dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
“Beneficiary,” by the language of the policy, includes both an identified “primary” and an identified “contingent.” The term as used throughout the policy encompasses both those categories. “Primary” as an adjective means “first in order of time or development” or “first in rank or importance.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged). A “primary beneficiary” is the one first in line to take upon the death of the insured. “Contingent” as an adjective means “dependent for effect on or liable to modification by something that may or may not occur.” Id. A contingent beneficiary is one who takes if the primary beneficiary does not. The term is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, as “Person who may or will benefit if primary beneficiary dies or otherwise loses rights as beneficiary_” (Emphasis supplied).
The dictionary definitions utilized by the majority do not specifically exclude as contingent beneficiaries those who become eligible to take because of disqualification of the primary beneficiary. For purposes of defining the term they merely utilize the most common example of when a contingent beneficiary would take under the policy. I am unable to conclude that such dictionary definitions can be converted into a legal holding that “contingent beneficiary” excludes anyone whose rights under the policy mature for reasons other than the death of the primary beneficiary. It should be remembered that an insured may condition the payment of his insurance policy to the primary beneficiary upon any of many conditions, i.e. that the primary is married to him at the time of his death. If the condition fails the contingency is removed and the contingent beneficiary receives the proceeds regardless of whether the primary is living or not. It is simply not correct to say that a contingent beneficiary takes, if, and only if, the primary beneficiary predeceases the insured. The Black’s definition recognizes the correct meaning of the term; the definitions utilized by the majority recognize only the most common circumstance where the contingent beneficiary takes.
Nothing in the policy before us conditions the right of the contingent beneficiary to take on the death of the primary beneficiary. The only condition is that the named beneficiary “survive the Joint Insured.” Catherine Spurgeon was named as a beneficiary in Delores Short’s application. She was therefore a named beneficiary of *678the policy; her right to take was contingent upon the primary beneficiary not taking. When Delores Short died the obligation of the company was to pay the proceeds to the “named beneficiaries” that survive Delores Short. The order of payment would be first to the primary beneficiary and if he could not be paid, for whatever reason, then to pay the proceeds to the contingent beneficiary. When James Short was disqualified as a matter of law from receiving the proceeds, the contingency was removed and Catherine Spurgeon, as a named beneficiary, was entitled to the proceeds.
This conclusion is further bolstered by paragraph numbered 2 of the beneficiary section which specifically provides that the money goes to the owner or the owner’s estate “if there is no beneficiary upon the death of a Joint Insured....” Catherine Sprugeon was a beneficiary under the application and she was in existence on the death of the joint insured, Delores Short. There was therefore a qualified beneficiary “upon the death” of Delores Short.
Whatever the merits of the cases of Beck v. Downey and Life & Cas. Ins. v. Martin relied upon by the majority, the policy before us does not contain the language of those policies requiring the death of the primary beneficiary as the trigger for the removal of the contingency. It was upon the “if living, otherwise to ” language that both cases specifically turned. The majority has engrafted that requirement onto the policy here without support either in the policy or in the plain meaning of the terms used.
I would affirm the judgment.