concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the Court that the proper measure of damages for a taking of only part of a tract is the market value of the land actually appropriated and the difference, if any, in the market value of the remainder immediately before and immediately after the taking. However, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals because Taub failed to establish damages to the remainder tract. I therefore concur in part and dissent in part with the opinion of the Court.
The basis for damages to a remainder tract is the fact that the property as a whole constituted a single tract prior to the taking; that is, there was unity of use, unity of ownership, and contiguity between the remainder tract and the parcel actually taken.1 See City of Austin v. Capitol Livestock Auction Co., 453 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex.1970) (citations omitted); see also 4A Nichols On Eminent Domain, § 14B.03[1] (3d ed. 1994). The most troublesome factor for determining whether damages to the remainder are appropriate is determining whether there was unity of use between the tract taken and the remainder tract. See generally Nichols, supra, § 14B.03[3].
In Capitol Livestock, 453 S.W.2d at 464, this Court held that there was no unity of use or unity of ownership in a remainder tract that had been sold prior to the date of the *829taking. In the present case, the evidence establishes that Taub succeeded in re-zoning the upper half of the tract for light industrial use prior to the date of the taking, while the lower half of the tract remained zoned for single-family residential use. Because Taub is using portions of the remainder tract for different purposes, there is no unity of use for the entire tract, even though there may be unity of ownership and contiguity. See Nichols, supra § 14B.03[1] (“[W]here an owner has been proven to use portions of what would otherwise constitute a single tract for different and separate purposes, the parts of that single tract, although in unity as to ownership and contiguity, may be held to be independent even though they'are not physically separated.”). A landowner may divide the actual remainder into two parts and seek damages as to only one part. State v. Oak Hill Joint Venture, 815 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex.App. — Austin 1991, no writ) (citing State v. Watson, 448 S.W.2d 720, 721 (Tex. Civ.App. — 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Taub, however, did not do this; instead, he sought to recover damages to the remainder property as a whole. The only evidence Taub provided of market value before and after the taking was as to the entire tract. I do not believe that under the present record Taub established damages to the remainder tract because he did not prove that there was unity of use between the parcel taken for the ditch easement and the remainder of his tract.2 I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals because Taub did not establish damages to the remainder tract. I otherwise concur with the opinion of the Court.
. Thus, when the tract taken is a self-sufficient economic unit independent of the remainder of the tract, with no unity of use between the two tracts, then the owner's recovery should be ascertained by considering only the condemned land. In that case, neither severance damages nor benefits to the remainder of the property are to be considered. See DeWitt & Rearick, Inc. v. State, 531 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1975, no writ).
. Because I conclude that Taub is not entitled to remainder damages, I would not reach the question of whether the ditch provided an "implied special benefit,” as the court of appeals held. 882 S.W.2d at 828. See State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 780-81 (Tex.1993); see also Olson v. Harris Co., 807 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (injuries or benefits experienced in common with the community may not be considered in estimating damages).