dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court’s denial of the request for restitution by Appellant JASDIP Properties SC, LLC (JASDIP).
I am reluctant to reverse the judgment of the trial court because JASDIP had an adequate remedy at law, which the jury rejected. Generally, equity is available when a party does not have an adequate remedy at law. See EllisDon Constr., Inc. v. Clemson Univ., 391 S.C. 552, 555, 707 S.E.2d 399, 401 (2011). “A party failing to fulfill the requirements of its legal remedy cannot later come to the courts complaining of hardship, seeking an equitable remedy.” Id. The jury’s verdict may be read in a different manner other than as a finding that neither party breached the contract. For example, the jury could have based its decision on whether damages were sufficiently proven. The judge charged the jury on all elements of a breach of contract cause of action, which includes the existence of a contract, breach, and damages. See Maro v. Lewis, 389 S.C. 216, 222, 697 S.E.2d 684, 688 (Ct.App.2010) (noting in an action for breach of contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of a contract, breach, and damages caused by the breach). Additionally, the verdict form contained a query instructing the jury to find for either the plaintiff or the defendant and used the terms “Breach of Contract claim,” which encompasses all of the elements required to prove a cause of action for breach of contract. I find it noteworthy that the parties did not seek an additional interrogatory before the jury was excused as to whether the jury found for Respondent Stewart Richardson on JASDIP’s claim based on the failure to prove breach or damages. If the jury resolved this question on the same damages component sought in equity, then JASDIP should not be entitled to an equitable remedy on its rejected legal claim. Therefore, I believe we may affirm on this basis. See Rule 220(c), SCACR (“The appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, decision or judgment upon any ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal.”).
To the extent JASDIP has not argued on appeal that the inadequacy of a legal remedy justifies equitable relief, I nonetheless would affirm the trial court’s decision to deny *644equitable relief based upon the record herein. To recover for unjust enrichment based on restitution, “the plaintiff must show (1) that he conferred a non-gratuitous benefit on the defendant; (2) that the defendant realized some value from the benefit; and (3) that it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying the plaintiff for its value.” Sauner v. Pub. Serv. Auth. of S.C., 354 S.C. 397, 409, 581 S.E.2d 161, 167 (2003). A non-gratuitous benefit is a benefit conferred either at the defendant’s request or in circumstances where the plaintiff reasonably relied upon or ought to have understood that the plaintiff expected compensation and looked to the defendant for payment. Niggel Assocs., Inc. v. Polo’s of N. Myrtle Beach, Inc., 296 S.C. 530, 532-33, 374 S.E.2d 507, 509 (Ct.App.1988).
In denying JASDIP’s request for restitution, the trial court noted the substantial evidence of damages Richardson claimed to have sustained as a result of the delay in closing on the property and that the delay was not caused by Richardson. Richardson testified about the mortgage payments he had to make as a result of JASDIP’s failure to close on time. He also testified that he did not have any income as a result of closing the business to facilitate the sale of the property, and testified about his inability to reopen the business as a result of the change in zoning of the property. Richardson testified about damage that was done to his property during JASDIP’s inspection, including ceilings and air conditioning ducts that had been torn out, which Richardson repaired at a cost of $42,000. Richardson incurred $15,524 in attorney’s fees defending this action by JASDIP. Finally, Richardson testified regarding $320,174 in living and mortgage expenses he incurred after he closed his business and was unable to reopen the business because the property had been rezoned. Based on this testimony, JASDIP has not met its burden of showing that it would be inequitable for Richardson to retain the $215,000 JASDIP paid towards the purchase price of the property.
Since JASDIP has not met its burden of convincing this court that the trial court’s equitable decision is erroneous, I would therefore affirm. See Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011) (“[A]n appellant is not relieved of *645his burden to demonstrate error in the [trial] court’s findings of fact.”).