dissenting.
Even after the amendment to section 14.-01(b) of the Texas Family Code, the “best interest” of the child continues to be the paramount consideration in child custody cases. I would hold that the trial court’s findings of fact are adequate for appellate review, that the presumption of parental preference over non-parents has been rebutted and that there is some evidence to support the discretion exercised by the trial court. Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
The trial judge was faced with a Hob-son’s choice of deciding custody of a child between two parties that were far from ideal. The trial court chose the lesser of two evils and awarded custody to the grandparents. Instead of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court, considering only the evidence and the inferences tending to support the findings, and disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary,1 our court merely pays lip service to this standard and blindly awards custody of the child to the mother.
The best interest of the child is the paramount consideration in custody disputes. Texas Family Code § 14.07(a) provides that “[t]he best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining questions of managing conservatorship, possession, and support of and access to the child.” Tex.Fam. Code Ann. § 14.07(a) (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added); see also Mumma v. Aguirre, 364 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex.1963).
Section 14.01(b)(1) was amended in 19872 to provide that a parent shall be appointed managing conservator unless it “would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional *171development.” This statute only reinforces what has been the law in Texas for 100 years. See, e.g., Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.1976); Herrera v. Herrera, 409 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex.1966); Mumma v. Aguirre, 364 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Tex.1963); Taylor v. Meek, 154 Tex. 305, 276 S.W.2d 787, 790 (1955); Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876, 879 (1948); State ex rel. Wood v. Deaton, 93 Tex. 243, 54 S.W. 901, 903 (1900); Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281, 282 (1894); Taylor v. Deseve, 81 Tex. 246, 16 S.W. 1008, 1009 (1891). Thus, preference of parents over non-parents in child custody disputes was present in the jurisprudence of this state long before the amendment to section 14.01(b) of the Family Code.
The 1987 amendment allows rebuttal of the presumption with evidence that placement with the parent would have a detrimental effect on the child’s physical or emotional well-being. The statute does not say, nor is there anything in the words chosen by the legislature or in the legislative history of the amendment to require, that the detriment must be' due to an act or omission of the parent. The court today reads this requirement into the statute and, thus, has invaded the legislative function by judicially amending the statute.3 Furthermore, the court holds that the protracted failure to remove the child from an unstable environment is not an omission that can be considered in determining the child’s best interest. This could lead to absurd results. It is not difficult to imagine a parent in an environment, through no fault of his or her own, that would be intolerably dangerous to the child’s physical or emotional health. Under the court’s new requirement, the child must remain exposed to the danger because it is not due to the act or omission of the parent.4
Furthermore, the legislature did not change the burden of proof of Family Code section 11.155 nor the public policy of this state expressed in section 14.07(a) that the best interest of the child is paramount in determining custody. Thus, rather than clarify the standard to be used when a non-parent is chosen over a parent in custody disputes, this opinion only muddies the water.
Even accepting the standard announced in today’s opinion, the trial court’s decision should not be disturbed. Trial courts are given wide latitude in determining the best interests of minor children and their judgments in this regard are reversed only when it appears from the record as a whole that the court has abused its discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.1982). The trial judge is in the best position to make these decisions. When faced with conflicting considerations the trial judge must be accorded the right to exercise a large measure of discretion. He or she has an opportunity that we do not have to observe and evaluate the parties and their witnesses, to weigh the credibility of their testimony, to weigh the evidence, draw inferences and make reasonable deductions from the evidence, to believe or disbelieve all or part of their testimony and to assess the physical and emotional needs of the child.
With this in mind, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination, as we must, the record shows that:
*1721. At the time of the divorce, Brenda lived with her mother, her sister, and their respective families and she planned to continue this arrangement after the divorce.
2. Brenda’s brother, a paramedic, testified that Brenda’s home environment was unstable. Not only did Brenda have emotional problems but the other adults living in the same house did as well. Their seventy-three-year-old mother, who was in poor health, had been a patient at the state mental hospital on several occasions and was on thorazine. Brenda’s sister and her sister’s twenty-year-old son also lived in the same household along with Brenda’s other child by a pri- or marriage. Brenda’s sister was also on medication for her nerves. Brenda did not get along with her sister and, on one occasion, she was kicked out of the house by her sister.
3. Brenda was physically abused by her husband on numerous occasions. She would file charges against him but she would be back with him “before the ink even got dry on the papers.”
4. Brenda was admitted to the state mental hospital.6
5. The child has lived with his paternal grandparents most of his life.
6. Brenda failed to undergo counseling with a trained psychologist as had been recommended by a social worker nor did she avail herself of opportunities for self-improvement such as job training and job counseling.7
The court today second guesses the trial court and concludes that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s decision that placement of the child with his mother at the time of the hearing would have been detrimental to the child.8 In my opinion, the above evidence is some evidence (more than a scintilla) which supports the trial judge’s decision that continuous exposure of the child to the unstable environment in which Brenda found herself at the time of the trial would significantly impair the child’s emotional health. In other words, none of these factors in and of themselves rebut the presumption of parental preference. But, from the totality of the circumstances, taking the record as a whole, the decision made by the trial judge is reasonable.
This is a close call,9 one that the trial court did not make lightly and one that he *173alone was empowered to make. After listening to conflicting evidence and observing the witnesses and weighing the credibility of their testimony, the trial judge awarded custody of the child to the grandparents. In my opinion, reasonable minds can differ as to whether or not he should have awarded custody to the grandparents or not. We ought not play Monday morning quarterbacks and second guess his decision unless it is clearly wrong and I do not think that it is. See Dyson v. Olin Corp., 692 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex.1985) (when reviewing factual sufficiency of evidence, trial court’s judgment will be reversed only if it is so contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust).
I have other problems with the court’s and Justice Cook’s opinions. They unfairly imply that the trial judge made his decision because he was influenced by the relative wealth of the parties. This is simply not true. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge said:
The court is in agreement with the argument that has been made that financial ability is not the determining factor. It never has been in this court and hopefully never will be regardless of who sits in this position.
Thus, poverty was not and should never be a factor in child custody cases and for my colleagues to imply that it was does a great disservice to this well respected trial judge.
Also, the court and Justice Hecht imply that the father of the child and his parents were in cahoots with each other to deprive Brenda of custody of the child. In fact, the record shows that not only was Brenda’s husband not living with his parents during the temporary hearing or trial but that he was alienated from his parents. He testified that his parents had a drinking problem and that the court ought to award custody of the child to Brenda.
I also have a problem with the court seeming to equate conservatorship and possession of a child with involuntary termination of parental rights. There are inherent differences between the two and the court today glosses over these differences. Involuntary termination of parental rights is permanent and irreversible. Also, the parent-child relationship is one of constitutional dimensions and should be disturbed only for the most compelling and serious of reasons. Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex.1976). On the other hand, conservatorship is not permanent and irreversible and the non-custodial parent is usually, as in this case, given rights of visitation. One can petition the court to modify the order at any time. There is also a lesser burden or standard of proof.10 The court today blurs this important distinction and treats this case as one involving severance of parental rights.
Today, the court reaches a decision which overlooks the central issue in child custody cases, the best interest of the child. The court addresses the interests of the mother and the paternal grandparents and determines that two-and-a-half years ago the trial court erred in awarding custody to the paternal grandparents since they could not point to any act or omission by the mother which would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. Now, nine men in Austin blindly instruct the trial court to award custody to the mother without any consideration of the effect on this child’s life. I submit that this does more damage to the child than anything that the trial court ever did. The court could achieve its objective in interpreting the amendments to the Family Code which reinforce the parental preference and, at the same time allow the trial court to reconsider custody at this point in time (two-and-a-half years since Jesse has been with his grandparents). Although the parties in interest here are the mother and the paternal grandparents, the *174real party in interest is the child. We should not act perfunctorily in carrying out our duties to interpret this statute without considering the impact of our decision on a young child who will be taken from the home he knows and placed with his mother when we do not have any information about her ability to care for him at this time.
Jesse is a three-and-a-half year old child who has lived most of his life with his grandparents. Although the mother was given liberal visitation rights, we do not know whether she has visited the child during the time this case has been on appeal or anything about her current situation. Conceivably, the grandmother is the only mother this child has ever known. For this child to now be jerked from familiar surroundings in response to an order of this court and be blindly handed over to a virtual stranger is not in the best interest of the child. In the interest of justice, we should remand this case to the trial court for reconsideration by the trial judge. By remanding the case, we permit the trial court to ascertain whether circumstances have changed while the case has been on appeal and whether there is a way to lessen the trauma to the child.
In conclusion, I am concerned that today’s opinion will be misconstrued by the bench and bar. This opinion puts into question the continued validity of Family Code section 14.07(a)’s objective that the best interest of child is paramount. There is nothing in the amendment itself or in its legislative history to indicate that by amending section 14.01(b) of the Family Code (presumption of parental preference over non-parents) the legislature meant for children to be treated as prizes to be coveted and that trial courts should concern themselves more with the righteousness of claims to custody by parents, rather than the best interest of children. However, this is the message that this case conveys.
For all of these reasons, I cannot join in the court’s opinion.
HECHT, Justice,dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the Court that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s decision to appoint the father’s parents rather than the mother managing conservators of the child in this case. I fully recognize that in determining the best interest of a child the trial court must have broad discretion. Appellate courts must always recognize the advantage that the trial court has in actually having seen and heard the participants in a case. Nevertheless, the decision of the trial court, even in the most sensitive cases involving parental rights, is subject to appellate review. Consequently, the reasons for the trial court’s decision must be articulated, or at least articulable, on the record. As the Court notes, neither the parties nor the court of appeals has been able to state why, on this record, appointing the mother as managing conservator would, in the words of the statute, “significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.” Tex.Fam.Code § 14.01(b). Thus, while I have no doubt that the trial judge made what he considered to be the best decision in this difficult case, I agree with the Court that the record does not support that decision.
The Court holds that “evidence that a parent is a victim of spousal abuse, by itself, is no evidence that awarding custody to that parent would significantly impair the child.” Supra at 167. I agree with this statement, but I am concerned that other, less precise language in the Court’s opinion may cause confusion.1 As the Court notes, battered spouses sometimes find it difficult, for a variety of reasons,2 to *175extricate themselves from abusive relationships. A parent who keeps a child in an abusive relationship subjects the child to the same abuse. If a parent would not or could not terminate an abusive relationship and continued to subject his or her child to the same threat of harm, the resulting impairment of the child’s physical and emotional welfare might well warrant a change in managing conservatorship. Petitioner’s counsel expressly conceded this proposition at oral argument but urged that there is no such evidence in this case. The evidence in this case is that Brenda has been physically abused by her former husband, that when she had left him in the past she had always returned, and that if he would submit to counseling she might return again. Although this evidence is certainly relevant in considering the child’s welfare, I am unwilling to conclude that it is any evidence that Brenda’s appointment as managing conservator will significantly impair her child’s wellbeing. At best, it seems to me, the evidence establishes a potential threat to the child but not a significant impairment of his wellbeing. Moreover, the evidence is that Brenda’s former husband has often stayed with his parents, whom the trial court appointed managing conservators. Leaving the child with his mother, who might return to his abusive father sometime, would hardly seem to expose the child to more risk than moving him to his father’s parents, with whom his father also lives.
I disagree with the Court that judgment should be rendered appointing Brenda managing conservator of her child. As a rule, we should render judgment against a party who, like Carl and Melba Lewelling here, fails to offer evidence to meet his burden of proof. See Tex.R.App.P. 180. We may, however, remand such a case to the trial court for further proceedings “if it shall appear that the justice of the cause demands”. Id. The evidence reflects that the child in this case was born April 1987. Some four months later his parents separated, and two months after that Brenda filed for divorce. The trial court appointed the father’s parents managing conservators of the child shortly before his first birthday. Before then, the father’s parents had kept the child on numerous occasions and for as long as two months at a time. Since then, I assume the child has remained in the possession of his grandparents. The child is now over three years old. I have no way of knowing what may have happened to the child or the parties in the two years that this case has been on appeal, and neither does the Court. Two years is a long time, particularly in the life of a child. Rather than render judgment blindly, I would remand this case to the trial court in the interest of justice for such further proceedings as may be appropriate, whether simply to render judgment appointing Brenda managing conservator, or to reopen the evidence in the child’s interest. While I realize that a parent like Brenda, who also must endure the delay of appeal to vindicate her right to possession of her child, may feel she has won a pyrrhic victory if she is told merely to go back and start over, the focus must be on the best interest of the child, and the trial court remains in the best position to protect that interest.
SPEARS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
. This is the proper standard of review in analyzing a "no evidence point.” Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1987); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965).
. Act of June 19, 1987, ch. 720, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen.Laws 2595-96. The bill as it was passed by the House merely added that evidence of violence in the domestic setting be considered by the trial court in determining custody. It was amended during the floor debate to clarify that the statute applied only to evidence of “abusive” physical force. H.J. of Tex, 70th Leg.Reg.Sess. 2462-63 (1987).
The Senate Committee on Jurisprudence amended the bill to include the "significantly impair" language. Senate Committee on Jurisprudence Committee Report, H.B. 614, 70th Leg. Reg.Sess. (May 27, 1987). This is the first time the bill contained this language. When the bill as amended was presented for a vote, it was described by the sponsor as merely requiring the trial court to consider evidence of domestic violence. There was absolutely no discussion concerning any change to the "best interest” of the child standard, no discussion that the parental presumption needed to be strengthened, nor any declaration of intent that this amendment apply to custody disputes between parents and non-parents. See id.; Debate on Tex.H.B. 614 on the Floor of the Senate, 70th Leg.Reg.Sess. (May 29, 1987) (tape available from Senate Staff Services Office).
. Only when it is necessary to give effect to the clear legislative intent can we insert additional words into a statutory provision. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex.1981). Here, the legislative intent is anything but clear as to whether the detriment to the child must be due to an act or omission of the parents.
. For example, under the court’s new requirement, if a parent chooses to live with his or her child in a rat infested crack house with drug addicts or partner swapping friends, but the parent does not use drugs, a trial court’s placement of the child with a non-parent would apparently be reversed by this court.
.§ 11.15. Findings
(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, the court's findings shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence under rules generally applicable to civil cases.
(b) In a suit in which termination of the parent-child relationship is sought, each finding required for termination of the parent-child relationship must be based on clear and convincing evidence.
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.15(a), (b) (Vernon 1986).
. The court decides that these events are insignificant and completely ignores evidence favorable to the trial court. For example, the court brushes aside the paramedic brother's testimony that Brenda had emotional problems and testimony of the social worker who recommended that Brenda seek psychological counseling. It is obvious to me that the court is impermissibly reweighing the evidence and reaching a result it concludes that the trial judge should have reached.
. The trial court heard other evidence, some of which was conflicting and other that was favorable to Brenda. For instance, Brenda’s husband testified that he wanted the child placed with Brenda and not with his parents.
. I agree with the court that a parent should not be denied custody of a child based on the fact that he or she has been battered. However, this has very little to do with this case. The trial court did not make a finding of fact to this effect, nor did it in any way indicate that this was a basis for its decision.
Also, if the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed, there is nothing to prevent Brenda from petitioning the trial court to change custody.
.When we first considered this case, the application for writ of error was denied. 33 Tex. Sup.Ct.J. 5 (Nov. 4, 1989). It was granted on rehearing. It would have been better if we had been patient and waited to interpret this statute until we received a case with more clear-cut facts. Instead, the court has rendered a "holding” (clearly dicta) that is inapplicable to the facts of this case. To support the holding, the court looks to section 14.01(c)(2) of the Texas Family Code. While I agree with the interpretation of 14.01(c)(2), it simply does not apply to the facts before us.
It is acknowledged by all that 14.01(c)(2) applies to custody disputes between parents. Nowhere does the literal text of the statute nor its legislative history indicate that the preference accorded to the non-violent spouse in a dispute between spouses shall, likewise, be accorded to the non-violent parent in a dispute between the parent and a non-parent. Certainly, evidence of spousal abuse should never weigh against a nonviolent spouse in a custody dispute between spouses. However, a different situation is presented when the dispute is between the nonviolent parent and a non-parent. There are numerous factual scenarios in which spousal abuse towards the non-violent parent should be *173a factor to be considered by the trial court when that parent is in a custody dispute with a non-parent.
. There is a "clear and convincing evidence" standard for termination of parental rights cases and a "preponderance of the evidence" standard for custody cases. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 11.15(a), (b) (Vernon 1986).
. For example, the sentence immediately preceding the holding just quoted states: "A parent should not be denied custody of a child based on the fact that he or she has been battered.” Supra at 167. I think the Court means, "based solely on the fact”, but I am uncertain enough to feel constrained to add a few comments.
. See Gelles, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay, 38 J.Marr. & Fam. 658-59 (Nov. 1976), reprinted in B. Costa, Abuse of Women: Legislation, Reporting, and Prevention 13-28 (1983); M. Pagelow, Woman-Battering: Victims and Their Experiences 145-177 (1981); L. Walker, The Battered Woman (1979). Indeed, children and the ability to support them are often issues.