141 (dissenting) — Because I believe sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Joseph Ehrhardt committed second degree theft in violation of RCW 9A.56.040(l)(a), I respectfully dissent.
142 Here, the State charged Ehrhardt with second degree theft. RCW 9A.56.040(l)(a). Brian Glaze, the victim of the theft, testified as to the market value of an air compressor ($100), a pressure washer ($199), and stereo equipment (approximately $100), and the purchase cost of a rotary *948hammer ($450) and two nail guns ($230 each). In addition, the State showed Glaze photographs of the items and he confirmed the identity and condition of each item. These photographs were entered as exhibits and the jury was able to view them during deliberations. Glaze also testified that the items were about three years old. In light of this testimony and evidence, I would defer to the jury’s determination that the cumulative value of the items stolen by Ehrhardt met the statutorily required threshold of $750 for a second degree theft conviction. RCW 9A.56.040(l)(a).
¶43 Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Notaro, 161 Wn. App. 654, 670-71, 255 P.3d 774 (2011). We defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990); State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1011 (1992).
¶44 To convict Ehrhardt of second degree theft, the State needed to prove that he exerted unauthorized control over items valued at more than $750. RCW 9A.56.040(l)(a). “Value” for the purposes of theft means the market value of the property at the time and in the approximate area of the theft. Former RCW 9A.56.010(18) (2006). “ ‘Market value’ is ... the price which a well-informed buyer would pay to a well-informed seller, where neither is obliged to enter into the transaction.” State v. Clark, 13 Wn. App. 782, 787, 537 P.2d 820 (1975). “In determining the value of an item, evidence of price paid is entitled to great weight.” State v. Hermann, 138 Wn. App. 596, 602, 158 P.3d 96 (2007). “Evidence of retail price alone may be sufficient to establish value.” State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.2d 414, 430, 5 P.3d 1256 (2000) (citing State v. Kleist, 126 Wn.2d 432, 436, 895 P.2d 398 (1995)).
¶45 The value of the air compressor, pressure washer, and stereo equipment are not at issue ($399). Thus, to convict *949Ehrhardt, the jury needed to determine that the stolen rotary hammer and two nail guns had a present market value of at least $351. But because Glaze did not own these items and testified only to the price his employer paid for these tools, not their present market value, the majority concludes, as a matter of law, that no reasonable juror could infer their market value. Although these items may not be worth their purchase price of $910, it is counter intuitive to permit them no value whatsoever or to discount Glaze’s testimony because Glaze’s employer had purchased the hammer and nail guns. Any reasonable juror could find that goods purchased for $910 would have a value of at least $351 only three years after purchase. Moreover, greater weight should be given to a jury’s determination that this element of the crime was satisfied. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d at 71.
¶46 The majority relies on State v. Morley, 119 Wn. App. 939, 83 P.3d 1023 (2004), to hold there was not substantial evidence to support the jury’s market value determination. But Morley involved the theft of a used generator that the owner, an equipment rental company, had purchased at less than retail price and rented to customers. 119 Wn. App. at 943. Although Division Three of this court held that in Morley, the purchase price could not be used because the generator was purchased at less than retail cost — making the purchase price uncertain — the court acknowledged that “the evidence creates an inference that its value exceeded the depreciated value of the first, smaller generator, which Mr. Fleury testified was $665.92.” 119 Wn. App. at 944. Thus, despite a lack of testimony regarding the generator’s age and exact purchase price, the Morley court reasoned that evidence of purchase price created an inference that the value of the generator could be ascertained after accounting for depreciation.
¶47 In contrast to Morley, the evidence here established the age of the tools in question while photographic evidence reflected the condition of the tools. In addition, while the *950owner of the generator in Morley did not know how much he had paid for the generator, only that he had paid less than retail price, the victim in this case testified to the purchase price of the hammer and nail guns when new. 119 Wn. App. at 943.
¶48 This case is more analogous to State v. Melrose, 2 Wn. App. 824, 830, 470 P.2d 552 (1970), in which the owner of a stolen camera testified as to its purchase price several years prior, but said that “[h]e didn’t know ‘what the camera might be worth today.’ ” The owner also admitted the “ ‘price of cameras drops rapidly.’ ” Melrose, 2 Wn. App. at 830. Division One of this court determined that direct evidence of value is a fact from which a jury may draw reasonable inferences and do “some conjecturing” based on substantial evidence “using the judgment of persons of ordinary experience and knowledge.” Melrose, 2 Wn. App. at 831-32. Thus, the Melrose court determined that even though the value evidence of the camera was sparse, it was nevertheless sufficient to show the items had a market value sufficient to prove the elements of grand larceny as charged.
¶49 Here, Glaze testified as to the purchase price and age of the nail guns and hammer. Because the nail guns and hammer were only three years old, the purchase price in this case gave the jury a price from which to infer the market value of the tools. The majority argues that Glaze did not testify about the condition of the tools but the jury in this case had photographs of the items in question from which to infer the condition. Using the purchase price provided by Glaze’s testimony as a baseline and the photographs of the items to determine condition, the jury had sufficient evidence to determine the threshold value required for second degree theft under the statute.
¶50 Because the jury heard testimony as to the approximate value of the rotary hammer and nail guns at the time of purchase ($910), when combined with the market value of the remaining stolen items ($399), this court should hold *951that the jury, “using the judgment of persons of ordinary experience and knowledge,” properly inferred the approximate value of all items stolen to be over $750 at the time of the theft. Melrose, 2 Wn. App. at 832. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.