with whom STOWERS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the court's decision to affirm the superior court's finding that the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS) made active efforts to help Josh L. remedy the conditions leaving Eva a child in need of aid and to keep this Indian family intact. I would reverse the superior court's decision terminating Josh's parental rights to Eiva.
We recently recognized in David S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services "the possibility that cases may exist in which OCS's early placement decisions may directly impact the ability of parents to fulfill the requirements of their case plans and thus may be part of OCS's active efforts 'designed to prevent the break up of the Indian family' " 1 Today the court states "this is not such a case" because "Eva's placement with one of [Josh's] relatives would not have affected his ability to participate in remedial efforts or fulfill his case plan requirements."2 I disagree-this is exactly the kind of case in which OCS's placement efforts are relevant and OCS's independent duty to investigate ICWA-compliant placements overlays and at least informs, if not directs, its duty to make active efforts designed to prevent the breakup of an Indian family.
I begin with the fundamental notion that OCS's active efforts must be tailored to the basis for finding a child in need of aid. We "identify the problem that caused the [child] to be in need of aid and then determine whether OCS's efforts were reasonable in light of the surrounding cireumstances."3 This makes abundant sense-it is not sufficient when terminating parental rights for a court to find only that (1) an Indian child is in need of aid and (2) the parent failed to remedy the condition that led to the Indian child being in need of aid.4 There also must be a finding, by clear and convincing evidence,5 that OCS made active efforts to assist the parent in remedying the conditions that led to finding the child in need of aid, and that those active efforts were specifically designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family.6 This necessary bridge between a need of aid finding and a failure to remedy finding is a critical component when taking the drastic measure of terminating parental rights.7
OCS took custody of Eva in September 2008 when Josh was in jail awaiting trial on serious criminal charges. As to Josh, Eva was adjudicated a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(1) and (2), which provide that a child may be found to be in need of aid if:
(1) a parent or guardian has abandoned the child as described in AS 47.10.013, and the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or ereated conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter; [8] [or]
*469(2) a parent, guardian, or custodian is incarcerated, the other parent is absent or has committed conduct or created conditions that cause the child to be a child in need of aid under this chapter, and the incarcerated parent has not made adequate arrangements for the child{.]
Josh was convicted and in July 2009 was sentenced to serve 99 years. At the October 2010 termination trial the superior court found, with respect to Josh, that Eva was still a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(1) and (2).
Before examining the superior court's termination findings, it is useful to review the interplay between incarceration and abandonment under AS 47.10.011(1). In Nada A. v. State9 and A.M. v. State10 we determined that incarceration cannot itself constitute abandonment because it does not involve willful conduct.11 After A.M., the legislature enacted a statutory change to provide that incarceration can constitute abandonment if the incarceration is a for a significant period of time and other factors are satisfied:12
For purposes of terminating a parent's parental rights ... the court may determine that incarceration of the parent is sufficient grounds for determining that a child is a child in need of aid ... and that the parental rights of the incarcerated parent should be terminated if the court finds, based on clear and convincing evidence, that
(1) the period of incarceration that the parent is scheduled to serve during the child's minority is significant considering the child's age and the child's need for an adult's care and supervision;
(2) there is not another parent willing and able to care for the child; and
(8) the incarcerated parent has failed to make adequate provisions for care of the child during the period of incarceration that will be during the child's minority.[13]
The legislature added AS 47.10.011(2) in 1998, "making clear that the change was intended to 'override [A.M. and Nada J"14 We subsequently stated that AS 47.10.011(2) is an additional ground OCS may rely on to terminate rights if the parent's incarceration itself is likely to injure the child in the future, but does not supplant AS 47.10.011(1) as a ground for terminating the rights of a parent who has willfully disregarded parental obligations before, during, or after that incarceration.15 We have also continued to consider a parent's actions while incarcerated as potential grounds supporting an abandonment theory despite the statutory change.16
It is against this legal backdrop that I consider the superior court's express findings on Eva's child in need of aid status after the termination trial:
At trial, [Josh] conceded that [Eval is a child in need of aid because [Eva's] mother abandoned her and he was absent. AS 47.10.01100(.] [17]
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[OCS] also claimed that [Eval was a child in need of aid because her father was incarcerated, her mother engaged in CINA-worthy behaviors, and [Josh] did not make adequate arrangements for her care. AS 47.10.011(2).
[Josh] testified that he wanted OCS to place [Eva] with his family, but it does not appear that he made any arrangements to meet [Eva's] needs.
To be sure, [Josh] may not have had much power to act onee he was incarcerated....
Still, other than sending a few letters, attempting a few phone calls and talking to his attorney, there is no evidence that [Josh]-who knew first-hand that [Robin] had abandoned [Eval] "quite a few times" in the past-did anything to [eJusure [Eva's] well-being.
As a result, the Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that [Eva] is a child in need of aid under the "incarceration" subsection as well. (Footnotes omitted.)
For its "failure to remedy" findings, the superior court stated:
[Robin] has still abandoned [Eval and [Josh] is still in jail. Nothing has changed.
In addition, [OCS] has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that (a) the period of incarceration (99 years) is significant given [Eva's] age (14) and her needs (which are pressing and substantial), (b) [Robin] is not willing or able to care of [Eval, and (c) [Josh] failed to make adequate provisions for [Eva's] care. CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(B); AS 47.10.080(o).
There can be no dispute that at the time of trial Robin was out of the picture and Josh was in jail for the rest of Eva's minority, so to the extent these findings relate to Josh's being absent and incarcerated, they certainly are correct. But something beyond incarceration is required for abandonment under AS 47.10.011(1), and the only factor addressed by the superior court on a "clear and convincing" basis was that Josh had not "made adequate arrangements" for Eva in light of his unavailability. Josh contended that he "attempted to reach out to family members for assistance" in making adequate arrangements for Eva and that OCS failed to make active efforts to assist him.
Three previous cases help frame the issue. Stanley B. v. State of Alaska, Division of Fomily & Youth Services,18 presented a similar situation in a non-ICWA context. In that case Stanley's children were taken into state custody when he was evading arrest for violations of release from prison.19 He was caught, returned to prison, and essentially remained there for the duration of the child in need of aid proceedings (and beyond).20 Stanley's "case plan directed Stanley to provide the names and addresses of any person he wished [DFYS] to consider for placement of the children.21 He did so, but DFYS denied all of Stanley's initial placement preferences and placed the children with a pre-adoptive family.22 Stanley's parental rights were terminated under the incarceration provisions of AS 47.10.080(o) and AS 47.10.011(2) because he had failed to "make adequate arrangements" for his children in light of his significant period of incarceration and the unavailability of the children's mother.23 On appeal, we stated:
The superior court correctly interpreted AS 47.10.080(o)(3). The statute obligates the incarcerated parent-not the state-to arrange for the children's care....
Stanley provided DFYS with the names of several relatives and friends with whom he wanted the children placed. The superior court found that DFYS had made "more than reasonable efforts" to consider Stanley's stated preferences. Having reviewed the record, we agree. Because none of Stanley's placement options was facially "adequate," the conditions for termination under AS 47.10.080(0 ) were met.
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*471The superior court [also] found the evidence that supported termination of parental rights under AS 47.10.080(0 ) (the significant period of Stanley's incarceration, the mother's unavailability, and the unsuitability of Stanley's placement proposals) was clear and convincing evidence that Sean and Sarah were children in need of aid for purposes of AS 47.10.011(2). These findings were not clearly erroneous.[24]
In a later unpublished decision involving the same non-ICWA circumstances,25 we stated that Stanley B. did not actually decide whether OCS has a duty to make reasonable efforts to consider a parent's placement proposals:
Although we mentioned the superior court's finding that DFYS had made "reasonable efforts" to consider Stanley's preferences and stated that we agreed with it, we did not hold or state that such a finding is a prerequisite to terminating parental rights under AS 47.10.080(o). Stanley B. therefore did not decide whether [DFYS] must make reasonable efforts to consider a parent's placement proposals before the superior court can terminate parental rights,[26]
The final non-ICWA case with similar circumstances is Samuel H. v. State, Office of Children's Services.27 In that case we said "Stanley B. requires incarcerated parents to take affirmative steps to arrange appropriate and feasible care options independent of department action." 28 But we also stated:
We decline to hold that "adequate arrangements" under AS 47.10.080(c) includes the requirement that an incarcerated parent must follow a formal procedure to initiate legal proceedings to formalize arrangements made for the child and make alternative plans merely because the parent's plans overlap with OCS's arrangements. An arrangement is adequate if, when followed, it will provide for the care of the child.[29]
Because the incarcerated parent had testified at the termination trial as to his attempt to arrange placement with the child's grandmother and his testimony was not rebutted, we remanded to the superior court for factual findings on the parent's credibility and efforts to place the child, without comment on OCS's potential duty.30
Although we do not need to decide the question here, it is difficult to believe that in the non-ICWA context OCS's reasonable efforts duty does not include assisting an incarcerated parent in remedying the lack of an alternative placement for a child when the parent provides the names of potential placements. OCS and the superior court certainly thought there was such a duty in Stanley B.31 This makes sense-OCS has legal custody of the child and cannot simply hand the child over to whomever the incarcerated parent arranges to come get the child for informal placement during the child's minority. What can an incarcerated parent do other than propose names for OCS's consideration? If OCS determines the proposed placements are unacceptable and, if necessary, proves that at trial, then the parent has not made adequate arrangements. If OCS finds a proposed placement acceptable, the CINA proceedings may be over.
This, however, is an ICWA case, and the standard is not reasonable efforts to reunite a family. OCS is required to make active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family.32 In my view OCS has an active-*472efforts duty to consider, evaluate, and take action on an incarcerated parent's request for alternative placement under ICWA's standards. This may remedy the child in need of aid condition that the parent has not made "adequate arrangements" for the child during the parent's incarceration. My view is buttressed by the fact that OCS already has a separate and independent ICWA duty to give a placement preference, not only for adoptive but also for any foster care or pre-adoptive placement, first to "a member of the Indian child's extended family," and then to other specified placements.33 Moreover, "[wlhere appropriate, the preference of ... the parent shall be considered"; 34 and "[the standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of this section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties." 35 The United States Supreme Court has characterized placement preferences as "[the most important substantive requirement imposed on state courts." 36
A primary objective of section 1915(d) is to prohibit state courts from imposing value judgments on proposed foster care placements based on the prevailing social and cultural standards of the non-Indian community, much in the same way state courts are prohibited from removing Indian children from their homes based on the prevailing child-rearing norms in the non-Indian community.[37]
In this vein, ICWA preferences may even control over state law standards for child placements:
In certain cireumstances, a relative who is otherwise entitled to a placement preference under the ICWA may be disqualified under state law because of a prior history of neglect or abuse toward another child. At least one court has held, however, that the ICWA preferences may override some state disqualification if the relative placement can demonstrate no harm would befall the child.[38]
In this context, then, OCS's ICWA-placement duty overlays its active efforts duty; the court is wrong to say that OCS's ICWA-placement duties have no relevance to its active efforts duties when lack of adequate placement is itself the basis for finding a child in need of aid. In evaluating OCS's active efforts to prevent the breakup of this Indian family, we must ask: Given that Josh *473was incarcerated and Robin was unavailable to parent Eva, what did OCS do to assist Josh with an appropriate case plan to make other "adequate arrangements" for Eva so she would no longer be a child in need of aid and the case could be resolved without terminating Josh's parental rights? In my view the answer is: Nothing. Why does it matter? Because if OCS had made active efforts to contact and consider the small universe of Josh's parents and six sisters, as he repeatedly requested, as OCS repeatedly obligated itself to do in its case plans, and as OCS was otherwise obligated to do under ICWA's placement provisions, a satisfactory placement might have been made for Eva's normal supervision that would have satisfied Josh's "adequate arrangements" obligation.39 Contrary to the court's suggestion, Eva then would no longer have been a child in need of aid and there would have been no basis to terminate Josh's parental rights and break up this Indian family.40
The facts of this case are that OCS took emergency temporary custody of Eva in late September 2008, when Josh was incarcerated awaiting trial on serious criminal charges. Josh's initial case conference with OCS was on October 14. OCS's conference record reflects that: Josh's tribe had already provided the name and telephone number of a possible placement; the social worker had found that number did not work; and Josh provided a correct number and also suggested a sister as a possible placement. A few days later Josh's tribe intervened and formally requested that OCS contact Josh's parents as a potential placement for Eva; their names and contact information were provided to OCS.
OCS's October case plan, setting family reunification as Eva's permanency goal, reflected that a "relative search is in progress" and the social worker "is sending letters to the tribe asking for family [placements]." Josh's duties under the case plan included completing mental health, anger management, and substance abuse assessments and following the recommendations. He was tasked with receiving sexual abuse counseling and treatment. Because of Josh's limited contact with Eva and his lack of understanding regarding her special needs, he also had a duty to engage in counseling and parenting classes to understand Eva's needs and to engage in her therapy when she was ready for his participation.
OCS's November predisposition report stated that Eva's current placement was not ICWA-compliant but that good cause existed for the deviation as Eva was in a therapeutic foster home with Robin's consent. OCS stated that the social worker "will be speaking with relatives that are named by either parent ... to consider them as a possible placement." OCS stated its awareness that Josh's parents wanted to be considered for placement, but that the social worker was "looking into some history on them" and obtaining documents regarding concerns. OCS stated that although Josh supported Eva's current placement because of her needs, he "also wants some of his family considered" for placement. OCS also noted that the social worker "will be looking into family requested when [Eval is ready to be discharged from the therapeutic foster home."
OCS's February 2009 case plan contained the exact same wording as the October case plan with respect to considering Josh's family members for placement-a "relative search is in progress" and the social worker "is sending letters ... asking for family." It also stated that the social worker "is continuing to look for family placement." The case plan contained no changes to Josh's duties and objectives.
OCS's March 2009 case plan changed Eva's permanency goal to adoption with fam*474ily reunification as a concurrent goal. That plan also contained the exact same wording as the October and February case plans with respect to the social worker's efforts to contact and consider Josh's family members as possible placements: a "relative search is in progress," the social worker "is sending letters ... asking for family," and the social worker "is continuing to look for family placement." The case plan listed no duties or objectives for Josh to complete. In fact, Josh was eliminated as a participant in this case plan. To the extent Josh had a case plan, it was the February 2009 case plan; no later case plan for Josh can be found in the record.
In June 2009 the social worker warned Robin that her parental rights would be terminated if she failed to make progress on her case plan, indicating OCS was "no closer to bringing [Eval home." Again in July 2009 the social worker warned Robin that "time [was] running out" because she had not made progress on her case plan and had not been in contact with Eva.
Also in July Josh was sentenced to serve 99 years for his criminal conviction, but OCS made no changes to his February 2009 case plan. In October 2009 Josh's attorney sent the social worker an email regarding relative placement with Josh's six sisters.
At trial the initial primary social worker stated that by October 2009 she had only investigated placement with Josh's parents, testifying generally that she "had some concerns about their ability to parent [Eva] with her special needs in the village, and I just didn't think that they would be able to take care of it." No testimony or contemporaneous evidence was offered indicating the extent of the investigation of Josh's parents or the specific nature of OCS's concerns.41 Also in October 2009, the social worker learned that one of Josh's parents planned to travel to Anchorage and wished to visit Eva. The social worker acknowledged at trial this visit could have been used to assess placement with Josh's parents, but she was not sure if the visit occurred. That social worker transferred to a different OCS office a few days later without following up on placement with Josh's parents or sisters.
No primary social worker was assigned to Josh for six months until April 2010. A secondary social worker wrote to Josh several times offering a chance to communicate with Eva. Josh wrote back and began sending Eva letters and pictures. The secondary social worker also sent Josh letters from Eva, pictures of her, and some of her recent schoolwork.
In April 2010 the secondary social worker asked Josh about possible relative placements for Eva and he again identified several sisters. The secondary social worker testified at trial that she had contacted the former primary social worker and was told the sisters were not viable placement options because "they [had] previously been known to have sex offenders in the home." But the record contains neither evidence indicating a basis for the former social worker's statements, nor any contemporaneous evidence of placement investigations of Josh's sisters; 42 in fact, the former primary social worker testified at trial that she had not followed up with Josh's request to have his sisters considered for placement.43
Also in April 2010 Josh was assigned a new primary social worker, but there is no record of any communication between her and Josh or of any placement investigations by this social worker. That same month, OCS petitioned to terminate Josh's parental rights. In August 2010 a different primary social worker was assigned to Josh. This primary social worker also had no contact with Josh. In September 2010, the month preceding the termination trial, this social worker met with Josh's mother and a sister about conducting an adoption study. But by the time of the trial, a home visit had not been arranged to determine whether the mother or sister could adequately provide for Eva's needs.
Trial was held in October 2010. The ree-ord is indisputable that from October 2009 until the termination trial no primary social
*475worker communicated with Josh. No evidence in the record documents that: (1) OCS actually attempted to meet its stated disposi-tional and case plan duties to "send letters" regarding family placement or "speak{[ ] with relatives ... named by [Josh] ... to consider them as a possible placement"; (2) OCS made any effort to contact or consider Josh's parents for placement until shortly before the termination trial (8) OCS actually had any "concerns" about placement with Josh's parents; or (4) OCS ever made any effort to contact Josh's sisters for placement consideration.44 Despite these facts, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that OCS had satisfied ICWA's active-efforts requirement:
In this case, [Josh] was in jail before [Eva] was taken into custody, and he will still be there when [Eval is an adult. [OCS] tried to engage [Robin], the only parent available for reunification, but their efforts failed.
Under such cireumstances, there is not much [OCS] could do (especially for [Josh] ) to prevent the family's break-up or to re-unite them.
OCS' efforts were not perfect in this case, especially regarding visitation and family contact for [Josh].
The Court still finds, however, by clear and convincing evidence, that OCS efforts were active enough to meet the statutory requirements.
The superior court did not even address placement until its "best interest" finding:
[Josh] does not want to lose [hlis daughter, and claims that it is not in [Eva's] best interests to terminate his parental rights. He wants [Eva] to be with his family in the village (not with someone else in Anchorage). [Josh] fears that his voice will be lost if his parental rights are terminated.
This argument, however, goes more to placement than termination. [Josh] was in jail when OCS took [Eval. He will remain in jail far into her adulthood. [Josh] knows that, no matter how well he cared for her when she was young or how much he still loves his daughter, it is now impossible for him to parent his own child.
Given the facts and cireumstances of this case, I must conclude that the superior court misapplied ICWA and that its active efforts finding was clearly erroneous. I conclude that OCS's efforts, in their entirety, failed to fulfill its statutory duty to actually help Josh remedy the conditions that caused Eva to be a child in need of aid. In short, OCS failed to meet its own case plan responsibilities to consider Josh's family members for placement, failed to create a relevant case plan for Josh after July 2009, failed to have a primary social worker even assigned to Josh for six months, failed to have a primary social worker contact Josh for a year, and failed to investigate placement with Josh's family to help him make "adequate arrangements" for Eva.45 Although OCS properly directed its initial efforts towards reunifying Eva with Robin,46 once it became clear that remedial efforts with Robin would not be successful-which occurred by July 2009 and near the same time it became clear Josh would be incarcerated for the duration of Eva's minority-OCS's active efforts should have turned to assisting Josh make adequate arrangements for Eva by investigating placement with Josh's family.
The superior court stated that although Josh "wanted OCS to place [Eva] with his family, ... it does not appear that he made *476any arrangements to meet [Eva's] needs." This reasoning confuses both the burden and extent of efforts required by ICWA where one parent is incarcerated and the other has abandoned the child. Josh certainly had the ultimate responsibility to make adequate arrangements for Eva's care. But the reality is that Josh could only fulfill this responsibility through and with the help of OCS. OCS had custody of Eva and any possible family placement would require either OCS's approval or a court order overriding OCS's objection. Josh requested that OCS consider placement with his parents and sisters. OCS obligated itself in its own case plans to consider these placement proposals. Having made these requests, there was little else Josh could do-OCS's active efforts obligation required it to contact Josh's family to determine willingness, to undergo home studies, and to assess his family's ability to address Eva's needs.47 To conclude otherwise lowers OCS's burden to merely requiring passive efforts,48 and completely ignores OCS's independent, but overlaying, duty to investigate ICWA-compliant placements. Here both the tribe and Josh requested that OCS consider Josh's family members for placement and OCS was required by ICWA to do so.
Placement with a family member would have satisfied Josh's requirement to make adequate arrangements for Eva's care, eliminating Eva's status as a child in need of aid and possibly saving Josh's parental rights from termination. But OCS made no effort, let alone active efforts, to consider and evaluate Eva's placement with Josh's family members.49
I would reverse the superior court's termination order and remand for OCS to make active efforts to assist Josh in making adequate arrangements for Eva's care by investigating placement with his family members, as he had repeatedly requested. If those efforts determine that none of Josh's family members are willing, qualified, or capable of caring for Eva, then OCS could initiate proceedings to terminate Josh's parental rights because he has failed to make adequate arrangements for her care.
. 270 P.3d 767, 779 (Alaska 2012) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2006)).
. Per Curiam Op. at 17.
. Barbara P. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 234 P.3d 1245, 1262 (Alaska 2010) (citing Burke v. State., Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 162 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Alaska 2007)).
. See CINA Rule 18(c) (listing these two findings as merely the first of four procedural steps in terminating the parent's rights to an Indian child).
. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence producing "a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1234 (Alaska 2000) (quoting Buster v. Gale, 866 P.2d 837, 844 (Alaska 1994)).
. CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(B) (comporting with 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)); see also Jon S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 763 (Alaska 2009) ("[Alctive efforts require taking a parent through the steps of a plan and helping the parent develop the resources to succeed; drawing up a case plan and leaving the client to satisfy it are merely passive efforts." (citing A.A. v. State, Dep't of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 261 (Alaska 1999))).
. See Christina J. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 254 P.3d 1095, 1104 (Alaska 2011) ("We bear in mind at all times that terminating parental rights is a drastic measure." (quoting Martin N. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 79 P.3d 50, 53 (Alaska 2003))).
. AS 47.10.011(1)'s incorporation of abandonment under AS 47.10.013(a) requires a finding of a parent's "conscious disregard of parental responsibilities toward the child by failing to provide reasonable support, maintain regular contact, or provide normal supervision, considering *469the child's age and need for care by an adult." The statute also sets out several specific circumstances that would, in the absence of justifiable cause, constitute abandonment. AS 47.10.013(a)(1)-(8).
. 660 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1983).
. 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995).
. See id. at 823-24; Nada A., 660 P.2d at 439.
. Ch. 89, SLA 1996; see also Zander P. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 2007 WL 2745157, at *3 (Alaska 2007) (describing history of AS 47.10.080(o)).
. AS 47.10.080(o).
. Zander P., 2007 WL 2745157, at *3 (quoting ch. 99, §§ 1(b)(2)(B), 18, SLA 1998 (expressly overriding A.M. and Nada )).
. Rick P. v. State, OCS, 109 P.3d 950, 957 (Alaska 2005); see also Zander P., 2007 WL 2745157, at *3.
. See, e.g., Rick P., 109 P.3d at 957 (affirming abandonment finding based on father's pre-in-carceration activities, but noting that father's actions during and after incarceration also demonstrated " 'willful disregard' of his parental obligations," pointing specifically to father's negative reaction to OCS's case plan while in prison and the "tone of [his] response ('I think you and your office has caused me enough stress and abuse by kidnaping my son')" as evidence that he was "not interested in participating in the case plan, and by extension, not interested in visiting his daughter").
. The superior court overstated Josh's concession. Josh conceded that Robin had abandoned Eva and that he was absent. Josh did not concede that he had abandoned Eva under AS 47.10.013 or that Eva was a child in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(1).
The superior court failed to recognize that in the context of incarceration, abandonment under AS 47.10.011(1) requires an additional finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of a "con*470scious disregard of parental responsibilities." AS 47.10.013. No such finding was made.
. 93 P.3d 403 (Alaska 2004).
. Id. at 405.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at 406-07.
. Id.
. Randy P. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 2005 WL 3006601 (Alaska, Oct. 19, 2005).
. Id. at *4 (footnotes omitted). We did not decide the question in that case, either, stating that if the state had such a duty, it was fulfilled given the parent's unsuitable placement preference. Id.
. 175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008).
. Id. at 1273.
. Id. at 1274.
. Id. at 1274-75.
. 93 P.3d 403, 406-07 (Alaska 2004) (recognizing that OCS "should not disadvantage an incarcerated parent by blocking his efforts to make 'adequate' provisions for his children").
. Compare CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(A) (requiring reasonable reunification efforts), with CINA Rule *47218(c)(2)(B) (requiring active reunification efforts in Indian child cases).
. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2006).
Under ICWA, the law or custom of the Indian child's tribe defines the extended family member. In the absence of tribal law or custom, "extended family member" is defined as a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2). By rejecting the limited nuclear family of state law as the group of persons eligible for child custody, the extended Indian family definition remedies the cultural gap between tribes and non-Indians that was evident during the legislative process. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 11, 20, 24 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530 at 7532, 7533, 7543, 7546.
Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 11.05[2], at 842 n. 168 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2005 ed.) (hereinafter HanpBoor).
. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (2006).
. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2006).
. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989).
. B.J. Jones, Mark Tilden, & Kelly Gaines-Stoner, The Indian CHild Werrare Act HandBoox 135 (2d ed.2008).
. Id. at 137 (citing In re Jullian B., 82 Cal. App.4th 1337, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 241 (2000)) (foot note omitted); see also Conen's Hanpsoox § 11.05[2], at 843 ("ICWA preferences replace preferences under state law, which tend to be more subjective and variable.").
ICWA also requires that OCS make a record of its Indian child placements, "evidencing the efforts to comply with" ICWA's placement preferences. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2006); see State ex rel. C.D., 200 P.3d 194, 212 n. 31 (Utah App. 2008) ("ICWA expressly requires that a record be created that documents the attempts to place the children in compliance with the ICWA preferences."). And at each hearing where the court authorizes the initial or continued removal of an Indian child from the child's parent, the superior court "shall inquire into and determine" whether OCS has complied with ICWA's placement preferences. CINA Rule 10.1(b).
. OCS's remedial efforts "need not be limited to formal programs of treatment. For example, a proposal to place a child with an extended family member can be a remedial and rehabilitative measure." Comen's HanpBook § 11.05[1], at 841 (citing In re Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.App.1991)); see also Samuel H., 175 P.3d at 1274-75 (discussing adequacy of arrangements made by an incarcerated parent).
. Had Josh's parents or his sisters been willing and capable of adopting Eva, then Josh may have been able to reserve some parental rights in the process rather than having all of his parental rights terminated at trial. See AS 47.10.089 (providing that in a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights a parent may retain some privileges with regard to the child, including visitation and communication).
. Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (requiring OCS to make a record "evidencing the efforts to comply with" ICWA's placement preferences).
. Id.
. The court nonetheless maintains that none of the sisters "were suitable" for placement.
. Id.
. I fail to see how developing and sending a limited number of case plans that OCS itself failed to follow is anything but passive, as opposed to active, efforts. And there is a clear disconnect between OCS's failure to create a relevant, placement-oriented case plan for Josh after July 2009 and the court's conclusion that placement efforts would not have been relevant to "fulfill[ing] his [February 2009] case plan requirements," when that plan consisted of no longer relevant parenting-oriented duties.
. See Dashiell R. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 222 P.3d 841, 850 (Alaska 2009) (holding superior court's active-efforts finding as to the father properly considered OCS's reunification efforts with the mother because the father was incarcerated and had their efforts with the mother been successful "'there would have been no need for the children to be placed elsewhere").
. In distinguishing In re Welfare of M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412, 418-19 (Minn.App.1991), the court suggests Josh was not sufficiently specific in his placement request. The Minnesota court in M.S.S. held that the state was required as part of the active-efforts requirement to investigate placement with the father's brother. Id. The court should not excuse OCS's failure to consider and investigate Josh's parents and six sisters after Josh and his tribe made repeated requests and OCS obligated itself to perform the investigations.
. See Jon S. v. State, Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 763 (Alaska 2009) ("[Aletive efforts require taking a parent through the steps of a plan and helping the parent develop the resources to succeed; drawing up a case plan and leaving the client to satisfy it are merely passive efforts.").
. The court supports its decision in part with Josh's January 2009 stipulation that there was "good cause" to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and allow Eva to remain in her Anchorage therapeutic foster home. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, we have stated in an unpublished decision that:
When a parent participating in the pre-termi-nation phases of a CINA proceeding stipulates to accept as established ... an element of the state's case, it does not seem fair to assume that this willingness to go along for the time being was meant to preclude the parent from contesting the issue if it later becomes important at a termination hearing-a stage of proceedings when the ultimate threat of permanently losing parental ties is directly raised.
Nicole H. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., No. S-11974, 2006 WL 895084, at *6, (Alaska, Apr. 5, 2006). Second, and more importantly, OCS had noted that despite Josh's stipulation he still wanted his family considered for placement and OCS had obligated itself to do so. Josh's stipulation and reliance on OCS's unfulfilled promise should not now be a factor held against him.