dissenting.
Because I do not believe the appeal presents a justiciable issue, I respectfully dissent.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law which may be raised by any party or by the court itself at any time in the proceedings. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998). To invoke a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a party must have standing to bring the claim, a live controversy must exist between the parties, and the case must be justiciable. Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd. 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-46 (Tex.1993). Justiciability requires a real dispute involving an immediate, concrete outcome. A hypothetical dispute concerning the parties’ respective rights and duties does not trigger jurisdiction. See Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Medina Lake Protection Ass’n, 640 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.). A decision which resolves an abstract question of law, without more, is merely an advisory opinion prohibited by Texas law. See State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex.1994).
The trial court’s summary judgment “orders” that the fire chief has “exclusive authority ... to terminate [appellant’s] probationary employment.” There is, however, no evidence in the record to document that anyone has terminated appellant’s employment or that either party has suffered an injury. City counsel conceded at the summary judgment hearing that Ms. Montemayor would be terminated if the trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment.
District courts do not have the authority, even in a declaratory judgment action, to give advice or decide cases based upon speculative, hypothetical, or contingent events. See Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex.1968). Under the circumstances, the City’s motion for summary judgment is premature and merely seeks an advisory opinion' — an exercise neither the trial court nor this court is entitled to perform. See Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.1980) (holding constitutionality of proposed charter amendment not justiciable before election on amendment occurred); Nuchia v. Woodruff, 956 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) (holding city’s claim that hearing examiner exceeded authority not justiciable until examiner took action). For this reason, the majority should not address the merits of the fire chiefs authority to terminate probationary firefighters at this time. I would reverse the summary judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.