No member of the panel nor judge in regular active service of the court requested the court be polled on rehearing en banc. The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. See 5th Cir. R. 35. Treating that petition as a petition for panel rehearing, the panel DENIES the petition but supplements the discussion of Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189 (10th Cir. 1957). See United States v. Sid-Mars, 644 F.3d 270, 279 (5th Cir.2011).
Though the United States had not yet condemned and obtained title to the land at issue here at the time that the state court suit commenced, the United States’ interest was certain enough to allow an injunction. The government’s interest in and possession of this property, and its stated intent to acquire title to that property, predated the Sid-Mar’s state court lawsuit. Indeed, Sid-Mar’s dismay about the slow pace following the commandeering is what led to its responding with its own suit in state court. The government had the right to possess the land as a result of the commandeering before the state suit commenced. The Supreme Court identified the claimant’s lack of possession in Bank of New York as a factor weighing against allowing an injunction in that case. See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 227, 77 S.Ct. 287, 1 L.Ed.2d 267 (1957). The opposite is true here. The government’s possession derived from a cooperation agreement with Louisiana.
It is the aggregation of these factors, and not merely a possible future interest, that comprise the United States’ property interest.
One circuit court, applying Leiter Minerals, has allowed the government to enjoin state court litigation involving a piece of property because the government had the right to prevent the Indian tribe that owned the property at issue from alienating it. See Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189, 196-97 (10th Cir.1957). At the very least, the uncertainty surrounding the ownership of the property Sid-Mar’s claims and the existence of some interest by the United States supports enjoining the state court litigation. Indeed, the foundational “certainty” upon which the Supreme Court ruled when deciding Leiter Minerals was that the “suit in federal court was the only one that could finally decide the basic issue in the litigation” and would foreclose confusing, inconsistent judgments. Leiter Minerals, 352 U.S. at 226-27, 77 S.Ct. 287. Before the Court distinguished its facts from those in Bank of New York, it identified this principle as a basis for its decision. See id. Our decision advances this rationale by ensuring the state court suit will not conflict with a later-in-time federal judgment.