dissenting.
The majority’s holding that a habeas court has discretion to transfer or retain a habeas petition after the petitioner’s county of detention changes is directly contrary to longstanding precedent, including the sole case which it cites for its novel proposition. See Preer v. Johnson, 279 Ga. 90 (610 SE2d 46) (2005). Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
OCGA § 9-14-43 provides, in relevant part: “A petition brought under this article must be filed in the superior court of the county in which the petitioner is being detained. The superior courts of such counties shall have exclusive jurisdiction of habeas corpus actions arising under this article.” As the majority points out, in Preer, supra, we explained that the second sentence in the statute means “that superior courts, as opposed to other courts, have subject matter jurisdiction over habeas petitions.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 91 (1). The majority ignores the fact, however, that in Preer’s very next sentence, we further explained:
We . . . turn to Georgia case law. In State v. Smith, 276 Ga. 14 (573 SE2d 64) (2002), this Court held that the superior court of the county in which a petitioner is currently detained has jurisdiction over his habeas petition. Specifically, we stated that Smith “represented that his ‘current location’ was a state prison facility in Baldwin County. If that is so, then only the superior court of that county would have jurisdiction to address the merits of his claim.” Id. at 15. Therefore, State v. Smith supports the transfer of Preer’s habeas petition to [the county where he was being detained].
(Emphasis in original.) Preer, supra, 279 Ga. at 91 (1). Therefore, the reality is that Preer does not support the majority’s recharacterization of the law because, in fact, Preer cites approvingly the exact case which the majority, without any rationale or explanation, now wishes to effectively overrule. See State v. Smith, supra.
Moreover, contrary to the implications of the majority opinion, the holding in State v. Smith is not insular. This Court has consistently made it clear for at least more than 60 years that the superior *58court of the county in which a petitioner is being detained is the proper forum to decide a habeas petition. See, e.g., McBurnett v. Warren, 208 Ga. 225 (66 SE2d 49) (1951); Colton v. Martins, 230 Ga. 482 (197 SE2d 729) (1973); Neal v. State, 232 Ga. 96 (205 SE2d 284) (1974); Craig v. State, 234 Ga. 398 (216 SE2d 296) (1975); Waye v. State, 239 Ga. 871 (238 SE2d 923) (1977); Nix v. Watts, 284 Ga. 100 (664 SE2d 194) (2008). The majority’s attempt to destroy decades of precedent without either legal support or any explanation at all is both incorrect and improper.
Decided November 7, 2011. Sarah Gerwig-Moore, Andrew Mahler, Danielle L. Brewer, J. Scott Key, for appellant. Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jason C. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.Our law is clear in this matter. The petitioner’s habeas case should have been heard in the superior court of the county in which he was detained.