dissenting.
[T24] I dissent because the majority opinion fails to address an issue which became readily apparent to the Court upon a close review of the record on appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
[T25] The matters at issue in these appeals followed on the heels of this Court's disposition of Baker's substantive appeal in Baker v. State, 2010 WY 6, ¶ 44, 223 P.3d 542, 558 (Wyo.2010). In that case, we reversed two of Baker's convictions and affirmed the remainder of his convictions. The matter was remanded to the district court for resentencing in accordance with that opinion. A hearing was held on April 7, 2010, to consider the sentence. At that hearing the district court took the position, as did the prosecutor, that the district court did not have the authority to resentence Baker in light of the circumstance that he stood convicted of four crimes rather than six. Thus, the district court deleted any reference to Counts III and IV and imposed the same sentences as he had when Counts III and IV were still valid. Baker's attorney argued that the district court was required to impose a sentence in light of the new cireumstances in which Baker stood at the time of the instant sentencing hearing. The district court rejected that contention and did not take into account the fact that Counts III and IV were determined to have been invalid convictions.
[¶ 26] In the amended judgment and sentence upon remand entered on April 23, 2010, the district court sentenced Baker to serve two concurrent terms of six to eight years for his convictions on Counts I and ILI. Counts III and IV were dismissed per the direction of this Court. With respect to Counts V and VI, Baker was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 18 to 24 months, to be served consecutively to Counts I and II. Baker's original sentence was imposed on January 7, 2008, at which time he was given credit for time served of 312 days.
[¶ 27] On April 28, 2010, Baker filed a motion for reduction of sentence. The district court asked for a progress report from the Wyoming Department of Corrections, and such a report was sent to the district court. It was largely positive as to Baker's progress in the Corrections system (the exception being that Baker had tried to acquire cigarettes from family, and all tobaceo products are prohibited in Wyoming Department of Corrections facilities). On July 9, 2010, Baker asked the district court to facilitate Baker's receipt of his case file so that he could prosecute a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The Wyoming Public Defender's Office provided Baker with all the records it had. On July 20, 2010, Baker filed a motion in the district to court to have a court reporter at his hearing. On that same date, Baker filed a motion asking that his motion for reduction of sentence be granted because the prosecutor had not responded to it. On that same date, he filed a motion to appear telephonically at his hearing. Finally, on that same date, he filed an objection to the limited amount of material he received from the Wyoming Public Defender's Office in aid of his petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. On July 22, 2010, the prosecutor filed a pleading urging the district court to deny the motion to reduce sentence. On July 27, 2010, Baker filed a renewed motion *275requesting that the motion for reduction of sentence be granted because the prosecutor had not timely responded to that motion. In Case No. S-10-0150, Baker asked this Court to grant a petition for writ of review so as to reinstate his appeal of the sentence imposed by the district court on April 28, 2010. That petition was denied by order entered on August 3, 2010, on the basis that this Court had not required the district court to conduct "a full-blown resentencing proceeding." On August 5, 2010, Baker requested a copy of his new sentence and contended that he should not have to pay for it because he had never received one. The clerk of district court answered that there was a charge for such copies that had to be paid in advance and informed Baker that he should be able to get copies from his defense attorney to whom the sentence had been sent. The Wyoming Public Defender's Office asserted that it had not received a copy of that sentence either. At that hearing, a public defender from Cheyenne stated that everything from his appellate file there had been sent to Baker, and a public defender from Casper stated that everything from his trial stage file had been sent to Baker as well. It appears from the transcript of the hearing into this matter that what Baker did not have was a copy of the original clerk's file. Public defenders do not usually make a photocopy of that file. Rather, the district court's file is used in preparing the appellate documents and then it is returned to the district court clerk.
[¶ 28] At the conclusion of that hearing, the district court ruled that:
1. The prosecutor would check into getting some photographs so that Baker had a complete record.
That there was no such thing as "a transcript" of the proceedings in the Supreme Court and so the district court could provide no relief in that regard.
The district court explained why a transcript had not been made yet of the resentencing hearing. (However, we take note here that such a tran-seript has subsequently been made, and it is included in the record for these appeals.)
4. The district court directed the clerk of the district court to give Baker copies of documents he needed from the district court's file, at no expense to Baker.
[¶ 29] After the district court delivered that part of its ruling, Baker presented argument on his motion for reduction of sentence. Baker first asked to amend his motion to a motion to correct an illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a). The district court allowed Baker to go forward and argue either or both a motion for sentence reduction and a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Baker's argument was primarily directed at the district court's refusal to sentence him to probation, given that the convictions(s) at issue in this case were: Baker's first felony convictions; because he was relatively young at the time of the crimes (he was about 38 years of age); and because Baker recognized and took responsibility for the seriousness of his crimes and was committed to his own rehabilitation. Baker also argued that his sentence should have been probation under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). I agree that Baker's contentions with respect to the Apprendi case are mistaken.
[T30] By order entered on August 6, 2010, the district court denied both Baker's motion for reduction of sentence and his motion to correct an illegal sentence.
[T31] W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) invests the district court with broad discretionary authority. However, we have held that it is in the interests of judicial economy to correct an illegal sentence even if it first comes to our attention in our examination of the appeal. See Leger v. State, 855 P.2d 359, 363 (Wyo.1993); Kahisdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1190 (Wyo.1991); and Price v. State, 716 P.2d 324, 328 (Wyo.1986). In my view, this Court must review the cireumstances under which this sentence was imposed whether Baker explicitly raised it or not. In this case, the source of our concern was called to the attention of the prosecutor and the district court by defense counsel. That concern was not whether or not a "full-blown" sentencing hearing should be held. Baker did not contend that a "full-blown" sentencing *276hearing should be held. Rather, he asserted that the district court was required to take into account the cireumstance that, at the remand hearing he stood convicted of four felonies rather than six. The prosecutor championed the position that the district court could only remove the offending conviec-tions from the sentence but he could in no way reconsider its sentence in light of the cireumstance that two of Baker's convictions had been overturned on appeal. In United States v. Pimienta-Redondo and Pupo, 874 F.2d 9, 12-16 (1st Cir.1989) the federal circuit court of appeals dealt with a very similar issue:
II. DUE PROCESS
A
Relying upon North Carolina v. Pearce, 895 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), appellants claim that they were denied due process of law by the district court's enhancement of their sentences on Count II. In Pearce, the Court addressed the due process concerns which emerge when a defendant, having obtained reversal of a conviction on appeal, is subsequently retried for, and found guilty of, the same offense, and given a stiffer sentence by the same trial judge. Recognizing the inherent potential for abuse-that a defendant might be penalized for exercising appeal rights-the Court concluded:
Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retal-fatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.
395 U.S. at 725, 89 S.Ct. at 2080 (footnote omitted).
It is important that the Pearce principle not be blown out of proportion. Pearce does not flatly prohibit resentencing, or even enhancement of sentence, after the accused has taken an appeal or otherwise taken advantage of some legal right. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24-28, 98 S.Ct. 1977, 1981-1988, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1978); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114-20, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 1959-62, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723, 89 S.Ct. at 2079; see also Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 566, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 3221, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984) (plurality opinion). Rather, the presumption envisioned in Pearce arises "only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists." United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2488, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). Once this presumption blossoms, the prosecution must proffer evidence to overcome it; elsewise, vindictiveness is deemed established, and the due process clause requires invalidation of the challenged action. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081.
It follows that more than chronal proximity is required to bring Pearce into play; the presumption does not apply indiscriminately to all instances of detrimental action treading close upon the heels of a defendant's exercise of some legal right. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384, 102 S.Ct. at 2494 (involving addition of felony count after defendant asked for a jury on misdemean- or charge); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 667, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (discussing imposition of sentence after defendant stood trial, unsue-cessfully, rather than plead to lesser offense); Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26-27, 98 S.Ct. at 1982-88 (involving reconviction and re-sentencing by jury after new trial obtained); Colten, 407 U.S. at 116, 92 S.Ct. at 1960 (discussing imposition of sentence after defendant's election of de novo "see-ond" trial in two-tier system proved unavailing); see also Wasman, 468 U.S. at 566, 104 S.Ct. at 8221. As such cases betoken, the Court has been chary of extending Pearce to precinets where, given the totality of the cireumstances, the likelihood of actual vindictiveness is tiny. This case, we suggest, derives from that line.
B
We have employed the Pearce presumption to ensure against "'a reasonable ap-*2777 3 prehension of vindictiveness," " see Longval v. Meachum, 693 F.2d 286, 237 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098, 103 S.Ct. 1799, 76 L.Ed.2d 364 (1983), and we assume arguendo the suitability of that standard.FN3 The presumption was devised as a proxy for actual evidence of vindictive motivation because "[mJotives are complex and difficult to prove." Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 378, 102 S.Ct. at 2488. But the blade has two edges: wielding it in too uninhibited a manner may serve to "block a legitimate response to criminal conduct." Id. Where the sentencing judge's motivation cannot be called fairly into question, there is no need to indulge in the conjecture, and run the risks, which the Pearce presumption necessarily entails. Absent proof of an improper motive-or some sound reason to suspect the existence of one-no reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness can flourish. See Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569, 104 S.Ct. at 3223 (where Pearce presumption inapplicable, defendant must affirmatively prove actual vindictiveness). Accordingly, on resentencing, if it is reasonably clear that the judge reshaped the impost merely as a means of bringing original sentencing intentions to fruition after some new development had intervened, a need for employing the Pearce presumption never arises. See, eg., United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136, 188 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Bentley, 850 F.2d 327, 328-29 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 970, 109 S.Ct. 501, 102 L.Ed.2d 587 (1988); United States v. Shue, 825 F.2d 1111, 1116 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 956, 108 S.Ct. 351, 98 L.Ed.2d 376 (1987); United States v. Colunga, 812 F.2d 196, 200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857, 108 S.Ct. 165, 98 L.Ed.2d 120 (1987). Stated in different terms, there must be some evidence of actual, or at least apparent, vindictive motivation before a due process violation can be claimed.
This case is a fair exemplar. Here, the district court's adjustment of defendants' sentences on remand, fairly evaluated, does not signal retaliatory animus. Indeed, the authority to reshape a sentence when multicount convictions garner mixed reviews on appeal-some affirmed, some reversed-looms as an integral component of the trial judge's broad sentencing discretion."FN4 See Wasman, 468 U.S. at 563-64, 104 S.Ct. at 8220-21. Society has a strong interest in ensuring that, in our criminal jurisprudence, punishment "will suit not merely the offense but the individual defendant." Id. at 564, 104 S.Ct. at 3220. The district court, in tailoring a sentencing package, protects this interest by considering a "breadth of information." Id. The offenses charged establish a permissible range of punishment and the court then designs the ultimate sentencing plan by considering the accused's actual conduct during the criminal enterprise, as well as his life, health, habits, and background. The myriad of other factors underlying the original sentence in a multiple count case are not necessarily altered when a defendant successfully appeals his conviction on one count. After an appellate court unwraps the package and removes one or more charges from its confines, the sentencing judge, herself, is in the best position to assess the effect of the withdrawal and to redefine the package's size and shape (if, indeed, redefinition seems appropriate). Seen in the light of these realities, retrofitting a sentence after a conviction is sustained in part and vacated in part seems altogether a sensible, fully legitimate response to criminal conduct.
*278Put another way, when a defendant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan. When the conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand, within applicable constitutional and statutory limits, if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still fits both erime and criminal. See Bentley, 850 F.2d at 328 ("whenever a reversal on appeal undoes a sentencing plan, or even calls the plan into question, the district court should be invited to resentence the defendant on all counts in order to achieve a rational, coherent structure in light of the remaining convictions"); United States v. Diaz, 834 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir.1987) (Diaz II) (trial judge could change sentence on remand to carry out original intention), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 818, 109 S.Ct. 57, 102 L.Ed.2d 35 (1988); United States v. Diaz, 778 F.2d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir.1985) (Diaz I) (court of appeals remanded for sentencing on affirmed counts when lower court's sentencing plan would otherwise be thwarted by successful appeal of other counts); United States v. Busic, 639 F.2d 940, 947 (8d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 3055, 69 L.Ed.2d 422 (1981) (like Diag II ).FN5 Notwithstanding the sparseness of the record of the original sentencing hearing, it seems plain that, following this court's order of remand, the district judge "simply used a different way to implement [her] original intention." Bentley, 850 F.2d at 328.FN6
Granted, it would have been preferable if the judge had articulated her sentencing plan earlier. Still, this omission was not constitutionally dispositive.
Defendants place the cart before the horse by arguing that accepting the judge's explanation would create an appearance of vindictiveness likely to chill the incentive to appeal convictions. The Supreme Court has ruled that unless vindictiveness (proven or reasonably presumed) underlies an enhanced sentence, any such "chilling effect" is without constitutional significance. See Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 29-35, 98 S.Ct. at 1984-1987. Moreover, the record in no way contradicts the thesis that there was an original sentencing plan. The judge's announcement of original sentencing intentions, though articulated after the fact, see supra note 6, bore all the hallmarks of plausibility. It finds support, for example, in the presen-tence investigation reports presented at *279the first sentencing hearing. We think it especially significant that these reports characterized the interdicted conduct as a unitary offense and set forth an evaluation not for each count, but rather for the "instant offense."
Nor is this a case where a disadvantage, not adequately explicable by reference to the judge's sentencing plan, has inured to defendants' detriment. Quite the contrary seems true: the arguments in favor of allowing the trial court to wield discretion are strongest where, as here, retrofitting does not serve to work a net increase in the accused's aggregate punishment. Seq, e.g., Gray, 852 F.2d at 138 ("resentencing will not be considered vindictive if the ultimate sentence for one or more counts does not exceed that given for all counts sentenced at the conclusion of the first trial") (footnote omitted); Bentley, 850 F.2d at 328; United States v. Cataldo, 832 F.2d 869, 874-75 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 1577, 99 L.Ed.2d 892 (1988); United States v. Hagler, 709 F.2d 578, 579 (9th Cir.), cert. demied, 464 U.S. 917, 104 S.Ct. 282, 78 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983); Busic, 689 F.2d at 951 n. 12; of United States v. Norton, 657 F.2d 10083, 1004 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (total time decreased under second sentence).
Pupo's situation exemplifies the lack of cognizable prejudice. He faces the same incarcerative prospect after the resentenc-ing (twelve years to serve on the affirmed count) as after the original sentencing (six years to serve on each of two counts, strung together consecutively). There has been no suggestion that his 12-year sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for the remaining count, or that retrofitting the sentence otherwise caused him some further detriment, say, postponing the likely date of parole or rendering good-time credits less attainable. In real-world terms, the sentence was not "enhanced" at all. Consequently, no reason existed to refrain from giving weight to the judge's explanation. The same generalizations apply to Pimienta-Redondo.
On this record, then, we have not the slightest reason to doubt the judge's explanation. The sentences imposed after remand were sufficiently within the integument of the district court's original sentencing plan that neither Pupo nor Pi-mienta-Redondo could have had any reasonable apprehension that harsher punishment was meted out in retaliation for claiming an appeal. Under the cireum-stances of this case, a presumption of vindictiveness is unwarranted.
A simple illustration highlights the practical value of this approach and strongly suggests why it must be correct. Assume that the district judge had originally concluded that Pupo should spend six years in jail for his part in this drug-related enterprise, and had sentenced him to six years' imprisonment on Count I and a term of probation on Count II. If the Pearce presumption applied, then Pupo would not spend a day behind bars after reversal of his Count I conviction.FN7 Such a result can scarcely be said to mirror the judge's original sentencing intentions, to honor the societal interest in condign punishment, or to be a necessary concomitant to treating a defendant fairly. Neither the due process clause nor Pearce cireumseribes the district court's sentencing discretion so severely, or mandates so bizarre an outcome, where the likelihood of actually vindictiveness is demonstrably small.
Also see, Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing, § 8:2, at 236-837 (Harsher sentence after invalid conviction) (3rd ed. 2004).
[T82] In Jones v. State, 2008 WY 154, ¶¶ 12-13, 79 P.3d 1021, 1025-26 (Wyo.2008), this Court spoke at length about the general principles that we believe apply in all sentencing proceedings:
While the focus of our review is for an abuse of discretion, it is frequently important that the record be reasonably clear with respect to the findings of the district court in its sentencing decision, in order *280that meaningful appellate review can be achieved. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Sentencing, (8rd ed. 1994), provide this guidance:
Standard 18-6.5 Sentencing for more than one offense
(a) A sentencing court should impose a sanction appropriate to the offense of conviction and should not consider other offenses of which the defendant was not charged, which were dismissed prior to determination of guilt, or of which the defendant was acquitted.
(b) In sentencing an offender convicted of multiple offenses, a sentencing court ordinarily should impose a consolidated set of sentences that appropriately takes into account the offender's current offenses and criminal history.
(c) In sentencing an offender for offenses that were part of an episode,
(i) a sentencing court should not increase the severity of the sentence or change the type of sanction merely as a result of the number of counts or charges made from a single episode, and
(i) where, the separate offenses are not merged for sentencing, a sentencing court should consider imposition of sanctions of a type and level of severity that take into account the connections between the separate offenses and, in imposing sanctions of total confinement, ordinarily should designate them to be served concurrently.
(d) In sentencing an offender for an offense graded by the amount of money or property involved, a sentencing court ordinarily should determine the appropriate sentence by treating the offense as a single offense and determining its gravity by cumulating the amounts of money or property in the separate offenses.
(e) In sentencing an offender for multiple offenses not within (c) or (d), a sentencing court should be guided by the presumptive sentence derived by reference to the sentence appropriate for the most serious current offense. Under guidance from the agency performing the intermediate function, a sentencing court may impose an enhanced sentence by treating other current offenses as part of an offender's eriminal history or as factors aggravating the most serious offense.
(f) When multiple sentences of total confinement are to be served consecutively, a sentencing court should impose sentences that do not exceed a total term reasonably related to the gravity of the offenses.
(g) In sentencing an offender who is subject to service of a prior sentence, a sentencing court should take into account the unexecuted part of the prior sentence in shaping a consolidated set of sentences.
A resource manual from the National Judicial College provides these additional suggestions:
Outline for Imposition of Sentence
In imposing sentence, it is important that you address all of the necessary issues. For ease in assuring that is done, you may wish to use the following outline:
1. Basis for Decision: Explain the information that you have considered, e.g., presentence report, testimony at trial, testimony at hearing.
2. Nature of the Offense: Include the statutory punishment range.
3. Factors: Enumerate the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors that you find detailing the evidence which supports each. If the factors are not statutory, articulate the findings and evidence which form the basis for the decision.
4. Victim Impact: harm to the victim. Address the
5. Nature of the Offender: Detail the offender's background and your appraisal of the offender given your observation of the offender during the trial and sentencing hearing (and the offender's testimony if applicable). Appropriate details include credibility, remorse, attitude, tendencies, industry, health, general moral character, and habits, in*281cluding drug and alcohol use. Inappropriate details include certain lifestyle choices, race, gender, ethnicity, and decision to demand trial.
6. Announcement of Sentence: Announce the term, the range, if appropriate, and the manner of service. If your sentence involves conditions that the offender must satisfy, detail them individually. If the sentence requires follow-up court appearance, announce the date.
Imposing Sentences for Multiple Offenses
When an offender is convicted of more than one offense, you must not only determine the appropriate sentence for each offense, but you also must determine whether the sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. State law generally establishes what you must find to impose sentences consecutively. Therefore, when faced with an offender with multiple offenses, after determining the appropriate sentence for each, you should determine whether, under the cireumstances, you should impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence.
Generally, to impose consecutive sentences, you must make some finding of an aggravating cireumstance that the legislature has established. It is recommended that you specify the exact statutory reasons that a consecutive, rather than a concurrent, sentence has been imposed for all the reasons illustrated above.
Penny J. White, Sentencing Guide for State Trial Judges, at 48-44, The National Judicial College (1998).
[¶ 33] Applying the above-cited authorities here, I conclude that the district court erred in simply editing out the two convictions that we reversed in Baker's appeal. While a "full-blown resentencing hearing" was not required, although the extent of any such hearing was most certainly within the broad discretion of the district court, a minimal requirement was that the district court re-weigh the sentences imposed in light of our decision to reverse two of Baker's six felony convictions. The district court declined to exercise its discretion, attributing to this Court's mandate on reversal a prohibition that he could do so. Such language was not included in our opinion, nor can it fairly be drawn from it. Thus, I deem the sentence imposed to be "illegal" as contemplated by W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), and it is necessary that this Court remand the case to the district court so that such a sentencing proceeding as more fully described above may be conducted.
[¶ 34] The district court's order denying Baker's motion to correct an illegal sentence should be reversed, and this matter should be remanded to the district court with directions that Baker's resentencing be conducted in light of the crimes for which he was convicted.
. Recent decisions suggest that Pearce likely prohibits enhanced sentences only when motivated by actual vindictiveness. See Wasman, 468 U.S. at 568, 104 S.Ct. at 3223 ("'due process does not in any sense forbid enhanced sentences or charges, but only enhancement motivated by actual vindictiveness toward the defendant for having exercised guaranteed rights") (emphasis in original). Absent vindictiveness, enhanced sentences are constitutional despite any "incidental deterrent effect they might have on the right to appeal." Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 29, 93 S.Ct. at 1984. This focus may well presage the demise of "reasonable apprehension" as the benchmark for judging due process claims of retaliatory sentencing, see Wasman, 468 U.S. at 574, 104 S.Ct. at 3225 (Stevens, J., concurring), but that is a bridge which need not be crossed today.
. The newly-mandated "guideline sentencing" which has overtaken the federal courts, see *278generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989); United States v. Twomey, 845 F.2d 1132 (1st Cir.1988), significantly cabins the district courts' discretion in structuring sentences, but does not entirely eliminate i. In any event, the guidelines were not applicable in the case.
. There is some caselaw which-though perhaps distinguishable in terms of the breadth of the mandate emanating from the first appeal may be read to stand for the proposition asserted by appellants. See United States v. Lewis, 862 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir.1988) (authority to alter sentence on remand extended only to illegal portions, and did not empower district court to alier legal punishments previously imposed), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032, 109 S.Ct. 1169, 103 L.Ed.2d 227 (1989); United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298, 303, 306 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc) (similar). To the extent these decisions are inconsistent with today's opinion, we reject them.
. At resentencing, the judge did allude to her original intentions. Regarding Pimienta-Redondo, she stated:
Let me state, Mr. Redondo, to you that .... when I imposed the original sentence which was a total term of 10 years I thought of it long and hard, and I still think that was a fair sentence given your individual circumstances, your prior conviction, and [the] nature of the offense.
Now, today, I have re-thought that. I have rethought it also after your allocution given to me today, and I have left a term of 10 years. I have considered your circumstances, I have considered the nature of the offense and the aggravating circumstance that you in the past committed this same type of offense.
Regarding Pupo, the judge said at resentenc-ing:
And as in the case of Mr. Pimienta, I must express that I understand that the Court is not increasing the sentence, that the Court always intended this defendant for the offense committed to serve the period of years that I have imposed, that he has a prior conviction, and taking into account his individual background, his prior conviction, and the nature of this offense I believe on this single count this is a fair and a reasonable sentence.
. It is no answer to suggest that district judges should guard against appellate disruption of sentencing packages by making all sentences run concurrently. The availability of consecutive, deferred, and/or suspended sentences, and their judicious use, have historically been important accoutrements of the district courts' broad sentencing authority.