concurring.
I concur in the result reached in the principal opinion.
In 1976, the 78th General Assembly, Second Regular Session, adopted three laws designed to address the issue of medical malpractice. H.C.S.S.C.S.S.B. 472 provided additional authority in the State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts for the licensing and discipline of physicians. § 334.100, RSMo 1978. H.C.S.S.S.S.C.S. S.B. 471 created a professional liability review board designed to mediate claims of professional malpractice prior to the filing of an action in the circuit court. Chapter 538, RSMo 1978. C.C.S.S.C.S.S.B. 470 imposed, inter alia, the special statute of limitations for medical malpractice which is before this Court in the instant litigation.
In State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. banc 1979), this Court struck down the provisions of Chapter 538, on the ground that that legislation violated our constitutional guarantee of access to the courts. Mo. Const, art. I, § 14. The Court stated:
The right of access to the courts is said to trace back to Magna Charta. DeMay v. Liberty Foundry Co. 327 Mo. 495, 506, 37 S.W.2d 640, 645 (1931). It has been held to be an aspect of the right to petition the government contained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. California Motor Transport Company v. Trucking Unlimited, *13404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972). Most importantly, it is explicitly preserved in the Constitution of Missouri.
Cardinal Glennon, supra at 110.
This Court’s decision today is the natural born, legitimate offspring of Cardinal Glennon. While one of the members of the majority in Cardinal Glennon now questions the wisdom of his vote in that case, see dissenting opinion of Welliver, J., fn. 4, Cardinal Glennon remains the law until a majority of the members of this Court determine otherwise. My concurrence in this case adheres to the precedent which Cardinal Glennon establishes.
The ground upon which the principal opinion rests — access to the courts — is narrow. It does not implicate, in my view, the broader concerns of the due process and equal protection guarantees of our constitution. The well-researched dissent of Wel-liver, J., reads the principal opinion far more broadly than I do.
Nor does this decision necessarily portend ill for the legislature’s current effort to revamp the law of medical malpractice. That legislation is not presently before us; we may not now judge its adherence to constitutional standards. Those who would attack that legislation should find no greater comfort in the principal opinion than already exists in Cardinal Glennon.