concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Near the commencement of its opinion today the majority states, “This Court granted appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review to determine whether the court below erred in affirming the trial court’s decision to overrule appellant’s objection that the trial court’s charge to the jury failed to apply the law of parties to the facts of the case.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In concluding and supposedly answering appellant’s contention, the majority states, “the error of the trial court in charging on the law of parties was harmless error.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus there seems a gap between question and answer.
In order to understand what is before this Court it is necessary to examine the record. Appellant’s ground of error expressly states, “The Trial Court erred in overruling appellant’s objection that the court’s charge failed to apply the law of parties to the facts of the case.”
This, however, is not really the contention appellant advances in his argument under said ground of error.
The argument states in part:
“The court’s charge in this case contained an abstract definition of the law of parties. The law of parties, however, was not specifically applied to the facts of the case. Instead, the court charged the jury as follows: .... ” (Emphasis supplied.)
The appellant then noted that in applying the law to the facts the court authorized the jury to convict him if they found he was “acting alone or as a party, as that term is defined herein, ....” Appellant then stated in his brief argument:
“The appellant’s co-defendant objected to the court’s charge because of its failure to specifically apply the law of parties to the facts of the case. The appellant adopted this objection as his own. The trial court overruled the objection..
“In light of the specific objection, made by the appellant in this case the court should have applied the law of parties to the facts of this case. Instead, the court’s charge authorized the jury to convict the appellant of being a party to this offense without any concrete delineation of how the law of parties applied to the particular facts of this case. This cause should therefore be reversed and remanded for a new trial.”1
Appellant and his co-defendant were separately indicted, but were jointly tried. Separate charges concerning each were submitted to the jury. In objecting to the jury charge concerning the co-defendant, his attorney, inter alia, stated: “And our third objection, Your Honor, is that the Court has failed to specifically apply the law of parties to the facts in this case.” The objection was overruled.2 Thereafter appellant’s counsel stated, “... I would like to adopt Mr. Huff’s objections.” Thereafter the court expressly permitted the objections, but appellant failed to se*572cure a ruling on the objections contrary to the assertion in his brief.3
It is clear from what has been said that appellant’s argument is that the trial court did not adequately and specifically apply the law of the parties to the facts in its charge to the jury, not that the court failed to apply the law of parties at all. It is on this point that the majority seems to lose its way. It ends in discussing whether the court erred in giving a charge on the law of parties, which is not the question presented.
In responding to appellant’s ground of error, the Court of Appeals wrote:
“Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection that the court’s charge failed to apply the law of parties to the facts of the case. We disagree. Appellant’s code-fendant objected to the charge stating, ‘[o]ur third objection is that the court has failed to specifically apply the law of parties to the case.’ Appellant then adopted the objection with the court’s approval. Failure to apply the law of parties to the facts is not fundamental error. Where appellant’s objection stated merely that ‘the Court’s charge fails to adequately apply the law of parties to the case,’ the objection was not specific enough to apprise the court of what is complained of and nothing is presented for review. Bilbrey v. State, 594 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Appellant’s fifth ground of error is overruled.”
Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., expressly provides the objection to the charge must distinctly specify each ground of objection. See also 23 Tex.Jur.3rd, Crim.Law, § 2755, p. 417. The purpose of Articles 36.14 and 36.15 is to enable a trial judge to know in what respect a defendant regards the charge as defective and to afford him an opportunity to correct it before reading the charge to the jury. Seefurth v. State, 422 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). This can be accomplished only when the objections are sufficiently specific to point out the errors of which complaint is made. Green v. State, 161 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.Cr.App.1942); McCain v. State, 158 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1942).
Thus an objection which does not distinctly specify and point out wherein the charge is defective, presents nothing for review. Myers v. State, 468 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Smith v. State, 439 S.W.2d 834 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Siros v. State, 399 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Cr.App.1966). See also Green v. State, supra; Harrington v. State, 424 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). See also Dozier v. State, 158 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.Cr.App.1942); Peters v. State, 137 S.W.2d 1008 (Tex.Cr.App.1940); Perry v. State, 126 S.W.2d 969 (Tex.Cr.App.1939).
And it has been said that an objection to the charge which is too general to call the court’s attention to the omission and which does not point out wherein the charge did not correctly set forth the law presents nothing for review. Chavira v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 197, 319 S.W.2d 115 (1958). See also Bryant v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 463, 293 S.W.2d 646 (1956); Soto v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 239, 275 S.W.2d 812 (1955).
In Criddington v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 613, 78 S.W.2d 185 (1935), it was held that the objection “If such issue (provoking the difficulty) were raised by the evidence the charge of the court is erroneous in that he does not properly submit the law covering said issue” was not sufficiently specific to direct the trial judge’s attention to the thing objected to. Maloney v. State, 119 Tex.Cr.R. 273, 45 S.W.2d 216 (1932), held the objection was too general to call the court’s attention to the admission complained of, that the mere presence at the scene would not constitute defendant a principal.
In Cain v. State, 136 Tex.Cr.R. 275, 124 S.W.2d 991 (1939) (Opinion on rehearing), the objection was “1. Defendants object to the charge for the reason that nowhere in said charge has the court charged on the definition of the law of principals, applying the law to the facts on principals, and charged on the converse of said application *573of the law to the facts.” The objection was held insufficient to call the court’s attention to the contradiction before the charge actually given on principals and the charge on alibi.
An objection to a certain paragraph of the charge as not correctly stating the law was held not to be sufficiently specific as required by the statute in Magana v. State, 115 Tex.Cr.R. 7, 26 S.W.2d 1072 (1930). In Ruiz v. State, 523 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), the defendant’s objection to a limiting instruction did not indicate why he thought the charge was defective. No error was shown. In Gill v. State, 84 Tex.Cr.R. 531, 208 S.W.926 (1919), an objection to a paragraph in the charge being on the weight of evidence was too general to be reviewed.
“That the defendant’s objects and excepts to the court’s charge as a whole as the same is not sufficient to protect the rights of the defendant” was not a specific enough objection to apprise the court of the nature of his complaint with regard to the charge and thus presented nothing for review. Hackbarth v. State, 617 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
In Bilbrey v. State, 594 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the objection was that the charge failed to adequately apply the law to the facts. There it was held that the objection was not specific enough to apprise the court of what was complained of and presented nothing for review.
In the instant case the appellant asked to adopt the objections of the co-defendant which in effect was saying “for the same reasons,” which is similar to Vaughn v. State, 607 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).4 The objection adopted, as earlier noted, was simply that the court had “failed to specifically apply the law of parties to the facts in this case.” The objection did not specifically point out to the trial court where the charge on law of parties was deficient.5 The court’s attention was not directed to what was desired. Thompson v. State, 162 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.Cr.App.1942). The objection was not sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P. Nothing is presented for review.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and for that reason I concur in the result reached by the majority. I dissent, however, to extending the discussion to issues not before the Court as the majority has done.
. In the middle of appellant's brief he states:
"The failure to apply the law of parties to the facts of a case is not fundamental error. Bilbrey v. State, 594 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Where a proper and timely objection is raised to such failure, however, reversible error is presented. Apodaca v. State, 589 S.W.2d 696, 698-699 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Rasmussen v. State, 608 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).”
Here appellant does not cite Apodaca and Rasmussen for the proposition claimed by the majority nor is argument advanced on the claim seized upon by the majority.
. The co-defendant's charge is not in this record before us so that we appraise the objection in light of the charge.
. The rulings referred to in the brief were those made as to the co-defendant’s objection.
. In Vaughn the Court noted the only objection was "for the same reasons stated in our motion for directed verdict." Speaking through Judge Clinton this Court held the objection was not in accordance with Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P.
. In Minor v. State, 476 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), the complaint that the trial court erred in charging only abstractly on the law of principals (now parties) without applying the law to the facts despite timely presented objection was held not supported by the record which showed that, in addition to the abstract charge, the court instructed the jury to convict if it found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense charged either "acting alone or together with another" as a principal as defined in the charge. It must be remembered that the charge must be read as a whole.