OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
McCORMICK, Judge.We granted the State’s motions for leave to file motions for rehearing in both of these eases to examine the panel’s holding as to the trial court’s failure to appoint separate counsel for each defendant. The panel opinion correctly set out the law applicable to these cases:
“In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 [98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426] (1978), the United States Supreme Court explored the risks inherent in the representation of co-defendants and set forth standards for review when those risks were made known to the trial court. The Court held that when the possibility of inconsistent interests between co-defendants is brought home to the trial court, the court has an affirmative duty to assure that the co-defendants are not deprived of their right to the effective assistance of counsel. Once this duty arises, the trial court has an obligation either to see that the co-defendants are represented by separate counsel or to ‘take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant separate counsel.’ Id. at 484 [98 S.Ct. at 1178]. Furthermore, the Court held that a defendant who has made an objection to joint representation need not show specific harm and prejudice. Reversal is automatic whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection.
“Two years later the United States Supreme Court again took up the problem of conflict of interest. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 [100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333] (1980), the Court resolved two issues specifically reserved in Holloway. First, the Court held that without a timely objection to joint representation, trial courts have no affirmative duty to inquire whether a conflict of interest exists. As the Court put it, ‘Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry.’ Id. at 347 [100 S.Ct. at 1717]. Second, the Court held that without a trial objection, Holloway’s presumption of harm will not be applied. ‘In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ Id. at 348 [100 S.Ct. at 1718].” Pp. 490-491
Guadalupe Lerma—Cause No. 62,537
The docket sheet shows that on June 20, 1978, after arraigning both appellants, the *495trial court inquired of appellants and their counsel as to a possible conflict of interest. The docket sheet reflects that the trial court was informed there would be no problem in that area. On July 31,1978, the day trial was to begin, defense counsel filed a motion for continuance at 10:30 a.m. which contained the following language:
“That Defendant, LUPE LERMA, does not wish to be represented by the attorney of record, ROBERT NINO, and the fact that Defendant, LUPE LERMA does not wish to be represented by ROBERT NINO, will jeopardize the trial of this cause in that the Defendant, LUPE LER-MA, might testify against Defendant, SAL LERMA, JR.”
At 11:55 a.m., before the jury was selected and impaneled, the trial court held a hearing on the above motion. The pertinent portion of that hearing is transcribed below:
“THE COURT: ... Now then, the Court specifically finds that on June 20th, 1978, the Defendants appeared, as stated on the docket sheet, with their lawyer, Luis DeLeon, who is an employee of the law offices of Robert Nino and the Defendants were duly arraigned and their bond set. Now then, at that time, the Court made inquiry as to whether or not there was any conflict of interest and there was none expressed at that time and one lawyer was to represent both Defendants.
“The Court further finds that on June 8th, 1978 the Defendants appeared without their lawyers and were given a notice of a trial setting and to make it abundantly clear to the Defendants that the case was set. for trial, the Court not only checked the appropriate part of the notice of setting, but circled it and the Defendants’ lawyer was again informed of the notice of trial setting on June 20th, 1978 when they appeared in court with their lawyer to be arraigned.
“Therefore, at this time the Court will overrule the Motion for Continuance as submitted.
“MR. NINO: Note our exception to that ruling, please.
“MR. NINO: As far as Defendant Guadalupe Lerma, who does not wish my representation, he does not want me to represent him and in that regard, I don’t want to be responsible for whatever Mr. Lerma might decide to do later on, being that he is forced to go forward with the case despite my objections and we object as to the Defendant, Guadalupe Lerma.
“THE COURT: Well, you heard what I dictated into the record about what all happened since you have been indicted, haven’t you, which is Guadalupe Lerma; you heard that, didn’t you?
“GUADALUPE LERMA: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: That is all true, isn’t it?
“GUADALUPE LERMA: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Sir?
“MR. NINO: Do you want him to explain to you?
“GUADALUPE LERMA: Well, I would like for him to explain.
“THE COURT: Well, you remember when you came up here on June 9th— you came up here June 8th, didn’t you?
“GUADALUPE LERMA: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: And I gave you a piece of paper here on the settings and told you—and I told you that the case was set for trial on July 31st, didn’t I?
“GUADALUPE LERMA: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: And you told me that Mr. Nino and his offices were representing you?
“GUADALUPE LERMA: But I changed my mind, I don’t want him to.
“THE COURT: I asked you if there was any conflict of interest and you said ‘No’ and I told you it was set for trial on July 31st and you signed this piece of paper. All that is true, isn’t it?
“GUADALUPE LERMA: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: And you come up here the day of trial saying you don’t want this lawyer and you have paid him money, haven’t you?
*496“GUADALUPE LERMA: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Well, the Court has overruled your Motion for Continuance and the Court advises you to cooperate with your lawyer totally. Court is adjourned until 1:30.”
The panel found that the judge was properly put on notice that the appellant was in some form or fashion arguing a conflict of interest. The State argues that because there is nothing specific in the motion concerning a conflict of interest the trial judge did not err in conducting an inquiry into the conflict. We disagree with the State and find that the panel was correct in holding that the trial court was put on notice of a potential conflict of interest. As the panel noted, the trial judge recognized this when he reminded the defense that he had inquired into a possible conflict of interest several weeks earlier.
The question which remains is whether appellant's objection was timely in that it was voiced on the day of trial. As the State correctly noted in its brief on rehearing, the Supreme Court has noted that untimely motions made for dilatory purposes only should not be tolerated by the trial courts. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 486, 98 S.Ct. at 1180. However, there has been no guidance from the Supreme Court as to what constitutes an untimely motion.
In United States ex rel. Ballard v. Bengston, 702 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.1983), Ballard filed an application for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated. The record showed that one week before trial Ballard’s defense attorney filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of record for Ballard because of a conflict of interest. This was some four months after he had been retained by the codefend-ants and the trial date had been set and rescheduled several times. The motion to withdraw was heard on the first day of trial and the judge denied it. When defense counsel reurged the motion to withdraw during the trial, the trial judge, noting that he thought it was made for dilatory purposes, again denied the motion. The Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the federal district court had relied entirely upon the trial judge’s evaluation of the motion and reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. In discussing the timeliness of Ballard’s motion, they wrote:
“We decline to view this motion as untimely. Although defense counsel has the ethical obligation to raise objections to joint representation as early as possible-before the commencement of trial, it is entirely conceivable that the conflict may not become apparent until shortly before trial is scheduled to begin. To hold that counsel must file such motion a set number of weeks before trial is to undermine not only the sixth amendment’s guarantee, but also counsel’s ethical obligation to disclose a conflict immediately upon its discovery.
“Because a trial judge’s failure to inquire into the circumstances of an alleged conflict upon timely objection is justified only when the prospect of dilatory practices is present, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 487, 98 S.Ct. at 1180, a finding of such practices must be scrutinized carefully. In the present case, the trial judge’s basis for his conclusion that the pretrial motion was filed for dilatory purposes is unknown. Although the trial date had been reset several times, the reasons for these delays were not articulated by the trial judge at the hearing on the motion to withdraw. It is unknown whether petitioners had requested continuances, and if so, for what reasons.” (footnote omitted) 702 F.2d at 663.
Dicta in the case of Smith v. Anderson, 689 F.2d 59 (6th Cir.1982), seems to indicate that a “timely motion” is any motion that is raised before the trial is concluded.
“At least two other practical policies support the distinction drawn in Cuyler v. Sullivan. The imposition upon the state, which is not heavy when timely objection may be judicially remedied by appointment of separate counsel before trial, increases dramatically once the trial has occurred and appellate or post con*497viction remedial vehicles are the forum for conflict claims. See generally, United States v. Mari, 526 F.2d 117, 120-21 (2d Cir.1975) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941, 97 S.Ct. 359, 50 L.Ed.2d 311 (1976). Furthermore, the focus of the criminal trial as the single most important stage in the criminal process is also retained by relying upon counsel’s pretrial representations but imposing a more searching examination once the trial has concluded without the conflict having been raised.” (footnote omitted) 689 F.2d at 65.
See also United States v. Ramsey, 661 F.2d 1013 (4th Cir.1981), in which it was held that since the defendants had not raised an objection to the multiple representation arrangement either before or during trial, it was their burden on appeal to show the existence of an actual conflict of interest.
We are hesitant in this jurisdiction to adopt a black and white rule which applies in every situation. However, we do find that in some instances, where the conflict does not arise until the trial is in progress, a motion alleging such a conflict may be timely even though made after trial begins. We do find that any motion made after the trial has ended is untimely. Undoubtedly, there will sometimes be motions alleging a conflict of interest filed at various times in the trial process which are filed solely for the purposes of delay. Likewise, it is conceivable that a conflict of interest might not arise until the closing moments of a trial and a motion alleging that conflict filed at that time will be sufficient to put the trial judge on notice so that he or she may conduct the appropriate inquiry. Each case will be adjudged on an individual basis.
We find that in the instant case appellant’s motion was timely. The record before us does not indicate in any fashion that the motion was made for the purpose of delay. Because there is no showing that the motion was merely dilatory, we find that the trial cburt erred in not conducting an inquiry into the potential conflict of interest. Holloway v. Arkansas, supra.
The State’s motion for rehearing in Cause No. 62,537 is overruled.
Salustrio Lerma—Cause No. 62,981
The panel opinion correctly pointed out that Salustrio only raised one ground of error on appeal and this ground of error dealt with the jury charge. Salustrio did not raise the conflict of interest issue either on appeal or in the trial court. Yet the panel found that such issue had to be discussed “in the interest of justice” because there was a possibility that it might be brought up in an application for writ of habeas corpus at a later date. The panel then applied the Holloway standard and found that Salustrio was entitled to a presumption that an actual conflict of interest existed and that he was harmed thereby. Consequently, the conviction was reversed.
The analysis of the panel opinion seems to directly contradict the law upon which it relied. The panel found that although Sa-lustrio did not object, Guadalupe’s “objection” should have put the trial judge on notice that a possibility of a conflict of interest existed. Thus Salustrio was entitled to the same presumption as one who had voiced a proper objection. But Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, and Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, stand for the proposition that no presumption exists unless the individual defendant voices his own personal objection. This is clearly pointed out in the language of Holloway v. Arkansas, supra:
“The Court’s refusal to reverse Kretske’s conviction is not contrary to this interpretation of Glosser. Kretske did not raise his own Sixth Amendment challenge to the joint representation. 315 U.S., at 77, 62 S.Ct., at 468; see Brief for Petitioner Kretske in Glosser v. United States, O.T. 1941, No. 31 [315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680]. As the Court’s opinion indicates, some of the codefend-ants argued that the denial of Glasser’s right to the effective assistance of counsel prejudiced them as alleged co-conspirators. 315 U.S., at 76-77, 62 S.Ct., at *498467. In that context, the Court required a showing of prejudice; finding none, it affirmed the convictions of the codefend-ants including Kretske.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 489, 98 at 1181.
Thus the rule is that if a codefendant has not voiced his own personal objection to the multiple representation arrangement, he is foreclosed from relying on the objection of his codefendant to preserve error. See also United States ex rel. Ballard v. Bengston, 702 F.2d 656, 661, n. 3 (7th Cir.1983); Scott v. United States, 598 F.2d 392 (5th Cir.1979).
We now hold that because Salustrio did not voice an objection as to the potential conflict of interest, he is not entitled to rely ' upon his co-defendant’s objection. Thus he is not entitled to the presumption of conflict under Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, but he must show some actual conflict pursuant to Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, before he is entitled to reversal of his conviction. Pollan v. State, 612 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Ex parte Parham, 611 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Hurley v. State, 606 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). As noted above, Salustrio did not even argue this issue on appeal so he has made no attempt to show any actual conflict. The Supreme Court made it very clear in Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, that the burden of showing this conflict is upon the defendant. We will not go on a fishing expedition because the defendant has not even attempted to carry that burden. Should Sa-lustrio feel at a later date that he may be able to successfully shoulder that burden, he may certainly bring the issue up in an application for writ of habeas corpus. Until then we must grant the State’s motion for rehearing and affirm Salustrio’s conviction in Cause No. 62,981.1
CLINTON, J., concurs in the result in Cause No. 62,981.. On appeal Salustrio raised a single ground of error relating to the court’s charge. Before looking at the conflict of interest issue, the panel reviewed the ground of error and found no error. We agree with this holding.