Justice, dissenting.
I dissent.
I agree with the majority that plaintiffs points of error three and four should be overruled. However, I disagree with the majority’s rulings on the first two points of error.
In points of error one and two, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the heirs because plaintiff holds superior title to the property. Plaintiff argues that no lien attached as to the property because the abstract of judgment was not indexed according to the Texas Property Code, which prescribes the manner in which an abstract of judgment must be indexed:
(b) At the same time an abstract of judgment is recorded, the county clerk shall enter the abstract on the alphabetical index to the judgment records, showing:
(1) the name of each plaintiff in the judgment;
(2) the name of each defendant in the judgment;....
Tex.Prop.Code Ann. § 52.004(b)(1), (2) (Vernon 1984).
Under Texas law, a judgment lien is created by complying with the applicable statutory mechanisms. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Banque Arabe Int’l D’Investissement, 747 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied); Tex.Prop.Code Ann. §§ 52.001-.007 (Vernon 1984 and Supp.1994). Since a judgment lien is created by statute, it is not established until the conditions to the lien fixed by the statute are satisfied. Nye v. Moody, 70 Tex. 434, 8 S.W. 606, 607 (1888).
Section 52.004(b)(1) requires the abstract to be indexed under the “plaintiffs” name. In this case, the abstract of judgment was indexed under “Maida, Estate of Lena” rather than “Letsos, Antoinette Maida, Guardian of the Estate of Lena Maida, a person of unsound mind.” An estate is not a legal entity and cannot be a party to a lawsuit, Henson v. Estate of Bruce L. Crow, 734 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1987); Bernstein v. Portland Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 850 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ); Janak v. Security Lumber Co., 513 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ), and therefore cannot be a plaintiff. A suit in behalf of an estate must be brought by the estate’s personal representative. See Henson, 734 S.W.2d at 649; Price v. Estate of Welton Terry Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.1975). It is the personal representative who is the “plaintiff.” *277Therefore, Antoinette Maida Letsos was the “plaintiff’ in the underlying suit.
Because Antoinette Maida Letsos, as personal representative of the estate, was the “plaintiff,” the abstract should have been indexed under her name. Here it was indexed under the name of the estate. This is not a minor deviation. The index, when considered as a whole, should somewhere show the correct name of both the plaintiff and the defendant, in order that even a substantial compliance with the statute be shown. McLarry v. Studebaker Bros. Co. of Texas, 146 S.W. 676, 678 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1912, writ ref'd) (emphasis added).
The heirs argue that Bernstein stands for the proposition that as long as the personal representative of the estate appears and participates in the case, a judgment that names only the estate is valid. However, even though the judgment in this case is valid, I would hold that the abstract was improperly indexed.
The heirs cite Womack v. Paris Grocer Co., 166 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1943), writ ref'd per curiam, 140 Tex. 423, 168 S.W.2d 645 (1943), to support their contention that the judgment need only be indexed according to who recovered on the judgment; here, the Estate of Lena Maida. In Womack, the court held that an abstract of judgment is properly indexed although it does not contain the names of all defendants, as the defendants listed in the index were the defendants against whom the plaintiff recovered. Womack is not inconsistent with my position. Here, it was necessary to index under “Letsos, Antoinette Maida, Guardian of the Estate of Lena Maida,” the plaintiff, because the “Estate of Lena Maida” is not a legal entity and cannot be a party to a lawsuit. Henson, 734 S.W.2d at 649; Bernstein, 850 S.W.2d at 699; Janak, 513 S.W.2d at 301. I would hold that the abstract of judgment was not indexed in compliance with the Texas Property Code and therefore a valid lien was not created. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., 747 S.W.2d at 929-30; Reynolds v. Kessler, 669 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1984, no writ).
I would sustain points of error one and two. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
OLIVER-PAEROTT, C.J., joins this dissent.