The juvenile division of the Jefferson County Chancery Court ordered appellant, the Arkansas Department of Human Services, to pay Reuben Southerland $3,325 as compensation for providing foster care to Charlie Smith, an eighteen-year-old foster youth, for the period June 1997 through December 1997. We reverse.
At a review hearing involving appellant and Charlie, the subject of board payments for Mr. Southerland arose. Charlie had run away from the foster home to which DHS had assigned him and moved into Mr. Southerland’s house in January 1997. DHS did not learn where Charlie was until June 1997. The approval process for certification and licensing began at that time. It was undisputed that until November 1997 Mr. Southerland was not certified to provide foster care, nor was his home licensed as a foster home. DHS contended therefore that it did not “place” Charlie in Mr. Southerland’s house. Rather, Charlie placed himself there and was allowed to remain there on “extended visitation” during the licensing/certification process. DHS was convinced that if Charlie were not allowed to remain in the Southerland home, he would run away again. Moreover, Mr. Southerland was certainly aware that he was not receiving board payments during this period, and, yet, according to DHS officials one of the reasons for the delay from June until November was that he was dilatory in satisfying the licensing/certification requirements.
Following the hearing, the juvenile judge’s order provided in pertinent part:
9.The next review of this case is scheduled for June 3, 1998 at 2:00 p.m. The Court at that time will consider whether or not Charlie Smith should remain in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services. The Court advised Charlie Smith that in order for him to remain in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Human Services, the said Charlie Smith will have to have already applied to college by the time of the next hearing scheduled for June 3, 1998.
10. Mr. Reuben Southerland, foster parent, testified that he has had Charlie Smith in his home for many months and has not received payment from Arkansas Department of Human Services. The Court finds that Arkansas Department of Human Services shall pay Reuben Southerland a total of $3,325.00 for providing care to Charlie Smith from June, 1997 through December, 1997. This sum was arrived at by calculating 7 months of care times $475.00 which is a regular board payment. The $3,325.00 shall be paid from the regular board payment funding source and shall be received by Reuben Southerland by January 15, 1998. That in the event Mr. Reuben Southerland does not receive the said check by January 15, 1998, Mr. Southerland is directed to inform this Court by letter.
11. That in the event that Mr. Reuben Southerland does not receive the said payment of $3325.00 from ADHS by January 15, 1998, then and in that event, Mr. Boyd Ward, Assistant Director of Children and Family Services, shall [appear] before this Court on February 4, 1998, at 1:30 p.m. for a special hearing. That in the event that Mr. Reuben Southerland does receive the said check by January 15, 1998, then and in that event, Mr. Boyd Ward will not need to appear before this Court as there will be no special hearing on February 4, 1998.
12. The Court has directed Arkansas Department of Human Services to pay the sum of $3,325 to Mr. Reuben Southerland for providing care to Charlie Smith for 7 months due to the fact that Arkansas Department of Human Services requested that Charlie Smith be allowed to stay in the home of Mr. Reuben Southerland while Mr. Southerland was being licensed as a foster care home. The Court received the testimony of the Arkansas Department of Human Services that the home of Mr. Reuben Southerland was not licensed as a foster care home until November 1997. However, the Court is not bound by the policy of Arkansas Department of Human Services, and the Court finds that Mr. Reuben Southerland should be compensated for providing care to Charlie Smith.
16. Jurisdiction of this cause is continued with a regular review hearing scheduled for June 3, 1998 at 2:00 p.m. At that time, the Court will enter another disposition. Further, all parties present have received notice of said hearing, and no further notice to this shall be required.
It is undisputed that DHS policies dealing with foster-parent approval and training provide that board payments are paid to “approved foster parents.” This DHS policy mirrors federal law governing foster-care services, which provides in pertinent part that foster-care maintenance payments may be made only on behalf of children placed in foster family homes. 42 U.S.C.S. § 672(b)(1) (1998). A foster family home is defined as a “foster family home for children which is licensed by the State in which it is situated or has been approved, by the agency of such State having responsibility for licensing homes of this type, as meeting the standards established for such licensing.” 42 U.S.C.S. § 672(c)(1) (1998). The juvenile court order in the instant case was directly contrary to these statutory requirements and DHS policies, and it provided no satisfactory justification for ignoring them. Consequently, we reverse and dismiss the juvenile court order because under the circumstances of this case the court lacked statutory authority to order appellant, the Arkansas Department of Human Services, to pay Mr. Southerland $3,325. Of course, he would be due payment beginning with the date of the completion of the licensing/certification process in November 1997.
There are two dissenting opinions in this case. One would dismiss, finding that the order appealed from is not final and appealable. The other would affirm the chancellor’s order based upon the insufficiency of appellant’s abstract, or in the alternative, for failure to preserve the arguments for appeal. We disagree with both dissents for the following reasons.
Rule 2(a)2 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil provides that an appeal may be taken from “[a]n order which in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken, or discontinues the action.” Here, the juvenile judge merely provided for a subsequent hearing for periodic review and enforcement, not for continuation of the matter at hand. The order appealed from put the court’s directive into execution and ended the litigation. It was therefore final and appealable.
Rule 4-2(b)(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals (effective for briefs filed through July 1, 1998) provides that “[i]f the Court finds the abstract to be flagrandy deficient, or to cause an unreasonable or unjust delay in the disposition of the appeal, the judgment or decree may be affirmed for noncompliance with the Rule.” Examples of flagrant deficiencies include instances ranging from the omission of documents or materials that are necessary to a clear understanding of the argument presented, see, e.g., Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322, 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996), to instances in which verbatim copies of the transcript are submitted as an abstract, see, e.g., Muldrow v. Douglass, 316 Ark. 86, 870 S.W.2d 736 (1994). Any deficiencies in appellant’s abstract do not rise to these levels and are not so flagrant as to make a decision “well nigh impossible.” See Haynes v. State, 313 Ark. 407, 855 S.W.2d 313 (1993). Moreover, as more fully quoted below, we think the attorney’s objection at trial was sufficient to preserve the points argued on appeal:
For purposes of the record and to preserve the record, I object on behalf of the Arkansas Department of Human Services to all the Court has ordered regarding the money. The main basis of the objection is the fact that the foster care home was not properly licensed until November and part of that was that the necessary documents were not provided by Mr. Southerland. The only reason I am voicing this objection is that I’m not sure really what the Department’s position will be, but I know I must preserve the record if I intend to object. I know there are different funding resources which I am woefully inadequate in being able to explain about the funding sources, but I do want to just preserve the record.
Reversed and dismissed.
Robbins, C.J., and Jennings, J., agree. Crabtree, J., concurs. Rogers and Meads, JJ., dissent.