The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) issued C & D Management Company a permit for a construction, demolition, and land-clearing debris landfill in York County. The County challenged that decision before the Administrative Law Court (ALC), which ruled in favor of C & D Management. The County appeals the ALC’s judgment, arguing DHEC impermissibly ignored a County ordinance purporting to impose a moratorium on the construction of any new landfills. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The South Carolina Solid Waste Policy and Management Act provides that each county must adopt a solid waste management plan. S.C.Code Ann. § 44-96-80 (2002). Before DHEC may issue any permit for the construction and operation of a landfill in a particular county, DHEC must determine that the proposed landfill is consistent with the county’s solid *219waste management plan and other applicable local ordinances. S.C.Code Ann. § 44-96-290(F) (2002).
In August 2005, C & D Management submitted an application to DHEC for a permit for the landfill. At that time, York County managed its solid waste using the 1994 Catawba Regional Solid Waste Management Plan (1994 Plan). In September 2005, DHEC issued a letter to C & D Management stating it made a determination that the landfill was consistent with the 1994 Plan.
While DHEC continued to process C & D Management’s application over the next year, the County moved towards adopting a new solid waste management plan. On January 9, 2007, York County Council passed what it called an “emergency ordinance,” which stated “all proposed landfills and landfill expansions not yet permitted by DHEC are declared inconsistent with the 1994 Plan.” The emergency ordinance described the declaration as a “moratorium” that would give the County more time to complete and adopt a new plan.
Initially, DHEC believed the emergency ordinance prevented it from issuing C & D Management a permit for the landfill. However, DHEC ultimately determined the emergency ordinance did not affect its determination that the proposed landfill was consistent with the 1994 Plan. On February 22, 2007, it issued C & D Management a permit.
The County asked the South Carolina Board of Health and Environmental Control to review DHEC’s decision to issue the permit. The Board declined, and the County requested a contested case hearing before the ALC.
The ALC affirmed DHEC’s decision to issue the permit. With regard to the emergency ordinance, the ALC determined that under Southeast Resource Recovery, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control, 358 S.C. 402, 595 S.E.2d 468 (2004) (per curiam), DHEC could not defer to the County’s declaration of inconsistency, as doing so would amount to an improper delegation of DHEC’s exclusive authority over permitting decisions for solid waste management facilities. The ALC therefore concluded DHEC properly disregarded the emergency ordinance in making its permitting decision.
*220II. Effect of the Emergency Ordinance
We agree DHEC properly disregarded the emergency ordinance. Our supreme court has made clear that DHEC alone has the authority to make consistency determinations. In Southeast Resource Recovery, the court held DHEC may not delegate that authority to counties. 358 S.C. at 408, 595 S.E.2d at 471. Prior to the court’s decision in that case, DHEC’s practice was to leave consistency determinations to county governments, which issued their determinations in the form of letters of consistency. Id. The court held the practice was impermissible, stating:
There is no statutory authority providing a county’s consistency determination is determinative of the ultimate permitting decision. Although Section 44-96-290(F) requires a proposed facility comply with local standards, it does not designate the county as the final arbiter on whether the proposed facility complies with its local zoning, land use, and other ordinances.
... DHEC, not the county, is charged with ensuring [solid waste management] facilities meet the requirements for permitting.
Id.; see also Sandlands C & D, LLC v. Cnty. of Horry, 394 S.C. 451, 463, 716 S.E.2d 280, 286 (2011) (stating “there is no doubt the express language of the [Solid Waste Policy and Management Act] provides for DHEC’s exclusive authority in the area of permitting” (emphasis in original omitted)).
We view the emergency ordinance as an effort by the County to control DHEC’s permitting decision. The only effect the emergency ordinance purports to have is to impose a “moratorium” on new and expanded landfills in York County. The section entitled “Scope of Moratorium” states in its entirety: “During the time that the emergency moratorium is in effect, all proposed landfills and landfill expansions not yet permitted by DHEC are declared inconsistent with the 1994 Plan.” No other language in the emergency ordinance explains the scope or the effect of the moratorium. Therefore, by its own terms, the emergency ordinance merely makes a blanket determination that all new landfills are inconsistent with the 1994 Plan.
*221Looking past the emergency ordinance’s “moratorium” label and focusing instead on its content and actual effect, we find no meaningful distinction between the emergency ordinance and the letters of consistency that Southeast Resource Recovery prohibits DHEC from following. In both situations, a county makes a consistency determination regarding a proposed landfill — a power only DHEC may exercise. The only difference here is that instead of DHEC willingly delegating its authority to local government, as it did in Southeast Resource Recovery, local government has attempted to usurp that authority. Because DHEC could not follow the emergency ordinance without delegating its authority in violation of Southeast Resource Recovery, DHEC was required to disregard it.
The County argues it had the authority to enact the emergency ordinance, and because subsection 44-96-290(F) requires DHEC to consider “applicable local ordinances” when it makes a consistency determination, DHEC was required to consider whether the proposed landfill was consistent with the emergency ordinance. We disagree. Subsection 44-96-80(K), on which the County relies for its authority, prohibits a county from enacting an ordinance that is inconsistent with state law. As Southeast Resource Recovery explains, it is inconsistent with state law for DHEC to follow a county’s consistency determination. See 358 S.C. at 408, 595 S.E.2d at 471. In this respect, the emergency ordinance is not consistent with state law, and is therefore not “applicable” under subsection 44-96-290(F). DHEC properly disregarded the emergency ordinance.
III. Other Issues
The remaining issues the County raises relate to factual determinations. As to those issues, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C.Code Ann. § l-23-610(B) (Supp.2010) (providing this court may reverse a decision of the ALC that is “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record”); Risher v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 393 S.C. 198, 204, 712 S.E.2d 428, 431 (2011) (stating a factual decision of the ALC should be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record).
*222The judgment of the Administrative Law Court is
AFFIRMED.
PIEPER, J., concurs. LOCKEMY, J., dissents in a separate opinion.