This litigation arose when Dealers Electrical Supply, Inc. (Dealers) sued “C. T. Lambert individually and d/b/a CTL Construction Company” on a sworn account under Tex.R.Civ.P. 185. Lambert answered and asserted defenses, but failed to swear to his answer as required by rule 185. At trial, the judge admitted into evidence the account but declined to permit Lambert to tender evidence on his defenses. The judge then rendered judgment against Lambert on the account, which showed that the goods were sold to CTL Construction Company, rather than Lambert. Lambert appeals on the ground, among others, that Dealers failed to prove that Lambert was conducting business in the name of CTL Construction Company, and therefore, as a stranger to the account, no sworn denial was required under Tex.R.Civ.P. 185 and that he should have been allowed to present evidence on his defenses. We hold that where the plaintiff sues the defendant individually and doing business under an assumed name on a sworn account and the affidavit of account and the sales invoices specify only the defendant’s assumed name as debtor and where plaintiff failed to allege and to prove that defendant was conducting business under that assumed name, judgment against the individual on the account was error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Lambert argues that the affidavit of account required by rule 185 and the sales invoices produced by Dealers show CTL Construction Company as purchaser rather than Lambert. Consequently, he asserts that he was a stranger to the transaction and not required to meet the requirements of rule 185 by denying the account under oath. On the other hand, Dealers argues that its petition naming Lambert, “individually and d/b/a CTL Construction Company” and the sales invoices made out to CTL Construction establish that Lambert was not a stranger to the transaction and, therefore, a sworn denial was required. We agree with Lambert.
In its petition, Dealers alleged that both Lambert and CTL Construction Company were defendants, although it sued only Lambert, “individually, and d/b/a/ CTL Construction Company.” At no place in its petition does Dealers allege that Lambert was doing business under an assumed name at the time he purchased the goods; instead, the petition appears to name two “defendants” and alleges that both Lambert and CTL Construction Company were liable to it on the account. The affidavit to which the account is attached states that the goods shown on the invoices were sold to CTL Construction Company. Likewise, all invoices show CTL Construction as the purchaser. In the absence of any sworn statement in the account that Lambert was doing business in the name of CTL Construction Company, Lambert was a stranger to the account. Consequently, we hold that the sworn account was not prima facie evidence of an account against Lambert under rule 185, upon which, without more, a judgment against him cannot be upheld. Sundance Oil Co. v. Aztec Pipe and Supply Co., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tex.1978) (Per Curiam); Foster Brothers Manufacturing Co. v. Style-Rite Manufacturing Co., 594 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1980, no writ).
We note that Tex.R.Civ.P. 93(o), which requires a defendant to deny under oath that he is not doing business in an assumed name as alleged, has no application here because Dealers failed to make such an allegation in its petition or in the account *63sworn. The mere fact that Dealers sued Lambert “individually and d/b/a/ CTL Construction Company” is not the equivalent of alleging that Lambert was doing business in that name at the time he purchased the goods. Consequently, rule 90 does not apply and Lambert’s answer was sufficient to place the account in issue. Of course, if the sworn account had set forth Lambert “individually d/b/a/ CTL Construction Company” rule 90 would apply. Indeed, in such a case the account would be prima facie proof of the account against Lambert.
Reversed and remanded.