dissenting.
I write because I respectfully dissent to Division 1 of the majority opinion. The trial court was correct when it concluded that the question of the existence of an original ordinance was rendered moot when we affirmed in East Ga. Land and Dev. Co. v. Baker, 286 Ga. 551, 552 (690 SE2d 145) (2010), the establishment of a true and correct copy of the ordinance as the original ordinance. The trial court’s decision is in line with the purpose of OCGA § 24-8-2 which is to ensure there is evidence of an original record on file with the County in the event of the record’s loss or destruction. Appellant cannot continue to use the ordinance’s inadvertent detachment from *739the minutes as a means to draw out this 14-year-old litigation and avoid, by a technical default, the possibility of an unfavorable outcome.
Decided March 19, 2012. Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Martin, Jimmy L. Paul, Drew V. Greene, for appellant.In the reestablishment action, the trial court issued a March 20, 2009, order finding that the 1985 ordinance was attached to the council minutes on May 21, 1985. Specifically, after holding a bench trial and hearing evidence from appellant and appellees, the trial court unequivocally stated: “The Court finds that a zoning ordinance was adopted by the Newton County Board of Commissioners on May 21, 1985, and apparently had been attached to the official minutes of the meeting.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court noted that the issue was a question of fact and based its final findings on various evidence presented, including the testimony of the county clerk who, in 1985, attached the ordinance in question to the minutes. In Baker, supra, we confirmed that “the superior court heard the case . . . [, that the superior court] found that the 1985 ordinance was originally attached to the May 21,1985 minutes,” and we affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. 286 Ga. at 552. Then, on March 1, 2010, we expressly denied appellant’s motion for reconsideration which requested this Court to exclude the phrase “found that the 1985 ordinance was originally attached to the May 21, 1985 minutes” from the opinion. Thus, as of 2010, any dispute regarding the attachment of the ordinance to the minutes in 1985 had been resolved between these parties going forward. See, e.g., OCGA § 9-11-60 (h) (“. . . any ruling by the Supreme Court... in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court... as the case may be”); In re T. M. G., 275 Ga. 543, 544 (570 SE2d 327) (2002) (“the re-adjudication of an issue that has previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits in another action between the same parties or their privies” is barred by collateral estoppel). Appellant must now advance its case based on the substance of the ordinance, rather than rehashing a factual dispute that no longer exists.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellees on this issue.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent.
*740Cook, Noell, Tolley & Bates, Edward D. Tolley, William T Craig, James B. Griffin, Peter R. Olson, for appellee.