dissenting.
By the holding in the principal opinion, the Director of Revenue is obliged to issue a certificate of title showing an odometer reading which is shown to be false by the records in the director’s office, if the seller has unqualifiedly certified to that reading. I cannot believe that the legislature, in a statute passed to protect purchasers of vehicles against turned-back odometers, intended such a result. I would reverse and remand with directions to dismiss the petition.
The claim of standing is shaky, to put it mildly. The auction neither buys nor sells vehicles. The principal opinion gives heed to the testimony of plaintiffs president that “the warning legend on a title devalues the resale value of the vehicle $500 to $2000,” and that, when such a legend appears “the buyer will immediately contact the auction and demand a refund....” I do not believe that the plaintiff has a legally cognizable right to the issuance of the titles which operate as a fraud on purchasers, by deceiving them as to the true mileage. Even if technical standing is found, the plaintiff’s position is completely lacking in equity and should not be fortified by injunctive relief.
The principal opinion, furthermore, is not sound on the merits. Statutes relating to odometer readings are designed to protect purchasers. Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.1979). The director’s actions are not forbidden by the language of the statute. It follows by fair implication that the director should be able to express a caution when he knows from his official records that the odometer reading tendered by the seller is incorrect. To hold otherwise would allow a statute designed for the protection of buyers to operate as a fraud and deception on them, by giving apparent official sanction to a false reading.
The principal opinion points to the statutory provisions governing the situation in which a seller knows that the figure shown by the odometer is not correct. These provisions are designed for the guidance of a conscientious seller who knows that the odometer’s reading is not correct, and provides the means by which he may effect a sale. But for the statutory language, the director might refuse to issue a certificate of title in which the correct mileage cannot be shown. The statutes simply do not deal with the situation in which the director, but not the seller, knows that the odometer reading is false.
The principal opinion rejects State ex rel. Rhodes v. Crouch, 621 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. banc 1981), as a basis for the director’s action. I consider the case in point and highly pertinent. There the Court looked to the broad purpose of a statute, so as to authorize a pre-condemnation inspection which was not specifically authorized. We borrowed from another statute which applied to other utility companies, thereby rejecting a strict application of the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, in favor of a construction more consonant with the statute’s purpose. By the same token we should allow the director to borrow the procedure of § 407.536, RSMo Supp.1984, to avoid the issuance of a false and deceptive certificate of title under the aegis of his office.
Authority also follows by fair implication from § 301.190, RSMo Supp.1984 obliging the director to “use reasonable diligence in ascertaining whether the facts stated in [an application for certificate of title] are true, ...” What is the director to do if he discovers that the seller’s statement of mileage is not true? Surely the director should be expected to take some action in this situation. The warning legend is an appropriate response.
It makes no difference that the director may not be able to discover all instances in which the records of the office show that a tendered odometer reading is not correct. There is no reason to require the director to sponsor some fraudulent readings, simply because all fraudulent readings may not be flagged.
The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the petition.