal process. We hold that either the forcible detainer suit papers or the writ of restitution constituted due process notice to Conroy that she had to either vacate the premises or her possessions would be removed. There being no constitutional violation, there can be no violation of Conroy’s rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. We overrule her third, fourth, and fifth points of error.
In her sixth point of error, Conroy contends that the court erred in granting a directed verdict because the evidence shows that her security deposit was not returned. The record shows that Manos was reasonable in not returning the deposit since rent was due and unpaid at the time Conroy surrendered possession of the premises and there was no controversy over the amount of rentals due and unpaid. Conroy did not comply with the requirements of former TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, §§ 3(b), (4)(c),1 much less with the requirements of the lease. We overrule her sixth point.
In her last point of error, Conroy contends that, if she abandoned the property, Manos had the duty to protect it. In the first place, the evidence does not show that she had abandoned the property. In this respect, the testimony from Conroy was that she was living in her apartment most of the month of November, that she was boxing up the property to move to another apartment, and that she came to the apartment to pick up her possessions. Under these facts, Conroy cannot claim to have abandoned the property. Cf. Fender v. Schaded, 420 S.W.2d 468, 473 (Tex.Civ. App.—Tyler 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In the *127second place, we hold that Manos, the landlord, had no duty to protect or to store Conroy’s property. When Conroy was served with process of notice to vacate the premises, that notice required not only that Conroy remove her person but also that she remove her personal property. When she failed to remove her property as required under the forcible detainer suit, she placed her property at risk. Indeed, Con-roy, rather than Manos, had a duty to protect her property, in which duty she failed. We overrule Conroy’s last point.
Affirmed.
Costs taxed against Conroy.
. Act of Sept. 1, 1973, ch. 433, 1973 Tex.Gen. Laws 1182, 1183, repealed by Act of Jan. 1, 1984, ch. 576, § 6, 1983 Tex.Gen.Laws 3729; now enacted at TEX.PROP.CODE ANN. §§ 92.109, 92.-104 (Vernon Supp.Pamp.1984).