dissenting on State’s Petition for Discretionary Review.
I dissent to the majority’s holding that “the instant jail felonies could not be enhanced under [V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section] 12.42(d).”
These cases require this Court to interpret several statutory provisions — the state jail felony law in V.T.C.A, Penal Code, Section 12.35(a), the community supervision law in Article 42.12, Section 15, V.A.C.C.P., and the habitual offender law in Section 12.42(d). The 1993 Legislature enacted Section 12.35(a) and Article 42.12, Section 15, as part of the overall revision of the 1973 Penal Code. See State v. Mancuso, 903 S.W.2d 386, 387 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995). The 1993 Legislature also revised V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 12.42. See id. Section 12.35(a) and the community supervision law in Article 42.12, Section 15, were enacted primarily to ease prison overcrowding.
Section 12.35(a), in relevant part, provides that a defendant convicted of a state jail felony shall be punished by confinement in a state jail for not more than two years or less than 180 days. However, Article 42.12, Section 15(a), requires the trial court to suspend imposition of the foregoing sentence and to place the defendant on community supervision. Except, Article 42.12, Section 15(d), provides a trial court with discretion to require the defendant, as a condition of community supervision, to serve up to one year jail time in a state jail facility if the defendant “previously has been convicted of two or more felonies.” Article 42.12, Section 15(d), expressly provides that “a defendant previously has been convicted of a felony regardless of whether the sentence for the previous conviction was actually imposed or was probated and suspended.” The habitual offender law in Section 12.42(d) provides for imprisonment in the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years, if it is shown on the trial for “a felony offense” that the defendant “has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final.”1 A “state jail felony” is expressly classified as a “felony” in V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 12.04. See *91also V.T.CA, Penal Code, Section 1.07(23) (definition of “felony”).
The issue in these cases is whether an habitual offender convicted of a state jail felony may have his sentence enhanced under Section 12.42(d) of the Texas Penal Code. Or, are habitual offenders convicted of state jail felonies, like those here, always required to be sentenced under Section 12.35(a) and Article 42.12, Section 15? The State argues that if it can prove a defendant is an habitual offender, then the “plain” language of Section 12.42(d) requires the defendant to be sentenced as an habitual offender.
When interpreting statutes, our duty as judges is to give effect to the collective intent of those who enacted the statutes at the time of their enactment. See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). We are not required to “strictly construe” the applicable statutory provisions; instead, we are required to “liberally” construe them “according to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice and effect the objectives of the code.” See V.T.C.A, Penal Code, Section 1.05; Article 1.03, V.A.C.C.P., Stine v. State, 908 S.W.2d 429, 435 fn. 4 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting). In interpreting the applicable statutes here, we presume the Legislature intended for the entire statutory scheme to be effective. See Tex.Gov’t Code, Section 311.021(2); Mancuso, 903 S.W.2d at 387. If possible, we should interpret the applicable statutes so that effect may be given to each and avoid any interpretation that would render any parts of the statutes irreconcilable or meaningless. See Mancuso, 903 S.W.2d at 387. We should strive to give effect to all the provisions to make them stand together and have concurrent efficacy. See Cheney v. State, 755 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
To resolve these cases, the majority apparently relies on the applicability of the doctrine of in pari materia which is a rule of statutory interpretation. But see State v. Perry, 912 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. filed October 27, 1995) (concluding that the relevant statutes are not in pari materia)-, see also Cheney, 755 S.W.2d at 126-27. My understanding of how this doctrine is applied is that statutes that deal with the same general subject, have the same general purpose, or relate to the same person or thing or class of persons or things, are considered as being in pari materia. See id. If possible, effect should be given to all the provisions of each act so they can be made to stand together. See id. However, where a general statute and a more detailed enactment irreconcilably conflict, the latter will control, regardless of whether it was passed prior or subsequently to the general statute, unless it appears the Legislature intended to make the general act controlling. See id; see also Tex.Gov’t Code, Section 311.026.
This rule is not applicable to irreconcilable enactments that cover different situations and that were apparently not intended to be considered together — i.e., irreconcilable enactments not in pari materia. See id. If statutes are not found to be in pari materia, analysis should still focus on whether effect can be given to all the provisions of each statute. When two irreconcilable statutes not in pari materia are at issue, other rules of statutory construction will dictate which statute controls. See id; see also Texas Government Code, Section 311.025.
Therefore, the threshold determination is whether the statutes in question irreconcilably conflict or whether they can be harmonized. If they can be harmonized to stand together and have concurrent efficacy, then the analysis ends. If they irreconcilably conflict, then the applicable rule of statutory construction to determine which statute controls will depend on whether the statutes are in pari materia. See Cheney, 755 S.W.2d at 126-27; compare Texas Government Code, Section 311.025 with Texas Government Code, Section 311.026.
The basis of the majority’s opinion seems to be that Article 42.12, Section 15(d), and Section 12.42(d) are irreconcilable; therefore, the specific provisions of Article 42.12, Section 15(d), will control over the general provisions of Section 12.42(d).2 See Texas Gov-*92eminent Code, Section 311.026; Mancuso, 903 S.W.2d at 387-88. As I understand the majority opinion, if the sentence of an habitual offender convicted of a state jail felony can be enhanced under Section 12.42(d), then that would nullify Article 42.12, Section 15(d). In other words, the sentence of an habitual offender convicted of a state jail felony would always be enhanced under Section 12.42(d) making the provisions of Article 42.12, Section 15(d), meaningless.
However, I agree with the Fourteenth Court of Appeals that Article 42.12, Section 15(d), and Section 12.42(d) do not conflict and that Article 42.12, Section 15, “applies only to convicted state jail felons whose sentence has been assessed within the punishment range specified in [Section] 12.35(a).” See Perry, 912 S.W.2d at 250. Where the State has “indicted and proven” that a defendant is an habitual offender as defined in Section 12.42(d), punishment must be assessed in accordance with that statute and Section 12.35(a) and Article 42.12, Section 15, have no application. See id.
In addition, this interpretation does not make Article 42.12, Section 15(d), and Section 12.42(d) irreconcilable or render Article 42.12, Section 15(d), meaningless. In its brief, the State claims Section 12.42(d) and Article 42.12, Section 15(d), “can live in harmony.” The State claims:
“Furthermore, applying section 12.42(d) to habitual state jail felons does not offend article 42.12, [section] 15(d). Section 12.42(d) provides for the enhancement of punishment for felony offenses. To use prior felony convictions for enhancement, the State must provide notice to the defendant. Furthermore, the prior convictions must be alleged in the proper sequence; that is, the second previous felony conviction must be for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction becoming final.
“However, article 42.12, [section] 15(d) merely provides for a defendant to serve up-front time in the state jail as a condition of the state jail community supervision. This is done by showing that the defendant has previous felony offenses. The defendant’s sentence, which has been suspended, is in no way affected by this condition on his community supervision. The State is not required to provide notice of its intent to use the prior felony or felonies. Moreover, there is no sequencing requirement and no requirement of finality. In fact, the prior convictions could have occurred on the same day, and could still be pending on appeal. In addition, unlike section 12.42(d), a prior felony may be used under article 42.12, [section] 15(d) even if the sentence for that conviction was probated and suspended.
“Therefore, it is clear that article 42.12, [section] 15(d) and section 12.42(d) are to be used in very different circumstances. Section 12.42(d) is to be used only where the State provides notice to the defendant that it will prove he has two prior final felony convictions, which are properly sequenced. Section 42.12, [section] 15(d) applies when the State shows only that a defendant has previously been convicted of one or more felony offenses, and he either served out his sentence or was placed on community supervision. Because these provisions can be used in harmony, it is not necessary to find that one trumps the other.” (Emphasis Supplied).3
*93The majority opinion does not address these contentions. And, I find these contentions persuasive since they show how Section 12.42(d) and Article 42.12, Section 15(d), can be harmonized and have concurrent efficacy. This Court can and should give effect to the “plain,” objective meaning of both statutes. See Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. In addition, the State’s interpretation of how and when these provisions apply do not conflict with any of the other provisions of Sections 12.35, 12.42 or Article 42.12, Section 15. And, this interpretation is consistent with the purposes of the community supervision law of easing the prison overcrowding problem and with the stated purposes of the code. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.02; Article 1.03.
Under the State’s interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, a state jail felon, who does not fall under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 12.35(e), with no prior felony convictions will receive community supervision under Article 42.12, Section 15(a). The same defendant, who “previously has been convicted of two or more felonies,” will still receive community supervision under Article 42.12, Section 15(a), but the trial court will have discretion to impose up to a year of incarceration in a state jail “as a condition of community supervision” pursuant to Article 42.12, Section 15(d). However, the same defendant, who “has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final,” will be sentenced under Section 12.42(d). All of these statutory provisions can stand together and have concurrent efficacy. Therefore, it is unnecessary to apply any rule of statutory construction to “find that one [of these statutory provisions] trumps the other.”
Appellees argue it is not “plain” from the face of Section 12.42(d) that the Texas Legislature intended for it to apply to state jail felonies. They further argue that extratex-tual sources clarify the ambiguity in Section 12.42(d) by making it plain that the Legislature did not intend for it to apply to state jail felonies. They support these contentions with a discussion of the legislative history of the applicable statutes. However, this Court has rejected this sort of approach to statutory interpretation when, as here, the “plain” language of the statutes can be given effect without leading to “absurd” consequences. See Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785-86; but see Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 789 (Miller, J., dissenting) (ambiguity in a statute often is not apparent until the legislative history is researched and the true legislative intent is discerned); Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 801 fn. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Miller, J., concurring).
The appellees also argue the State’s interpretation of the applicable statutes leads to absurd consequences. They argue:
“In closing, it is interesting to say the least that under the State’s proposed construction of section 12.42(d), an habitual offender with a prior ‘3g’ felony conviction could be assessed from 2-20 years in prison under section 12.42(a) after being subjected to the built-in enhancements of section 12.35(c)4 and 12.42(a).5 (Citation Omitted).
“Meanwhile, an habitual offender such as appellee[s], whose two prior felonies were non-violent (at least as far as section 12.35(c) is concerned) could be assessed *94from 25 years to life in prison. (Citation Omitted).
“This is absurd. It is presumed that a just and reasonable result is intended in enacting a statute. (Citation Omitted).
“Moreover, in construing a statute a court may consider the consequences of a particular construction. (Citation Omitted).
“The State’s construction of section 12.42(d) would lead to the illogical result that violent habitual offenders would be eligible to receive a maximum punishment which is less than the minimum punishment for non-violent habitual offenders.”
However, under the State’s interpretation of Section 12.42(d), “an habitual offender [convicted of a state jail felony] with a prior ‘3g’ felony conviction,” will be sentenced as an habitual offender under Section 12.42(d) and not under the provisions of Sections 12.35(c) or 12.42(a). Therefore, the State’s construction of Section 12.42(d) does not lead to the absurd results envisioned by the ap-pellees.
Because the majority holds the Legislature did not intend for state jail felonies to be enhanced under Section 12.42(d), I dissent.
MEYERS, J., joins this dissent.. The majority opinion sets out the relevant text of these statutes. It also should be noted the 1995 Legislature amended Section 12.42 and Article 42.12, Section 15, with the amendments becoming effective January 1, 1996. See Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 318, Section 1; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 256, Section 7. Effective January 1, 1996, Section 12.42(a)(2) provides that a defendant adjudged guilty of a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(a) shall be punished for a second-degree felony if it is shown "the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felonies, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final." (Emphasis Supplied). And, effective January 1, 1996, Section 12.42(d) expressly excepts from its operation “a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(a).”
. The majority opinion states:
"Art. 42.12, [section] 15(d), deals specifically with state jail felonies committed by one who *92has two or more prior felony convictions and provides that the trial judge may impose as a condition of community supervision probation a term of confinement in a state jail facility for a term not to exceed one year. Art. 42.12, [section] 15(d) controls the specific circumstances presented by the instant cases.”
. Unlike Section 12.42(d), Article 42.12, Section 15(d), expressly provides that "a defendant previously has been convicted of a felony regardless of whether the sentence for the previous conviction was actually imposed or was probated and suspended.” Therefore, the State appears to be correct in arguing that Article 42.12, Section 15(d), and Section 12.42(d) “are to be used in very different circumstances." Accord Perry, 912 S.W.2d at 247:
“Section 12.42(d), when read in conjunction with [Section] 12.42(e), applies only to those persons who have been finally convicted of two prior non-state jail felonies, where the second offense was committed subsequent to the first conviction having become final. On the other hand, article 42.12 [section] 15(d) applies regardless of when, or if, the sentence was actually imposed, was probated, or was for a previous state jail or non-state jail felony.”
. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 12.35(c), in relevant part, provides that a defendant convicted of a state jail felony shall be punished for a third degree felony if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant, either as a principal or as a parly, used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the offense, or the defendant has previously been convicted of a "3g” offense. See Article 42.12, Section 3g(a)(l), V.A.C.C.P. Under the State’s interpretation of Section 12.42(d), the provisions of Section 12.35(c) are not applicable if the State can prove "the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final.”
. V.T.C.A., Penal Code,. Section 12.42(a) provides:
"If it is shown on the trial of a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(c) or on the trial of a third-degree felony that the defendant has been once before convicted of a felony, on conviction he shall be punished for a second-degree felony.”