dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree that if there were federal court jurisdiction over these parties, then Congress intended the federal district courts to be the exclusive venue in which an arbitrator's subpoena may be enforced. But I simply cannot conclude that where, as here, there is no federal court jurisdiction, Congress intended to tie the hands of the arbitrators and the States in this fashion. If there is no federal court jurisdiction, then this is simply an intra-state dispute.
Indiana has elected to pass a trial rule that enshrines the rule of comity as part of our body of law. Trial Rule 28(B) "allows Indiana courts to assist tribunals and litigants outside this state by providing a mechanism to pursue discovery within Indiana's jurisdiction in a cause initiated outside Indiana's jurisdiction." Dean v. Weaver, 928 N.E.2d 254, 257 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010), trans. denied. In other words, Indiana has made it a priority to cooperate with-and aid, when possible-the tribunals of our sister states and of the federal government in discovery disputes.
The majority opines that "[the operation and effect of Monsanto's arguments is to confer nationwide jurisdiction on an arbitration panel," op. p. 867, but I cannot agree. Only when there is no federal court jurisdiction over the arbitration such that federal courts cannot step in to aid the arbitrators, and only in those states that have enacted something analogous to Indiana's Trial Rule 28(E), would the arbitration panel have the ability to enforce its nonparty subpoenas. I simply cannot conclude that Congress intended to prevent states that have chosen to make the rule of comity a legislative priority from applying that policy when there is no federal court jurisdiction over the matter.
To put it another way, if there were ongoing litigation in a Minnesota state court and our sister tribunal needed help enforcing a subpoena over an Indiana resident, an Indiana trial court could and would step in, pursuant to Rule 28(B). But the result reached by the majority herein means that we could not offer that same help to a sister arbitration panel, notwithstanding the fact that there is no federal court jurisdiction. I simply cannot conclude that Congress intended such a result.
Indeed, this interpretation of Section 7 means, essentially, that only the largest corporations, which engage in business in all fifty states, are without recourse. Whereas an entity that does not have a presence in all fifty states would be able to achieve diversity jurisdiction, and the arbitrators in such a scenario would be able to enforce nonparty subpoenas in the federal *369district courts, a large entity such as Monsanto has no such option. Congress could not have intended to treat large and small corporations so disparately. Consequent ly, I read the language of Section 7-which, notwithstanding the majority's representation, does not say "only 'the United States district court for the district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting," op. p. 365 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 7) (emphasis added)-to be in the nature of venue direction, rather than venue preemption.
In other words, when there is federal court jurisdiction, the arbitrators are directed to a federal district court. But when there is no federal court jurisdiction, it obviously makes no sense to direct the arbitrators to a federal court, so the issue is left to the individual states to handle. As noted above, Indiana has decided to aid sister tribunals in matters of discovery enforcement. Consequently, I believe that the trial court herein had every right to order Beck's to comply with the subpoena, and I would affirm.