I concur in the court’s result. As I understand it, this dispute boils down to the following legally relevant facts and circumstances. Exxon owns an undivided *76830.937% interest in the surface of mineral classified land covered by the Mobil lease. As a Relinquishment Act surface owner, Exxon is entitled and continues to receive royalty payments from production on the lease, which, in settlement of a separate lawsuit, has now been assigned to Wally Scott, Trustee for the General Land Office. The only issue is whether Exxon, as a Relinquishment Act surface owner, is entitled to 30.937% of one-half of the working interest assigned to Scott, Trustee. I agree that the trial court was correct in rendering summary judgment against Exxon’s claim.
The thrust of Exxon’s argument is that the State and other surface owners conspired to settle their litigation with Mobil in such a way as to exclude Exxon from the benefits of the settlement and deprive Exxon of its exclusive right to lease the State’s minerals. I submit that Exxon’s arguments that it should share in the settlement are unsupported by any legal authority. Exxon’s arguments also run counter to the established rule “that legislative grants of property, rights, or privileges must be construed strictly in favor of the state on grounds of public policy, and whatever is not unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms is withheld.” Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. State, 121 Tex. 138, 158-59, 47 S.W.2d 265, 272 (1932).
So long as Exxon continues to receive its share of royalty payments from production, it has no legal basis to complain that the State may be getting more out of its minerals than it would under an ordinary lease to a third party. In addition, Exxon’s right to execute any new lease would be contingent on invalidity of the Mobil lease. Only the State has authority to seek invalidation of a Relinquishment Act lease, Colquitt v. Gulf Production Co., 52 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex.Comm’n App.1932, judgm’t adopted), and the State has settled and abandoned its claims that the Mobil lease is no longer in effect. Exxon lacks standing to assert otherwise.
I consider the court’s opinion to contain overly simplistic representations of the holdings of certain cited cases. Also, I do not ascribe to some of the broad pronouncements and sweeping statements to be found in the language of the opinion. Nevertheless, I agree that the trial court’s summary judgment was correct and should be affirmed. Accordingly, I concur in the court’s judgment.