dissenting.
Characterizing this as a ease in which “the facts are not in dispute,” the majority has nevertheless failed to adequately describe the relationship between appellee *958and the man with whom she cohabits. The trial judge who rendered an exhaustive opinion and order and determined from the evidence that cohabitation was proven stated the facts with considerably more particularity than the majority has seen fit to provide and in the interest of fairness, the facts as found by the trial court are stated as follows:
“Specifically, and somewhat condensed, what has occurred in this case since sometime late in 1986, is that Mr. Spradling and the respondent have been daily companions. While the evidence discloses there have been a few occasions on which they have not seen each other every day, the overwhelming evidence is that they spend some part of each day together. They eat together frequently as much as four or five nights a week, and Mr. Spradling pays for the respondent’s meals on these occasions. They attend church together. Mr. Spradling stops by respondent’s house every day to check on the house and on her son. Mr. Spradling has provided a T.V. set and a VCR for the respondent, which are at her home. The respondent washes Mr. Spra-dling's clothing on a regular basis.
“Mr. Spradling has given the respondent an engagement ring, and although the petitioner [sic] stated at the oral argument on exceptions that the engagement was off, she testified under oath, at an earlier time, that the reason she did not accept Mr. Spradling’s proposal of marriage was ‘that she would not marry Mr. Spradling until she got all she could from the petitioner.’ While she did attempt to modify that statement by stating that she did not plan to marry until her son was grown, her intent was clear from the statement she made under oath.
“The respondent and Mr. Spradling are the joint owners of a van purchased entirely by Mr. Spradling. This van is used regularly by the respondent, and Mr. Spradling pays for gas when they use the van on social occasions, and its upkeep. The respondent has used Mr. Spradling’s credit cards on occasion and borrowed money from him. Although there is evidence that some of that money has repaid, and the respondent testified that it has all been repaid, the fact that she has the use of Mr. Spradling’s credit cards is a factor that weighs toward cohabitation.
“Additionally, Mr. Spradling and the respondent share a joint checking account, and while it is true that predated their sexual intimacy and was done initially for the purpose of enabling the respondent to assist Mr. Spradling in the handling of his financial affairs, it nevertheless is true that they currently share and have for sometime this joint account.
“In addition, since sometime in 1986, the respondent and Mr. Spradling have engaged in sexual relations with each other to the exclusion of all other persons.
“In short, it is the court’s opinion that every vestige of cohabitation exists in this case with the single exception that the respondent and Mr. Spradling maintain separate houses. The evidence is that they engage in sexual relations only at Mr. Spradling’s house, although a good deal of their time is spent at the respondent’s home.” (Trial court opinion and order, p. 9-11).
In an effort to avoid reaching the result compelled by the foregoing facts, the majority has taken a hypertechnical approach and essentially held that despite any other facts, the failure of the persons to share a common dwelling house on a regular basis precludes a finding of cohabitation. In my view, such an interpretation is contrary to these parties’ agreement that maintenance was to be terminated upon the cohabitation of the recipient spouse. By its decision, the majority has encouraged spouses receiving maintenance to refrain from marriage, safe in the knowledge that they may establish relationships which have all of the incidents of marriage if only they maintain the fiction of separate places of dwelling.
In a mobile and frequently affluent society, the concept of cohabitation is often ambiguous. Parties whose relationships have all of the trappings of marriage and even married persons frequently live apart. The fact that persons may not live in the same *959dwelling on a daily basis should not be the controlling factor. The nature of the parties’ relationship should be broadly analyzed and a decision rendered upon the totality of same.
The decision of the majority will surely encourage fraud and evasion of parties’ consensual undertakings and weaken this Court’s decision in Combs v. Combs, Ky., 787 S,W.2d 260 (1990). In Combs, the Court identified six factors which should be considered in determining whether parties’ subsequent relationships are of such significance as to justify relief from the duty to pay maintenance. In my view, the decision in Combs represents a balanced, progressive approach to deciding whether relief from maintenance is justified. Such a decision was desperately needed in view of the frequency with which unmarried persons nowadays establish quasimarital relationships.
It should not be overlooked that the concept of cohabitation embraces far more than simply sharing the same dwelling. A party seeking to avoid the implication of cohabitation will always be able to point to some factor about his or her circumstances which is unconventional and by the terms of the decision of the majority, such would be sufficient to defeat a finding of cohabitation.
When all is said and done, the majority opinion amounts to a victory for deceit, bad faith, and the distasteful practice of requiring a maintenance payor to subsidize the illicit relationship of the maintenance recipient. That appellant intended to evade the terms of her agreement is attested by her statement “that she would not marry Mr. Spradling [the man with whom she cohabits] until she got all she could from the petitioner [appellant herein].” This Court should not reward such conduct and permit appellant to be victimized in such a manner.
COMBS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.