David Duffy, a minor, age 18, by father Martin Duffy as next friend, and the latter individually, filed this suit against defendant Railway Company for damages arising from personal injuries suffered by David, also for doctors, hospital and medical expense allegedly incurred by the father as a result thereof. Basis of the action was an automobile collision with a standing train of defendant on night of February 16, 1955, by a 1941 Chevrolet automobile in which David Duffy was a passenger, and operated at the time by Irving A. Hoff, age 19. Upon trial and jury verdict, judgments were rendered for Martin Duffy in the sum of $1,500 and $50,000 for plaintiff’s son; which rendition is the subject of this appeal.
The place of accident and attendant circumstances, both physical and otherwise, will be later detailed; but first to be stated are the jury answers in summary, which sufficiently reflect the material issues raised in pleadings of the respective parties and *205the testimony (defendant primarily contending, however, that upon the record as a whole it was entitled to a peremptory instruction) : (1) That conditions surrounding the railroad crossing in question were such as to render it more than ordinarily dangerous as a nighttime crossing during switching operations; (2) defendant should have known that such crossing was more than ordinarily dangerous as a nighttime crossing during switching operations; (3) the failure to have a signal device there installed prior to the collision in question was negligence; (4) and such failure was a proximate cause of the collision; (5) failure to throw flares or fuses during switching operations on the night in question was negligence and (6) a proximate cause; (7) failure to have a flagman at the crossing during switching operations on the night in question was negligence and (8) a proximate cause of collision; (9) that the driver, Irving A. Hoff, on such occasion failed to operate his automobile at a rate of speed that was reasonable and prudent; (10) but that such failure was not the sole proximate cause of the collision; (11) Irving A. Hoff failed to apply his brakes until he was too close to such train; (12) but that such failure was not the sole proximate cause; (13) that the driving of said Chevrolet automobile with worn tires was not negligence; (15) that Irving A. Hoff drove his vehicle at a rate of speed which was excessive and dangerous; (16) that such manner of driving was negligence; (17) but that such negligence was not the sole proximate cause of the accident; (18) Irving A. Hoff failed to keep a proper lookout; (19) that such failure was not the sole proximate cause; (20) that Irving A. Hoff failed to have the 1941 Chevrolet under proper control ; (21) that such failure was negligence; (22) but was not the sole proximate cause; (23) that Hoff, the driver, negligently failed to apply his brakes in time to avoid the collision; (24) such negligence was not the sole proximate cause; (25) Hoff, the driver, was not operating his Chevrolet at a speed in excess of 50 miles per hour; (28) his driving of the automobile with the lights dimmed was negligence; (29) but such negligence was not the sole proximate cause of collision; (30) failure of plaintiff David Duffy to warn the driver of the danger of driving with the lights dimmed was not negligence; (32) failure of said passenger-plaintiff to warn the driver of the approach to the railroad crossing was not negligence; (34) plaintiff’s failure to request the driver to reduce the speed of his automobile as he approached the crossing was not negligence; (36) failure of such plaintiff to notice and apprise the driver of the presence of the train on the crossing was not negligence; (38) failure of the driver Irving A. Hoff to apply his brakes in time to avoid the collision was negligence; (39) but such failure was not the sole proximate cause thereof; (40) that the collision was not the result of an unavoidable accident; (41) that $1,500 would compensate plaintiff Martin Duffy for reasonable and necessary hospital and doctors bills; (42) that the sum of $50,000 would reasonably compensate the minor David Duffy for physical pain, mental suffering and loss of capacity to work and earn money.
The collision occurred at a railroad crossing in north Dallas County where Belt Line Road, a public Highway, crosses the tracks of defendant Railroad at grade; the crossing being south of the incorporated municipality of Addison, a small village or town. Belt Line Road runs almost due east and west, crossing defendant’s tracks at right angles; the railroad running north and south with Addison immediately north of the crossing and Dallas to the south. At Addison, defendant’s railway, Dallas branch, intersects with its Fort Worth-Texarkana line of railroad in a Y connection. Belt Line Road is a two-lane asphalt highway, 24 feet wide, with 10-foot graveled shoulders, and generally embraces Dallas County. As appellant points .out, there are no curves or angles on either highway *206or railroad track involved in this record. A slight decline in elevation or grade of 14.4 feet is evident as one approaches the crossing from the east on Belt Line, beginning at a distance of 1,500 feet; and defendant’s exhibits 1, 2 and 3 depict the crossing as viewed from the east on Belt Line some 500, 200 and 100 feet away. There is a standard railroad warning sign erected by the Texas Highway Commission on the right of such highway 489 feet east of the grade crossing; also a statutory crossarm warning sign at left or south side, was present on defendant’s right of way. Addison Road, a public highway, to the north intersects Belt Line Road 150 feet east of the crossing, and Inwood Road, running north from Dallas, intersects Belt Line some 85 feet west of the crossing.
The train involved was No. 318, destination Commerce, Hunt County, leaving Dallas at 7:55 P.M., with crew of engineer, fireman, conductor, head and rear brakemen, arriving at Addison approximately 8:30 P.M., at which place the connection occurs with Fort Worth train No. 18, the two trains stopping for an interchange of freight cars each night, train 318 consisting of two Aleo diesel locomotives, some 38 freight cars and a caboose. On the night in question the Fort Worth train was already there when train 318 drew up to the railroad junction point and stopped preparatory to switching operations, with caboose and one car south of Belt Line Road crossing, one car standing on the crossing and another partially occupying same. This caboose, immediately south of crossing, was equipped with lights reflecting green on three sides and red at the rear; interior thereof lighted with an oil lamp. Only a minute or two had elapsed (Engineer Wilcox having just detached his engines “to do our switching”), when the collision occurred.
David Duffy and friend Irving A. Hoff were skating enthusiasts and earlier the same night had been at a rink in suburban Vickery. Hoff proposed a trip to Lewis-ville, Denton County, to see a new type rink, both leaving in Hoff’s 1941 four-door Chevrolet car, proceeding to Belt Line Road via Preston Road, at an intersection a mile and a half east of the involved railroad crossing. The night was moonless, but cold and clear, no weather conditions that would interfere with visibility in driving on the highway — such as mistiness or rain. As they approached Addison, according to Duffy, the lights on the Hoff car were on low beam and good, brakes good, with no traffic on the highway. Both knew the railroad crossing was there, having traveled Belt Line before. Duffy testified to looking straight ahead as they went along at 45 to 50 miles per hour, describing the accident, viz.: “Well, as we neared the crossing, and as we passed, I noticed the sign and I glanced ahead to see if I could notice a train or anything. The sign told me — it didn’t say anything about a train. I was looking to see if I could see anything; it seemed to me that the road just went straight ahead, straight ahead and then all of a sudden in about two or three seconds before we hit it, there was a big wall 'and there (that) was it.” To be here noted is a stipulation between the parties that Hoff, driver of the car in which plaintiff was a passenger, had testified by deposition that because of injuries suffered at time of the collision he had no memory whatsoever of the particular trip or accident.
The Hoff automobile appears to have crashed into the train at a point between the two freight cars at north edge of pavement and with such force that it was practically demolished, setting fire to both freight car and automobile. David and driver Hoff were promptly extricated, but their car could be moved only with aid of a wrecker. (See defendant’s exhibit 19 attached for one view of wrecked car.) First on the scene were Elliott, train conductor, and Fred Foley who had driven up on Belt Line Road from the west before the collision, but stopping at Inwood Road on account
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*208of the blocked crossing. Two deputy sheriffs soon arrived at the scene, both testifying to automobile skidmarks extending 36 steps forward to point of impact. Pictures taken by a free-lance photographer just after-wards, and in evidence as numerous exhibits, graphically portray the scene of the accident; it being undisputed that the box cars crashed into were red in color, one with “Southern” painted on side in large white lettering, and figures “11139.”
It is the contention of plaintiff that fact questions are raised under the circumstances of this record of an extra-hazardous railroad crossing — a condition that defendant knew or should have known in the exercise of ordinary care; and presented in issues 1 through 8. Appellant most earnestly takes the opposite view, asserting in sum that if the crossing in question be determined an unusually dangerous one, then “most any country crossing in the State of Texas” would be rendered extra-hazardous. In the first four points of error it argues insufficiency of the case made by plaintiffs as a matter of law; in effect, (1) of no evidence adduced that would sustain findings of either negligence or proximate cause against the railroad; (2) the uncon-troverted record reflects that the collision was caused solely by the negligence of Hoff, the driver, or plaintiff, either or both; (3) total lack of evidence to sustain findings of negligence or proximate case against defendant; (4) error in the court’s refusal to set aside jury findings 1-8 inclusive because so contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of all credible evidence in the case as to be manifestly wrong. For due consideration of these points, a summary of evidence relied on by plaintiffs is in order.
Addison is a junction point for the Fort Worth and Dallas trains, according to defendant’s train engineer, testifying by deposition ; necessitating nightly interchange of cars or switching operations, train 318 from Dallas running “from 30 to 60 cars”; that the distance from the crossing to the intersecting Fort Worth line was about 33 cars, requiring a block of the crossing (Belt Line Road) if the freight train be of greater length; that on night of the accident train 318 consisted of 39 cars, with result that several cars were left standing south of and thus blocking said crossing. He also testified that from Dallas to Commerce his train stops only at Addison, Plano and Greenville, and that switching operations do not require the blocking of a public highway at the two other points. Others of the train crew stated that sometimes “as much as 30 minutes or more” pass from the time the Dallas train stops at Addison until it resumes its journey, but that'Belt Line Road blocking is not for “more than two or three minutes” at a time, and that on the night of the accident Belt Line Road would have been cleared in “three or four minutes.” In the same connection, C. C. Calla-way, who operates a filling station and resides on Addison Road and adjacent to defendant’s right-of-way, testified that Belt Line Road was blocked, in 1955 prior to the collision, “almost every night that you look out.”
Over strong objection of defendant there was testimony of an accident and near-accidents experienced by highway travelers at the crossing either prior to February 16, 1955, or a few days thereafter. C. M. Hindman, cabinet maker living at Carroll-ton several miles to the west, with shop at Addison, testified to frequent travel between the towns; that the latter part of 1954 he was on way from Garland back to Carrollton at 9:00 or 9:30 o’clock at night, “looking straight ahead”, when his wife called attention to the train across the highway, “and I had never seen the train, and I just went for my brakes and, of course, we got stopped all right, but I couldn’t see the train at that time within one hundred feet of the track, I know.” Roy Money, of Carrollton, whose business of delivering gasoline required traveling up and down Belt Line Road, testified to difficulty in seeing a parked train on the crossing on a dark night (no rain or fog, with car lights in good condition) until *209close to the intersection; that unless same was new or newly painted, a freight car on the crossing would not reflect the headlights of his automobile. The standing freight car on the night of February 16 had been described by another witness as “dull red”. T. W. Rutledge told of his experience at the crossing in 1949 or ’SO at nighttime, traveling west; an occupant of his car calling attention to the train across Belt Line Road; that he stopped, but otherwise he “might have seen it or I might not have.” George Meister related a similar happening two or three days after the Duffy accident; of traveling west on Belt Line Road around 6:00 o’clock in the morning and having to take off to the side over an abutment “and I was very fortunate that I landed safely on my four wheels,” incurring some car damage; that he was familiar with Belt Line Road, having traveled it for more than a year prior thereto, and that road conditions had been in all respects similar. C. C. Callaway testified to observing similar occurrences two or three years before; that a man named Holloway, going same direction as the Hoff car, had run into a train there; and before that, a bunch of negro boys traveling east had gone into the ditch on opposite side to keep from hitting a train; also of a car going west two nights after February 16, 1955, the driver not seeing the train, applying brakes, of his jumping curb on south side of road and heading car down the right-of-way. Above instances of an accident and near-accidents were qualified as having taken place under similar conditions as the accident in question. Callaway, however, on page 63, statement of facts, describes the night as dark and misty, when, two years before, a car, obviously that of the man Holloway, had collided with a train at this crossing.
Witness Callaway said that on account of structures lining Addison Road to the north, one could not see that portion of a standing train, only the part across and to the south of highway; that, due to the slope from the east, headlights of an automobile at night would be lower than the train, making it a little bit hard to see from that way, “especially with nothing to reflect.” Roy Money also testified to the same condition, in that, when approaching the crossing at night, “your lights would shine under the train * ⅜ * you would have to get close up * * * the lights would go under ⅜ * On cross-examination he admitted to having always seen trains in time to stop and that if a motorist were looking for a train he could always see it. On the other hand, Foley, defendant’s witness, who had assisted in rescuing the two boys, testified to having no difficulty in seeing the train (then moving over the crossing) from 100 yards away; that the crash occurred approximately one minute after both he and the train had stopped; also that he had no difficulty in seeing the caboose, its lights, and the conductor within.
W. C. Brandes, County Traffic Engineer, testified that Belt Line Road generally encircles Dallas County, passing through various outlying towns. In May 1954, and in official capacity, he had taken a traffic count at Belt Line and Preston Roads, one and one-half miles east of the subject crossing; following same by a letter to defendant suggesting that signal lights be installed there. In Footnote1 is set forth the particular correspondence.
*210In answer to above primary points of error, appellees summarize the foregoing outline of testimony; arguing that fact questions are thereby presented relative to aforesaid issues 1 through 8. A statement of principles bearing upon the subject-matter under discussion should first be stated:
(1) It seems to be universally recognized that trainmen in charge of a train which has blocked a public crossing with an object which is easily discernible, like a box car, have a right to assume that one traveling a highway and approaching the obstruction will adopt suitable lights and such a rate of speed as that he can bring his automobile to a stop before coming in contact with the obstruction, and consequently accidents by reason of an automobile driver running his car into a train on a crossing, whether standing or moving, cannot reasonably be foreseen and anticipated as a natural result of blocking the crossing. (Citing-authorities.) 15 A.L.R. 901; 56 A.L.R. 1114; 99 A.L.R. 1454, and 161 A.L.R. 111. (2) “Before a jury will be warranted in saying, in the absence of any statutory direction to that effect, that a railroad company should keep a flagman or gates at a crossing, it must be first shown that such crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, as, for instance, that it is in a thickly populated town or city, that the view of the track is obstructed either by the company itself, or by other objects proper in themselves, or by the configuration of the land, or that the crossing is one which, for any reason, a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care could not use with safety, or that the crossing is a much traveled one, and the noise of approaching trains is rendered indistinct and the ordinary signals difficult to be heard by reason of bustle and confusion incident to railroad or other business, or by reason of some other such cause. In determining whether a railroad crossing is extrahazardous within this rule, each case must be viewed in the light of its own facts.” 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 728, pp. 1350, 1351. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Beard, Tex.Civ.App., 91 S.W.2d 1080 (writ ref.). (3) A railroad company has “the right to assume, in the absence of notice to the contrary, that approaching travelers would gauge their speed according to the efficiency of their automobile headlamps and other equipment and according to existing apparent natural conditions, especially those affecting visibility of the road, such as darkness, rain and fog; and that despite lowered visibility from such natural agencies, due care by the approaching traveler would prevent a collision with defendant’s cars without other notice of the presence of the cars than that afforded by the cars alone * * Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W.2d 195, 204. (4) The risk of harm to the traveler from the blocking of the high*211way by cars upon the crossing is treated as a reasonable incident of a lawful act, which could have been avoided by due care upon the traveler’s part and against which the traveler is therefore required to protect himself. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Davis, supra, citing authorities. (5) As defined in the court’s charge, by the term “extra-hazardous crossing” during nighttime switching operations is meant one which is shown to be more than ordinarily dangerous ; “attended with unusual or extra hazards — a crossing so peculiarly dangerous that prudent persons cannot use the same with safety unless extraordinary means are used to protect such crossing.” (6) And although' each case, whether or not involving above issues, must turn upon its own facts, obviously, to raise the issue, evidence of special circumstances or peculiar conditions must be shown, additional to those attendant upon the usual “country crossing.” The Texas cases so holding, point to existing obstructions; or conditions amounting to a trap or distraction; or illusion created in the mind of the traveler that would prevent an ordinarily prudent driver from observing that a crossing was occupied by a train in time to avert a collision therewith. Texas City Terminal R. Co. v. Allen, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 727 (writ ref.).
For example, in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. Long, Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W. 184; Id., Tex.Com.Rpp., 299 S.W. 854; Id., Tex.Civ.App., 23 S.W.2d 401 (writ ref.), the crossing was in a depression, with lights of the City of Temple shining above and beyond the crossing as approached by a night traveler (distraction or illusion). Likewise in Ft. Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. Looney, Tex.Civ.App., 241 S.W.2d 322, there were different levels in elevation of both highway and track, causing lights of automobiles to go under the train, together with a glow of lights of the City of Henrietta appearing over the train, thereby creating the illusion of an open road ahead. In Beaumont, S. L. & W. R. Co. v. Richmond, Tex.Civ.App., 78 S.W.2d 232, the crossing was occupied by a fiat car, presenting a barrier to the traveler’s view of only eight inches, over which the lights of Sour Lake could be seen, also the railroad crossarm and switch light — night dark with haze and mist of rain. In Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Picard, Tex.Civ.App., 147 S.W.2d 303, the night was foggy, pavement wet and slippery. A gondola type car blocked the crossing, with more open space underneath than the usual box car, plaintiff’s automobile lights shining thereunder; similarly as to approaching cars, and causing him to think the way was clear. In Thompson v. Royal, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 317, the first of a three-track crossing was obstructed by switch engine and houses, plaintiff failing to see approaching passenger train on the second track until too late, and in St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Brack, Tex.Civ.App., 102 S.W.2d 261, the train had been standing across the highway longer than the statutory five minutes, a low tank car on the crossing with taller yellow cars on either side, producing the impression that the train had been broken so as to leave the crossing open.
It has been difficult, indeed, to comprehensively appraise the facts of this record; viewing the same as we must from a standpoint most favorable to the prevailing party. At first blush the jury’s answers would appear as supported by competent testimony; but on a more careful analysis thereof we have concluded that the standing train on the crossing was adequate warning of its presence to users of this highway; in other words, that the switching operation in question involved no special circumstances or hazardous conditions, and consequently, there was no duty of additional warnings as .charged. We will now consider the factors, which, one or all, in plaintiff’s view constitute a showing of extra-hazardous crossing and a jury question.
(1) First to be listed are defendant’s nightly switching activities blocking the highway when the makeup of train 318 was more than 33 cars. These cars had *212been on the crossing only some two minutes. Defendant’s obligation to take extraordinary precautions does not include extra statutory measures against dangers arising merely from an ordinary operation of the railroad. (2) From Callaway’s property on up Addison Road to the north are houses, garages and other structures well obscuring that part of train 318; leaving visible to a traveler from the east, according to appellees, a view only of the cars on and south of the highway; constituting an obstruction, and material to issue 1 of a dangerous nighttime crossing. However, defendant’s exhibit No. 2 of the locale (shown herewith) from a distance of 200 feet east, reveals an ample view of the crossing; the houses, etc., to the north not visible except to a minimal degree. The obstructions complained of along Addison Road, in our opinion, would have relevancy only to a vehicular collision caused by defendant’s train in its approach to the crossing from the north. (3) Messrs. Callaway and Money testified that, due to the gradual slope of highway from the east, auto lights are lowered and would go under the train, would not hit the box cars “until close up”; the latter witness testifying similarly of an automobile parked on opposite side of the blocked crossing, that it “looked like you are meeting a car.” David Duffy did not testify to the described phenomena and in consequence that he or the driver Hoff were misled thereby; nor did any one of the witnesses who had experienced near-accidents make reference thereto.2 Neither was there testimony tending to show that defendant knew or should have known (aside from the safety history record of the crossing and letter of Brand-es next to be noted) of the described illusive factors. “Proof of illusion which misled motorist to believe that railroad crossing was not blocked, and of the circumstances which created such illusion, is not enough to support a finding that railroad either knew or should have known that such an illusion would result from existing circumstances.” Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 210 S.W.2d 195, syl. 6. (4) A history of near-accidents is insufficient as notice to the railroad, on the primary issues here sought to be established. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Davis, supra. Also inadmissible and of no probative force in this connection was the statement of Callaway concerning the Holloway incident of running into a train at the crossing two years before, the. circumstances so far as known being entirely dissimilar. (5) Effect of the Brandes letter as notice; this case involving a blocked crossing and not a train approaching the highway,. The correspondence calls attention of the railroad to advisabilty of increased protection at the crossing because of heavy travel along and in vicinity of Belt Line Road; and manifestly relates to a warning of approaching trains rather than to precautions additional to the notice afforded by cars already upon the crossing. “The use of signs, signals, and warnings is for the purpose of letting persons using the highway know of the presence of the crossing, and that a train is approaching the highway. Under the facts in this case, after the train had completely blocked the highway and was lawfully passing over the highway, it was within itself sufficient warning to persons using the highway to beware of the train.” Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Stratton, Tex.Civ.App., 74 S.W.2d 741, 743.
As raising the issue of extra-hazardous crossing, plaintiffs alleged that “The dull, *214dark color of defendant’s box cars on the crossing obscured plaintiff’s vision on the night of said accident and blending with the night and with the dark color of the road pavement failed to reflect the light of the headlights of the car in which plaintiff was riding sufficiently and in time to apprise plaintiff of the danger he was approaching” ; thus presenting a peculiar situation of danger similar to that reflected in the Davis case, supra, where a jury verdict was sustained. The two situations were not at all parallel. Two black or dark-colored tank cars were involved in the Davis case, night dark, wet pavement, dark-colored; the Court holding that even those conditions did not put defendant on notice of the particular hazard, nor did the fact of near-accidents. The notice there held sufficient to raise the issue of extra dangerous crossing was contained in the testimony of a deputy sheriff who detailed several actual collisions previously occurring at the location under almost identical circumstances. Absent the safety history just noted, said the Beaumont Court, “There was nothing on or adjacent to the highway which could have obscured plaintiff’s view of the crossing, or distracted his attention. The country adjacent to the road was level. Under ordinary conditions of visibility, the crossing was not hazardous.”
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*214The injuries suffered by David Duffy on the occasion were admittedly serious and lasting; and equally serious is our responsibility in the matter of determining defendant’s liability therefor. We conclude that the principle followed in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Stratton, supra, is likewise controlling of the instant subject-matter. The San Antonio Court there cited with approval the following language of Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Dillon, 1 W.W.Harr. 247, 31 Del. 247, 114 A. 62, 65, 15 A.L.R. 894, as illustrative of that principle: “Here, then, the railroad company had a right to assume that the plaintiffs would act in a reasonable way to avoid running into the train of box cars while it was lawfully standing across the highway. If the defendant’s trainmen had a right to assume that a reasonably careful man driving an automobile on a highway at night would use such lights and adopt such a rate of speed as that he could bring his machine to a standstill within the distance that he could plainly see by the lights on his machine a railroad box car twelve feet high standing across the highway motionless on • a railroad track, and completely obstructing his passage along a straight unobstructed highway, then the defendant did not then omit to perform any duty by not showing lights, or giving other warning of the presence of the train.”
In harmony with the conclusions here-inabove reached, we must sustain appellant’s first, third and fourth points, rendering unnecessary a consideration of any further points of error. The judgment under review is accordingly reversed and here rendered in favor of appellant, St. Louis, Southwestern Railway Company of Texas.
. “Industrial Department St. Louis & Southwestern Railroad 209 South Lamar St. Dallas, Texas.
“Gentlemen:
“We are very desirous of increasing the protection to our County vehicle traffic using Belt Line Road at the crossing of your railroad directly south of the Town of Addison. Our County Belt Line carries a considerable volume of traffic in this vicinity. We have actual volume counts on record showing a volume of over 1700 vehicles in a typical 24-hour day at a point approximately 1 ⅛ miles east of the crossing under discussion. Another count taken at a point approximately 3 miles west of here shows a volume of more than 600 vehicles per day. On basis of the importance of this particular Belt Line Road and the number of vehicles using it, we respectfully re*210quest consideration of proper railroad officials to equip this crossing with the automatic type of railroad-crossing flashing signals. Will you please advise us as to official approval and probable installation date of such equipment.”
“August 18, 1954.
“Mr. R. H. Olinger County Engineer Records Building Dallas 2, Texas.
“Dear Mr. Clinger:
“Your letter of May 10, to the Industrial Department of the St. Louis Southwestern Railroad, regarding crossing protection at Belt Line Road, south of Addison, has been referred to me. Estimate has been prepared for the installation of flashing light signals at this crossing and the estimated cost is $4,-228.76. I do not feel that the Railway Company would be justified in paying 100% of the cost of installation and will appreciate if you will advise what percent the County would be willing to bear of this expense in order to provide signal protection at this crossing.
Yours very truly, Signed: J. M. Lowry 16.”
The County Engineer in answer to above communication refused to bear any of the expense incident to signal protection at this crossing; adding that “Dallas County feels that this is the railroad’s duty.” Belt Line Road had been widened some two years before, pavement resurfaced or rebuilt.
. We are cognizant of the fact that in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of Texas v. Long, Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W. 184, the car occupants did not testify to any misleading effects of the City of Temple electric lights shining above and beyond them as their car approached the crossing, but the point of relevancy does not appear to have been raised. By way.of contrast, in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Beard, supra, plaintiff herself testified to automobile lights shining under train on account of railroad track elevation, thus creating the illusion of an open unobstructed road. Notwithstanding this, the case was reversed and rendered on basis of the entire record.