concurring.
Contrary to the majority, I believe art. I, § 11a vests this Court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all non-capital cases where bail has been denied.
I.
Applicant was arrested on January 12, 1994, for possession of a controlled substance. Applicant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus on January 18, 1994, contending he was illegally restrained be*344cause he was being held without bail. The habeas judge issued the writ and conducted a hearing. At the hearing the State did not offer any testimony or contend bail should be denied. Applicant presented evidence he was forty-eight years of age and had been married for eighteen years. Applicant and his wife had two children and had lived in the same residence since their marriage. Applicant was self-employed as a carpenter with several pending contracts. Applicant testified he had been previously convicted and was on parole but testified he reported as required by his conditions of parole. Further, applicant was released on bail prior to his previous convictions. Nevertheless, the habeas judge denied bail stating: “You can appeal it. They want to come back and I am here, I will be happy to comply if they require that a bond be set.”
II.
As a general rule bail may not be denied. Tex. Const. art. I, § ll.1 There are only five exceptions to this general rule, capital cases “where proof is evident,” 2 art. I, § 11, and in non-capital cases when the defendant is accused
1. of a felony and has been twice previously convicted of a felony;
2. of a felony committed while on bail for a prior felony for which he has been indicted;
3. of a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon and has been previously convicted of a felony; or
4. of a violent or sexual offense committed while under the supervision of a criminal justice agency.
Art. I, § 11a.3
However, even in these non-capital situations bail may be denied only after a hearing wherein the State produces evidence substantially showing the defendant’s guilt. And the order denying bail must be entered within seven calendar days of the defendant’s incarceration. Tex. Const. art. I, § 11a. See also, Neuenschwander v. State, 784 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex.Cr.App.1990); Garza v. State, 736 S.W.2d 710, 711 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); and, Westbrook v. State, 753 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). Consequently, in a non-capital case, bail can be denied only if: 1) one or more of the art. I, § 11a situations exist; 2) *345the State makes a substantial showing of the defendant’s guilt; and, 3) the trial judge enters an order denying bail within seven days of the defendant’s incarceration. Finally, art. I, § 11a provides for our review of “any” order denying bail in a non-capital case.
III.
Prior to 1980 this Court had direct review of all criminal cases. However, in 1980, Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 5 and 6 was amended to give the courts of appeals direct appellate jurisdiction in most criminal cases. Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 3224, S.J.R. No. 36, § 5. In Clapp v. State, 639 S.W.2d 949 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), our appellate jurisdiction of an order denying bail was challenged. Clapp was charged with possession of a controlled substance and the trial judge denied bail. Clapp appealed to this Court under art. I, § 11a. The State contended we no longer had jurisdiction to directly review an order denying bail after the 1980 amendments to art. V, §§ 5 and 6. Clapp, 639 S.W.2d at 950-951. We recognized the conflict between art. V, §§ 5 and 6 and art. I, § 11a but held the general grant of jurisdiction in art. V, §§ 5 and 6 must yield to the specific grant of jurisdiction in art. I, § 11a. Clapp, 639 S.W.2d at 952. Therefore, we retained exclusive appellate jurisdiction over any order denying bail in a non-capital case.
In summary, under our interpretation of art. I, §§ 11 and 11a and the 1980 amendments to art. V, §§ 5 and 6 we have exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all orders denying bail in non-capital eases while the courts of appeals have direct appellate jurisdiction of all orders denying bail in capital cases.4 This view is supported by Wescott, 651 S.W.2d 271, where the defendant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus contending he was illegally restrained because bail had been denied. Id. We handled the matter as an art. I, § 11a direct appeal because, regardless of the type of vehicle chosen to challenge the order denying of bail, any order denying bail was appealable to this Court.
IY.
The majority concludes this is not an art. I, § 11a situation. Majority op., 876 S.W.2d at 342. In my view, that conclusion is erroneous. Any order denying bail in a non-capital case is necessarily entered pursuant to art. I, § 11a, because that is the only authority for denying bail. Art. I, § 11a provides for our review of “any judgment or order” denying bail. The order denying bail may be erroneous, as in the instant case, but that determination is exclusively within the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the majority errs in holding the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction of this case.5 Majority op., 876 S.W.2d at 342.
Any confusion in this area of law is the direct result of our past attempts to interpret art. I, § 11a. The majority opinion will only add to that confusion. We should use this case to establish the following bright line rule relating to bail pending trial: The Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all non-capital cases where bail has been denied and the Courts of Appeals have exclusive direct appellate jurisdiction of all capital cases where bail has been denied and all non-capital cases where bail is challenged as being excessive or unreasonable.
*346With these comments, I join only the judgment of the Court.
OVERSTREET, J., joins.. Art. I, § 11 provides:
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is evident; but this provision shall not be so construed as to prevent bail after indictment found upon examination of the evidence, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.
. The phrase “proof is evident” means clear and strong evidence, leading to a well guarded judgment to the conclusion that an offense was committed, that the accused is guilty of that offense and that the accused would probably be punished by death for the commission of that offense. Beck v. State, 648 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
. Specifically, Tex. Const. art. I, § 11a(a) provides:
Any person (1) accused of a felony less than capital in this State, who has been theretofore twice convicted of a felony, the second conviction being subsequent to the first, both in point of time of commission of the offense and conviction therefor, (2) accused of a felony less than capital in this State, committed while on bail for a prior felony for which he has been indicted, (3) accused of a felony less than capital in this State involving the use of a deadly weapon after being convicted of a prior felony, or (4) accused of a violent or sexual offense committed while under the supervision of a criminal justice agency of the State or a political subdivision of the State for a prior felony, after a hearing, and upon evidence substantially showing the guilt of the accused of the offense in (1) or (3) above, of the offense committed while on bail in (2) above, or of the offense in (4) above committed while under the supervision of a criminal justice agency of the State or a political subdivision of the State for a prior felony, may be denied bail pending trial, by a district judge in this State, if said order denying bail pending trial is issued within seven calendar days subsequent to the time of incarceration of the accused; provided, however, that if the accused is not accorded a trial upon the accusation under (1) or (3) above, the accusation and indictment used under (2) above, or the accusation or indictment used under (4) above within sixty (60) days from the time of his incarceration upon the accusation, the order denying bail shall be automatically set aside, unless a continuance is obtained upon the motion or request of the accused; provided, further, that the right of appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of this State is expressly accorded the accused for a review of any judgment or order made hereunder, and said appeal shall be given preference by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
. In Beck v. State, 648 S.W.2d 7 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), and Primrose v. State, 725 S.W.2d 254 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), the defendants were charged with capital murder, denied bail and sought our direct review of the denial. We distinguished Clapp and held we had no direct appellate jurisdiction from the denial of bail in a capital case. Primrose, 725 S.W.2d at 256. While art, I, § 11a expressly authorized a direct appeal to this Court, art. I, § 11 did not authorize such an appeal. Therefore, when bail is denied in a capital case, direct appellate jurisdiction lies in the courts of appeals. See, Tex. Const. art. V, §§ 5 and 6, and, Tex.R.App.P. 44.
The Courts of Appeals also have direct appellate jurisdiction of questions concerning whether bail is excessive or unreasonable. Tex.R.App.P. 44.
. The majority begins its opinion by stating this case involves a "series of unconscionable miscues.” Majority op., 876 S.W.2d at 341. I disagree. In my view, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that this case did not involve excessive bail but instead involved the denial of bail. Consequently, the appeal was correctly dismissed by the Court of Appeals for want of jurisdiction.