(dissenting, with whom Spina, J., joins). In this case, the police officer believed that the person consenting to his warrantless entry had lawful authority to admit him to the premises. Because this belief was objectively reasonable, the entry did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the analysis of consent for the purposes of art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights should be no different than what takes place under the Fourth Amendment, the entry did not violate art. 14. The court concludes otherwise. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The only evidence at the motion hearing was the testimony of Revere police Officer Mark Desimone. The judge found the following facts.1 While Officer Desimone and his partner were on routine patrol at a motel, “Victor,” the motel manager, asked Officer Desimone to pick up a syringe, “a service which the police routinely provide.” The officers had to respond to another call, but said they would return to the motel to pick up the syringe later that night. They returned at approximately 10 p.m. The night clerks in the hotel management office told Officer Desimone that Victor was in his room, which the officer understood (from past conversations with Victor) to be room 138. This room was separate from the rest of the motel and was not regularly rented. The officer went to room 138, knocked on the door,2 and a woman whom he did not know opened the door.
When the officer inquired if Victor was there, she said, “I don’t know.” He explained that Victor had asked him to pick up a needle, and asked the woman if he could come in. She responded, “yeah, sure.” On entering room 138, he discovered that it consisted of two small, about “[ejight by ten” bedrooms. The front door opened into one room, where the woman was *401standing; four other persons, including the defendant, were in the next room. Officer Desimone did not see the other persons until after he entered room 138. Officer Desimone and his partner “lacked any information regarding whether ‘Victor’ was married, dating or living with anyone.”
The Fourth Amendment permits an officer’s warrantless entry onto private premises when a party consents to the entry and where the consent comes about by reason of either actual or apparent authority. Persons who own or rent the property entered or searched, or third parties who have “common authority” based on joint access to and control of the premises, have actual authority to consent to any entry.3 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). Apparent authority exists where the officer has a reasonable, but mistaken, belief that the consenting party has actual authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra at 186. Whether the belief is reasonable without further inquiry is determined by evaluating objectively the context for that belief:
“[D]etermination of consent to enter must ‘be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment. . . “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” ’ that the consenting party had authority over the premises? ... If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid.”
Id. at 188-189, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). Even an invitation to enter, accompanied by an explicit assertion of actual authority, is insufficient if “surrounding circumstances [are] such that a reasonable person would doubt [the assertion’s] truth and not act upon it without further inquiry.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra at 188. The Fourth Amendment does not, however, require affirmative inquiry when the consenting party reasonably appears to have authority to consent. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122 (2006) (“[Illinois v.] *402Rodríguez held it would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent”).
Here, because the woman said Officer Desimone could come in to room 138, she consented to his entry. The officer’s prior experience indicated that room 138 was where Victor lived and was not being rented to others. Based on that understanding, the fact that the woman opened the door in response to “Hello, Victor,” and the lateness of the hour, the officer could reasonably believe that the woman either shared the room with Victor or was otherwise authorized to be on the premises. If so, he could permissibly conclude that she had lawful authority to admit him to the unit. See United States v. Matlock, supra at 170.
The woman not only was inside the room and appeared to be a lawful occupant of the premises, but she also “acted at all times as though [s]he were the keeper of the door.” United States v. Rosario, 962 F.2d 733, 738 (7th Cir. 1992). It can be inferred from the size of the small rooms that any other occupants would know that the woman answered the door, but there was no evidence that she sought guidance from anyone or behaved as though she needed approval. See id. at 737. Nor did any other occupants attempt to prevent her from either answering the door or admitting the person who sought entry.4 See id. See also United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1225 n.7 (10th Cir. 2004). As a result, the officer had no reason to doubt the woman’s authority to admit him.
Considering all the information available to the officer at the time, he had an objectively reasonable belief, grounded in known facts, that the woman was an occupant with actual authority to consent. The officer was entitled to rely on that apparent authority, and his entry did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. For the same reasons, it did not violate the defendant’s analogous art. 14 protection.
The court disagrees. It concludes that Officer Desimone faced an “ambiguous situation,” ante at 395 n.12, based on two facts: a woman not known to the officers answered the door, and she gave an “ambiguous response” (“I don’t know”) to the officer’s *403inquiry about Victor’s whereabouts. Id. Absent other indications that the woman lacked authority, the woman’s presence at the door would not lead “a reasonable officer” to “doubt[] the woman’s authority to consent,” ante at 395. Because Officer Desimone knew nothing about Victor’s personal life or living arrangements, the woman’s presence neither reinforced nor undermined the officer’s belief. Similarly, the woman’s response to Officer Desimone’s question was insufficient to render the officer’s belief objectively unreasonable. The woman did not indicate that she did not know who Victor was, or that the room was not his; she only indicated that she did not know whether he was inside. See United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 520 U.S. 1170 (1997) (“an officer does have discretion to interpret the factual implications of words in light of the context in which those words are spoken”). I do not agree that these two facts raised doubts sufficient to necessitate “further inquiry” pursuant to the Fourth Amendment standard articulated in Illinois v. Rodriguez, supra at 188-189, and I would not require any different analysis pursuant to art. 14.
The court applies to its art. 14 analysis the standard declared in Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 271-273 (2010) (Porter P.), a decision from which I dissented. In Porter P., this court adopted, for the first time, the apparent authority doctrine with respect to cases arising under art. 14, but held that the doctrine applied “only if the reasonable mistake of fact occurs despite diligent inquiry by the police as to the consenting individual’s common authority over the home” (emphasis supplied). Id. at 271. Porter P. further noted that a “diligent inquiry” requires two steps: the officer must “continue his inquiry until he has reliable information on which to base a finding of actual authority,” and if presented with “contrary facts” he must “not only thoroughly question the individual consenting” but also evaluate the individual’s credibility. Id. at 271-272.
Because the Fourth Amendment would not require a “further inquiry” in this case, I do not believe art. 14 requires a “diligent inquiry” either. By its plain language, however, Porter P. appears to presuppose that an “inquiry” is mandatory in every case. It suggests that, absent a colloquy with the consenting *404party, an officer cannot have an objectively reasonable belief that actual authority to consent is present. If Porter P. is understood to require such a colloquy, it imports into the Declaration of Rights a harmful and unnecessary restriction on proper police performance that is nowhere found in the Fourth Amendment.
I do not believe art. 14 is violated when officers rely on objectively reasonable beliefs developed from context and past experience, rather than verbal inquiry. No similar inquiry requirement is imposed by Federal law, unless circumstances make the officer’s belief unreasonable. Cf. Georgia v. Randolph, supra at 122 (declaring such requirement “unjustifiably impractical” when authority is “apparent”); United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1170 (8th Cir. 2008) (“police are entitled to draw the usual inferences from what they see and hear, even though further inquiry might prove the inferences wrong”). The standard articulated in Porter P. transforms the Fourth Amendment inquiry requirement from an exception into a rule. Article 14 does not require that result.
T have supplemented the judge’s findings with uncontested testimony as noted.
Officer Desimone testified that he said, “Hello, Victor,” while knocking on the door.
The Commonwealth did not assert in the present case that there was actual authority. Without addressing whether actual authority may have existed here, I address the issue in the manner in which it was litigated, i.e., as a question whether there was apparent authority for the consent to enter.
As stated, the officer was not aware of any other occupants until after the woman opened the door and admitted him.