concurring.
I concur in the judgment that the appellant, Lee Cain, is personally liable to the State of Texas for the cost expended by the State to plug certain oil wells owned and operated by Timber Creek Oil Company (“Timber Creek”), of which Cain was an officer and director. I choose to write separately, however, to express my views for affirming the trial court judgment.
BACKGROUND
The material facts of this summary judgment case are undisputed. Timber Creek was the designated operator of fifty oil wells in the Corsicana Field, Navarro County, Texas. At all material times Cain was an officer and director of Timber Creek. Because the wells had been inactive and unplugged since approximately September of 1984, the Texas Railroad Commission (“the Commission”), on June 8, 1987, filed a request for action to (1) determine whether Timber Creek had violated any statewide rules; (2) impose administrative penalties; and (3) order Timber Creek to plug the wells. See Tex.Nat.Res. Code Ann. § 89.041 (West 1993).
On May 12, 1988, the Commission held a public hearing on the wells, and on July 8, 1988, the hearings examiner circulated a proposal for decision. In her proposed decision the examiner recommended that Timber Creek be ordered to plug the wells and pay an administrative penalty.1 On August 15, 1988, the Commission rendered its final order, which adopted entirely the hearings examiner’s proposed decision and ordered Timber Creek to plug the wells. See Tex.Nat. Res.Code Ann. § 89.042 (West 1993).
When Timber Creek failed to comply with the Commission’s order to plug the wells, the Commission decided to exercise its authority to plug the wells itself. Section 89.043 of the Code provides that if, after a hearing and a Commission order to plug is issued, the wells remain unplugged and are likely to constitute a serious threat of pollution or injury to. the public health, the Commission can take action to plug the wells with State funds. Tex. Nat.Res.Code Ann. § 89.043 (West 1993). After determining that the fifty wells in question did pose a threat of pollution and a danger to public health, on December 19, 1988 the Commission rendered its order entitled “Authorization to Plug With State Funds,” which provided:
authorization [is] granted to expend such funds in the manner, for the purposes and subject to the prescriptions provided by law and to do such things as are necessary and proper to effectuate the proper plugging of the wells above-listed including authorization to appoint agents and to enter onto land....
After a bidding process, the State of Texas authorized an independent contractor to plug the fifty wells. The wells were actually plugged between May 25, 1989 and September 23, 1989.
In the interim, Timber Creek failed to pay its franchise taxes that were due on March 15, 1989. As a result, on June 23, 1989, the State of Texas forfeited Timber Creek’s right to do business. Pursuant to Section 171.-255(a) of the Texas Tax Code, Cain, as an officer and director of Timber Creek, became *521liable for each debt of the corporation “created or incurred” after March 15, 1989. See Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 171.255(a) (West 1993) (hereinafter “the Tax Code”).
The State of Texas sought to impose liability individually on Cain utilizing the Tax Code in conjunction with Section 89.083 of the Natural Resources Code, which provides as follows:
§ 89.083. Cause of Action If Commission Plugs
(a) If the commission plugs a well under Sections 89.043 through 89.044 of this code, the State has a cause of action for all reasonable expenses incurred in plugging or replugging the well according to the rules of the commission in effect at the time the well is plugged or replugged.
(b) The cause of action is:
(1) first, against the operator, ...
Tex.Nat.Res.Code Ann. § 89.083 (West 1993).
Thus, the State filed suit to establish liability against Timber Creek and its officers and directors, one of whom was Cain. The State contended that since Timber Creek failed to file its franchise tax report on March 15, 1989, its officers and directors were liable for the state funds expended to plug the wells. Because the wells were plugged between June and September of 1989, after the failure to pay franchise taxes, the State argued that Cain was individually liable.
Cain responded that he should not be held individually liable because, although the wells were not physically plugged until after March 15, 1989, the Commission authorized the expenditure of state funds in December 1988, at a time when Timber Creek’s franchise taxes were current. Cain argued that the creation of the debt related back to a date prior to the franchise tax default.
The district court rejected Cain’s position and accordingly rendered judgment against Timber Creek and its officers and directors, including Cain, jointly and severally. Only Cain appeals to this Court.
In two points of error, Cain actually articulates a single complaint: the trial court erred in concluding that the State’s reimbursement expense cause of action was a debt which was created or incurred after the failure to pay franchise taxes on March 15, 1989.
DISCUSSION
This is the third in a series of cases decided upon similar facts in which we conclude that a debt created under the well-plugging provisions of the Texas Natural Resources Code may be enforced against individual officers and directors of a defaulting corporation. See Jonnet v. State, 877 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, no writ h.); Serna v. State, 877 S.W.2d 516 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, no writ h.). In both Jonnet and Sema, we held that pursuant to the statutory scheme provided for in the Code, the key question was when the statutory liability was created. Since the Commission action in both Jonnet and Serna post-dated the franchise tax default, we concluded that individual liability under the Tax Code was proper. In the instant case, the statutory scheme under the Natural Resources Code provides that the Commission is empowered to plug wells through the use of state funds. Pursuant to Section 89.083, I would hold that a cause of action for reimbursement of the State is created when the well is actually plugged. Therefore, applying this interpretation to the facts of this case, since all fifty of the wells in question were plugged after the failure to pay franchise taxes, Cain, as an officer and director of Timber Creek, is personally liable for the reimbursement debt.
Cain cites a series of eases for the proposition that debts arising from the breach of a written instrument or contract relate back to the date of the instrument or contract.2 Cain contends that we should apply the rationale of these cases and relate back the State’s well-plugging expenses to December 1988, the date when the expenditure of state *522funds was authorized. Thus, under this argument, Cain contends that since the original Commission authorization occurred before the franchise tax forfeiture, no individual liability ought to attach to him.
We rejected this argument in both Jonnet and Sema, relying on our prior holding in Wilburn v. State, 824 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, no writ). In Sema, we limited the “relation back” doctrine to contractual obligations. We specifically declined to apply the “relation back” doctrine to actions that are statutorily required and administratively ordered. Serna, 877 S.W.2d at 519-20. Thus, applying the holdings in Jon-net, Sema, and Wilburn, I concur in the affirmance of the district court judgment.
. In the present action, the State does not seek to hold Cain individually liable for the administrative penalty assessed against the company.
. See McKinney v. Anderson, 734 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ); River Oaks Shopping Ctr. v. Pagan, 712 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rogers v. Adler, 696 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Curry Auto Leasing, Inc. v. Byrd, 683 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, no writ).