Respectfully, I dissent. In my opinion, the General Assembly effectively overrode the gubernatorial veto of Act 308. Accordingly, I would reach the merits of the Board’s second constitutional challenge and find Act 308 is constitutional special legislation.
*286I. The Yeto Override
I agree with the majority’s acknowledgement that “absent a constitutional mandate providing otherwise, each house in the General Assembly determines its rules of procedure free from interference with judicial and executive branches.” However, I disagree with the majority’s determination that our constitution provides otherwise. The majority reads Article IV, section 21 of the South Carolina Constitution to require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of a full quorum to override a gubernatorial veto, rather than abiding by our long-standing precedent requiring the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the membership present and acting upon the matter, so long as a quorum is present to conduct business. The majority’s approach focuses on the number of affirmative votes cast, rather than the ratio of votes constitutionally required. For instance, two-thirds of a quorum of the House equals 42 members. Under the majority’s holding, a vote of 42-0 in the House is sufficient to override a governor’s veto, as long as a quorum of the House is present. However, a vote of 41-1 would be insufficient to override a veto because the number of affirmative votes does not equal two-thirds of the full quorum. A vote of 41-1 is a ratio that far exceeds two-thirds of the votes cast. In my view, this is contrary to the plain language of our constitution and contrary to our opinions thus far interpreting constitutional vote requirements.
The concept that a vote ratio prescribed by our constitution applies only to those members voting in the presence of a quorum dates back to 1878. In Morton, Bliss & Co. v. Comptroller General, we stated, “If the rule is the mere majority rule, then a majority of the quorum present and acting is intended; if the rule is that of two-thirds, then two thirds of such quorum [present and acting] must concur for effective action.” 4 S.C. 430, 463 (1873) (emphasis added). This Court specifically applied this concept to the constitutional provision at issue in this case in Smith v. Jennings. In that case, the Court determined “[w]hen the Constitution speaks of ‘two-thirds of that house’ as the vote required to pass a bill or joint resolution over the veto of the governor, it means two-thirds of the house as then legally constituted and acting upon the matter.” Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324, 328, 45 S.E. 821, 823 (1903) (emphasis added).
*287The General Assembly has since relied upon our holdings in Morton, Bliss and Smith v. Jennings when establishing its rules. While debating a concurrent resolution in 1984, a point of order was raised concerning the amount of votes required to pass the resolution. H.R. Con. Res. 3947, 106th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C.1984). It was urged that the House adopt the Smith veto override standard that two-thirds of the house means “two-thirds vote of those present and voting, a quorum being present.” Id. Following a discussion on the matter, the Speaker of the House of Representatives ruled that “it takes two-thirds of those present and voting to adopt a Resolution.” Id. Along these same lines, the current Rules of the Senate and Rules of the House provide that a veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the members present and voting. Rules of the Senate of South Carolina 50 (2009); Rules of the House of Representatives 10.3 (2010-11).
This Court’s precedent combines with parliamentary authority to solidify the concept that legislation may be passed as long as a quorum is present and those voting meet the constitutionally prescribed ratio of votes required. Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure, the preferred parliamentary authority of the South Carolina House of Representatives, states “[t]he requirement of a two-thirds vote, unless otherwise specified, means two-thirds of the legal votes cast, not two-thirds of the members present, or two-thirds of all the members.” Mason’s § 512.3 (2000). The majority quotes this authority, but finds that our constitution specifies otherwise. In my view, the only means of finding a different specification in our constitution is to ignore the constitutional interpretation provided in Morton and Smith v. Jennings, which focuses on those voters acting upon the matter rather than the threshold number of votes required.
The parliamentary rules of the United States Congress additionally support the General Assembly’s “voting and present” requirement. The preferred parliamentary manual of the South Carolina Senate is an amalgamated version of the United States Constitution and Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice, which contains commentary on the provisions of these documents written by the United States Congress. The Senate of South Carolina, Constitution of the United States and Jefferson’s Manual (1989) (unpublished *288pamphlet, on file with the South Carolina Senate). In this document, the commentary of Article I, section 5 of the United States Constitution7 recounts events that took place in the late nineteenth century that “established the principle that a quorum present made valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum might not vote.” Id. § 54. The United States Supreme Court sustained that principle in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 12 S.Ct. 507, 36 L.Ed. 321 (1892).
For over a century, the General Assembly has relied upon our interpretation of Article IV, section 21 and the common standards of parliamentary procedure when voting on bills and joint resolutions. The doctrine of “[sjtare decisis exists to ‘insure a quality of justice which results from certainty and stability.’ ” State v. One Coin-Operated Video Game Mach., 321 S.C. 176, 181, 467 S.E.2d 443, 446 (1996) (quoting McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 256, 329 S.E.2d 741, 747 (1985) (Chandler, J., concurring)). Therefore, in the interest of promoting the stability of existing laws, and with recognition that the execution of parliamentary procedure is generally within the purview of the legislature, I would find that when a quorum of the voting body is present, it is equipped to conduct business, and as such, the General Assembly effectively overrides a gubernatorial veto when two-thirds of the votes cast affirm the passage of that bill.
II. Special Legislation
Because I believe the General Assembly validly passed Act 308, I find it necessary to reach the Board’s second constitutional challenge. The Board argues that Act 308 is unconstitutional under Article III, section 34(IX) of the South Carolina Constitution because it is a special, or local, law that conflicts *289with the general law; or alternatively, that it is a special law where a general law can be made applicable. I do not believe that Act-308 conflicts with an existing general law. Further, in my view, the history of special legislation addressing the manner and means of school district budget preparation in individual counties precludes a finding that a general law could be made applicable statewide. Therefore, I would find that Act 308 complies with Article III, section 34(IX) of the South Carolina Constitution, and is wholly constitutional.
Article III, section 34 of the South Carolina Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from enacting local laws in several enumerated instances. Of note in this case, subsection IX of that section restricts the passage of local laws “where a general law can be made applicable.” S.C. Const. art. Ill, § 34(IX). This provision not only prevents the enactment of special legislation where a general law is already applicable, but also where an applicable general law may be created. Horry County v. Horry County Higher Educ. Com’n, 306 S.C. 416, 418, 412 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1991) (citations omitted). The purpose of restricting local or special legislation is to promote uniformity in the laws of the state where possible, and to “avoid duplicative or conflicting laws on the same subject.” Med. Soc’y of S.C. v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 334 S.C. 270, 279, 513 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1999). Also pertinent to this issue, subsection X of Article III, section 34 states that “nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the General Assembly from enacting special provisions in general laws.” S.C. Const. art. III, § 34(X).
This Court is deferential to the General Assembly when determining the constitutionality of a local law and will not declare that law unconstitutional “unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt,” Med. Soc’y of S.C., 334 S.C. at 279, 513 S.E.2d at 357, or “there has been a clear and palpable abuse of legislative discretion.” Sirrine v. State, 132 S.C. 241, 248, 128 S.E. 172, 174 (1925), overruled on other grounds, McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). Even greater deference is afforded the General Assembly when evaluating local laws relating to school matters. See McElveen v. Stokes, 240 S.C. 1, 10, 124 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1962). When local legislation involves public education, the constitutional restriction on the enactment of local laws must *290be viewed in light of the General Assembly’s Article XI duty to “provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State.... ” S.C. Const. art. XI, section 3; McElveen, 240 S.C. at 10, 124 S.E.2d at 596. In McElveen v. Stokes, this Court summarized this jurisprudence as follows:
In determining whether a statute pertaining to school matters is obnoxious to subsection IX of Section 34, Article III, it is well settled that this subsection must be construed in connection with the applicable provisions of Article XI, which deal with education and various school matters. It is clear from a study of these cases and the constitutional provisions that the scope of the legislative power is much broader in dealing with school matters than is the scope in dealing with various other subjects.
Id. Accordingly, this Court traditionally sustains local laws relating to the state’s public education system. Bradley v. Cherokee Sch. Dist., 322 S.C. 181, 470 S.E.2d 570 (1996); Smythe v. Stroman, 251 S.C. 277, 289, 162 S.E.2d 168, 173 (1968); Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 33, 39 S.E.2d 133, 140 (1946); Walker v. Bennett, 125 S.C. 389, 118 S.E. 779 (1923).
The constitutional prohibition against local laws not only includes local laws that conflict with an existing general law, but also local laws that are passed when a general law could be made applicable. Horry County, 306 S.C. at 418, 412 S.E.2d at 423. Therefore, to arrive at whether a general law could be made applicable, this Court has stated:
There must ... be a substantial distinction having reference to the subject matter of the proposed legislation, between the objects or places embraced in such legislation and the objects and places excluded. The marks of distinction upon which the classification is founded must be such, in the nature of things, as will in some reasonable degree, at least, account for or justify the restriction of the legislation.
Id. Thus, “the General Assembly must have a ‘logical basis and sound reason’ for resorting to special legislation.” Id. (quoting Gillespie v. Pickens County, 197 S.C. 217, 14 S.E.2d 900 (1941)).
*291A. Whether Act 308 is a Special Provision in a General Law
The State and General Assembly first argue that Act 308 is a special provision in a general law, acceptable under subsection X of Article III, section 34.8 Therefore, they argue, Act 308 is not subject to the prohibition against local laws where general laws can be made applicable found in subsection IX of Article III, section 34.1 disagree.
Local laws and general laws are distinctly different session laws and are treated as such in the Statutes at Large published each year. The Statutes at Large, a publication of the Acts and Joint Resolutions passed by the General Assembly during a calendar year, is divided into two parts. The first part contains general and permanent laws that will ultimately be codified in the South Carolina Code. The second part contains local and temporary laws which are not codified, but are executed as session laws. It is my opinion that where the constitution states “nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the General Assembly from enacting special provisions in general laws,” S.C. Const. art. III, § 34(X), it is referring to special provisions that are contained within the codified general law. These special provisions may make a general law’s effect different in certain counties, but they may not exempt a county from the general law’s entire operation. Horry County, 306 S.C. at 419, 412 S.E.2d at 423.
Here, Act 308 cannot be fairly construed as a special provision in a general law. The General Assembly passed Act 308 as an amendment to a local law relating to the manner of selection of the Board of Trustees of the Fairfield County School District. It will not be codified in Title 59 of the South Carolina Code as will other acts and resolutions involving education. If this Court found that acts passed as local laws can be considered special provisions in general laws, subsection X of Article III, section 34 would be left with few limitations. Such a reading would permit subsection X to essentially swallow subsection IX’s prohibition on local laws where general laws can be made applicable. I do not believe *292this to be the intention of the constitution’s drafters, and therefore, I believe Act 308 should be analyzed under the constraints of Article III, section 34(IX).
B. Whether Act 308 Directly Conflicts with a General Law
This Court has on two occasions invalidated a local law involving county school districts because of a conflict with existing general law. In Smythe v. Stroman, a provision in the act at issue provided that a newly consolidated school district would not assume the bonded indebtedness of its original school districts. 251 S.C. at 282, 162 S.E.2d at 170. The general law required that when school districts are consolidated, the consolidated district shall take on the liabilities of the original districts. Id. Finding that provision to be in direct conflict with the general law, this Court struck the provision from the act, while upholding the remainder of the act as a special provision in a general law under subsection X of Article III, section 34. Id. at 289, 162 S.E.2d at 173.
In Kearse v. Lancaster, a school district had been previously created by consolidating the Olar and the Three-Mile districts. 172 S.C. 59, 61, 172 S.E. 767, 768 (1934). The Three-Mile district wished to withdraw from the consolidated district and re-establish itself as it formerly existed. Id. The act at issue allowed only those residing in the Three-Mile district to vote in an election to determine the question of whether it should be withdrawn from the consolidated district. Id. This Court found that the local law conflicted with the general law that addressed school incorporation, and as such, the act violated subsection IX of Article III, section 34. Id. at 63, 172 S.E. at 769.
In my opinion, the South Carolina Code does not include a general law that explicitly vests budget-making authority with a school district’s board of trustees. The Board cites to several provisions within Title 59 of the South Carolina Code to support its contention there is a direct conflict between Act 308 and the general law. Of note, section 59-19-10 provides that “[e]ach school district shall be under the management and control of the board of trustees.... ” S.C.Code Ann. § 59-19-10 (2004). Act 308 vests sole budget-making authority with a finance committee and requires its approval for a list of enumerated expenses. H. 4431, Act 308 of S.C. Acts 2010. *293Outside of this function, however, the ability to execute the budget provisions made by the finance committee and the duty to establish the policy of the school district remains with the Board. Id. Act 308 does not affect the Board’s ability to promulgate rules and regulations regarding standards of achievement or conduct within the district, to call meetings, or generally, to control the educational interests of the district. Therefore, I do not believe Act 308 squarely conflicts with section 59-19-10 of the Code.
The general law also provides that school trustees have the power to manage and control school property, S.C.Code Ann. § 59-19-90(5) (2004), to provide suitable school houses, Id. § 59-19-90(1), and to purchase, rent, and lease supplies and equipment necessary for the operation of the public schools of the district, Id. § 59-19-130. Again, Act 308 does not conflict with any of these laws because under the act, the finance committee is charged only with preparing the annual budget and approving any fiscally related activity of the district. The Board continues to be the body that acquires the goods necessary for the upkeep and operation of its schools.
The Board has not directed this Court to a provision in the Code that explicitly grants a board of trustees the budget-making power that Act 308 has now taken away. For the reasons stated above, I do not believe that Act 308 conflicts with an existing general law.
C. Whether a General Law Can be Made Applicable
In determining whether a general law could be fashioned to standardize school district budget-making statewide, this Court’s decision in Moseley v. Welch is instructive on both points of fact and law. 209 S.C. 19, 24, 39 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1946). In that case, plaintiffs sought to have declared invalid an act that would abolish the Williamsburg County Board of Education, replacing it with a new board consisting of seven members to be appointed by the governor upon the recommendation of the local delegation from that county. Id. at 24, 39 S.E.2d at 136. In pertinent part, the act empowered the new board with the final authority to approve budgets submitted by trustees in the individual districts within the county, to set teacher salaries, to borrow funds, and to order the construction and repair of buildings. Id. at 25, 39 S.E.2d at 136.
*294In that case, it was urged that the act was a special law where a general law could be made applicable. Id. at 27, 39 S.E.2d at 137. This Court explained that the chapter in the 1942 South Carolina Code containing general school law was followed by a chapter containing special legislation relating mostly to the fiscal affairs of the schools in each of the forty-six counties in the state. Id. This Court recognized that the General Assembly’s opinion that “conditions in the various counties ... preclude uniformity of treatment in relation to the administration of school affairs .... is entitled to much respect and in doubtful cases should be followed.” Id. at 27-28, 39 S.E.2d at 137. The Court further observed that, although public education is a matter of general concern across the state, the act in question only related to the fiscal operation of the schools, and did not invade the general field of education. Id. at 30, 39 S.E.2d at 138. Specifically, the act did not
regulate the textbooks to be used or the subjects to be taught ..., the qualifications of teachers or the manner in which they shall be elected, school attendance or enrollment of pupils, the length of the school term, or various other matters pertaining to the general field of education. The general law regulating all these subject areas is left undisturbed.
Id. This Court ultimately found the act was constitutional as a special provision in a general law. Id. at 28-29, 39 S.E.2d at 138.
The General Assembly, which has been granted wide authority to legislate the field of education, has chosen not to enact a law that explicitly vests budget-making authority with district boards of trustees. Because the general law is silent on the matter, local legislation in several counties specifically grants this authority to a district’s board of trustees. See, e.g., H. 3655, Act 578 of S.C. Acts 1984 (“In addition to the powers and duties of the board of trustees of the School District of Calhoun County provided by the law, the board shall prepare and adopt the budget for the operation of the district....”); H. 3069, Act 268 of S.C. Acts 1977 (“The county board of education (board) shall be granted all of the powers and charged with all of the duties otherwise provided *295by law and shall have executive, financial and administrative control of the public schools in the school district....”).
Since this Court’s holding in Moseley, the manner in which school district budgets are formulated and approved continues to vary county by county. For instance, in Aiken County, the board of trustees has the authority to prepare the annual budget; however, if the proposed budget exceeds the budget of the previous year, the Aiken County Legislative Delegation must approve it. H. 3069, Act 268 of S.C. Acts 1977. In Anderson County, the board of trustees of each district prepares the annual budget and then recommends to the Anderson County Board of Education the amount of tax mileage, H. 3589, Act 96 of S.C. Acts 2009, while in Orange-burg County, the board of trustees directly notifies the county auditor of the tax levy needed, H. 2788, Act 245 of S.C. Acts 1983. In Horry County, the budget may be prepared by the board of trustees, superintendents, or principals of the several schools, who are then to submit the prepared budgets to the county board of education. S.492, Act 239 of S.C. Acts 1983 (emphasis added). Thus, by passing local laws in this area instead of enacting a general law that standardizes the school district budget-making process, the General Assembly has signaled its belief that a tailored approach best meets the needs of the varied districts within our state.
In recognition of the General Assembly’s constitutional duty to provide for the maintenance and support of a public school system, I believe the following statement in Moseley aptly states my opinion on this issue: “[i]t is exceedingly doubtful whether a general law, uniform in operation throughout the State, regulating ... the extent of the control which should be vested in the county boards of education, could be made applicable.” Moseley, 209 S.C. at 28, 39 S.E.2d at 138. I would find Act 308 is sustainable under Article III, section 34(IX). Therefore, I would enter judgment for the Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors.
. Article I, section 5 of the United States Constitution requires a "Quorum to do Business.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 5. Between 1861 and 1891, a quorum in die United States Congress was determined only by noting the number of members voting. The Senate of South Carolina, Constitution of the United States and Jefferson's Manual § 54. This method of determining the existence of a quorum encouraged a practice where members would refuse to vote in order to break the quorum and "obstruct the public business.” Id. In 1890, the Speaker of the House directed the clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the record of votes the names of the members present, but not voting. Since, the standard method of ascertaining the presence of a quorum is to count all members present, even if not voting. Id.
. "[N]othing contained in this section shall prohibit the General Assembly from enacting special provisions in general laws.” S.C. Const, art. Ill, § 34(X).